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Preface 
 
The School of Social Sciences and the School of Cultural and Innovation Studies of the 
University of East London merged in the autumn of 2004 to constitute the School of Social 
Sciences, Media and Cultural Studies.  The merger brought together almost 50 registered 
PhD students in each School.  This seemed an ideal opportunity to organise PhD student 
seminars which would explore the boundaries between the disciplines which had 
traditionally been represented in the two different Schools of the university. 
 
Since October, 2004, therefore,  there have been five discrete series of seminars which have 
attempted to provide a framework within which PhD students can situate their personal 
research in relation to the research of others and in relation to different intellectual 
perspectives within the broad field of the Humanities and Social Sciences.  These seminars 
have been framed in slightly different conceptual ways in part to meet the needs of students 
at different stages in their research, differentiating mainly, for instance, between the initial 
stage in which a research project is proposed for registration and the subsequent stages in 
which research is undertaken and findings are prepared for submission.  The five series 
were: 
 
1. Semester A, 2004/5.  This was designed for the 2003/4 student cohort in their 
second year.  Student presentations were framed by an introduction to the 
reflexive sociology of research proposed by Bourdieu et al in The Craft of 
Sociology (1991, 1968). 
2. Semester B, 2004/5.  The 2003/4 cohort in their second year were joined by the 
2004/5 cohort, post registration.  Student presentations in every session were 
matched with presentations given by active staff researchers in the School. 
3. Semester A, 2005/6.  Student presentations for the 2003/4 and 2004/5 cohorts, 
culminating in the student-led organisation of a national conference on Inter-
diosciplinarity in the Humanities and Social Sciences funded by the AHRC, with 
guest speakers, including representatives of the relevant AHRC and ESRC inter-
disciplinary committees. 
4. Semester A, 2005/6. This was distinct from 3 above and was designed for the 
2005/6 cohort in their first year as part of their preparation for submitting 
registration documentation.  Student presentations were framed by introductory 
sessions on the state of German social theory in the 1960s; the state of French 
social theory in the 1960s; the Franco-German social theory debate of the 1980s; 
concluding with a session on the state of contemporary social theory in Britain 
with a view to enabling students to contextualise their own work. 
5. Semester A, 2006/7.  Student presentations framed by introductory sessions 
which presented the changing social conditions in the UK for the production of 
Humanities and Social Science Research from 1945 to the present, focusing on 
the post-war work of Karl Mannheim; the emergence of New Left cultural analysis 
in the 1960s; and the post-1980s implications of the work of journals and 
publishing houses founded at that time such as Theory, Culture and Society, and 
Polity Press. 
 
The organisation of these seminars has been based on two related principles, both of which 
are themselves scrutinised during all the series: 
 
a. that the relationship between disciplines is not to be understood abstractly or a-
historically by reference to an idealist philosophy of knowledge but, rather, to be 
understood in terms of the changing social conditions of production of 
knowledge. 
b. that an intrinsic part of the process of undertaking research is that researchers, 
including PhD students are agents who modify in their practice the conceptual 
structures within which they operate – that there is a constant tension whereby 
the  logics of discovery which may be non-disciplinary often have to be expressed 
in disciplinary discourses. 
 
In March, 2007, the university’s Graduate School invited Schools to apply for funding to 
encourage Interdisciplinary Research Seminars.  The successful bid from the School of Social 
Sciences, Media and Cultural Studies sought funding which would, in part, enable the limited 
publication of Yearbooks of PhD research in the School which would reflect the ethos and the 
intellectual character of the sessions of the seminar series. 
 
Yearbooks I and II are the outcomes from this internal funding from the Graduate School and 
are the results of collaboration and discussion between myself, contributing students and 
other PhD students during the period of this funding from April to July, 2007. Yearbook I 
represents the character of the first three of the series described above, whilst Yearbook II is 
based on the last two. 
 
The form and purpose of the seminars and of these associated publications relate 
substantially to my engagement with the thought and practice of Pierre Bourdieu.  Put 
boldly, the form and purpose have been designed to encourage a reflexive sociology of 
social and cultural research.  It is completely appropriate that these Yearbooks should 
reflect my involvement in the processes of discussion  – pursuing my own intellectual project 
through participation in the projects of PhD students, not as a lector transmitting pre-
established knowledge and information but as an auctor seeking to foster new insights and 
approaches.  In this respect, it is important to emphasize that the contributions are 
examples of ‘work in progress’ and are assembled in the same spirit as encouraged 
Bourdieu to establish his own journal in 1975 to publish research activity rather than 
findings, which, accordingly, he named the Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales.  The 
student papers have their origins in work leading towards the completion of their PhD 
theses.  In some cases they have been presented only internally whilst in other cases they 
have been presented at conferences and are being prepared for publication elsewhere.  It is 
important to stress that these are not finished pieces of work and are published here without 
prejudicing either the possibility of other, modified publication or the views of examiners of 
final theses. 
 
The intention of each Yearbook is to represent the ethos of the seminars but, again, it is 
important to emphasize that in no sense are the contributions properly ‘representative’.  In 
each case, an appendix gives information about the research activity of registered PhD 
students in the School.  Of these, only a proportion has found it possible to attend regularly 
the fortnightly seminar series.  Of those who have attended regularly, only a proportion have 
been able to spare precious time to become involved in this publication project.  The 
contributions are, therefore, unashamedly random indications of the totality.  There has 
been no selection of contributions, either in terms of the supposed quality of the work or in 
terms of relevance to any thematic principle guiding the collection.  Each Yearbook includes 
a discussion of the contents, as a virtual Table ronde of contributors, and this chapter does 
enounce some ex post facto consensus about each collection, but it remains the case that 
the ‘organizing’ principle of the texts is based on a commitment to articulated ‘difference’ or 
dissensus. 
 
There is a progression from Yearbook I to Yearbook II.  My Introduction to Yearbook I 
explores the analogy between the construction of a research culture for PhD students within 
a multi-disciplinary School and the historical construction in Paris in the 1960s of the Centre 
de Sociologie Européenne, reinforced ideologically by the publication, in 1968, of Le métier 
de sociologue.  (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, & Passeron, 1968, 1991).  The emphasis of this 
collection is on the social encounter of persons from different cultural backgrounds, coming 
together almost arbitrarily at UEL from 2004 to 2007.  The emphasis of Yearbook I is on the 
way in which inter-disciplinary work is perhaps based on this social encounter within an 
institutional setting as much as on the abstract relations between instituted disciplines.  The 
second appendix to Yearbook I reproduces the paper which I gave at the student conference 
which was the climax to 2005/6 in which I tried to set the work which we had undertaken in 
the seminars in the context of discussion of the way in which Bourdieu had made use, in 
Homo Academicus (Bourdieu, 1984, 1988), of Kant’s text on the ‘Conflict of the Faculties’.  
The point of Yearbook II is to move on from the symbolic interactionist emphasis of 
Yearbook I to explore what might be the implications for the production of research of the 
ways in which historically the boundaries between disciplines have been constructed.  My 
Introduction to Yearbook II represents the case-studies examined in the seminars – 
especially the historical production of social research by Mannheim in the immediate post-
World War II period in the UK, and then the development of Cultural Studies by the New Left 
in the 1960s as a form of socio-political critique. The intention is that these two publications 
will stimulate the production of annual Yearbooks which will represent ongoing dialogue 
between research students and, through them, between academic discourses. 
 
References 
Bourdieu, P.  1984 Homo Academicus, Paris, Ed de Minuit. - translated as Bourdieu, 1988. 
Bourdieu, P.  1988  Homo Academicus, Oxford, Polity Press. 
Bourdieu, P., with Chamboredon, J.-C. and Passeron, J.-C., 1968  Le métier de sociologue, 
Paris, Mouton-Bordas. – translated as Bourdieu, Chamboredon, & Passeron, 1991. 
Bourdieu, P., with Chamboredon, J.-C. and Passeron, J.-C., 1991 The Craft of Sociology, New 
York, Walter de Gruyter. 
 
Derek Robbins, July 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction:  
For a socio-genetic understanding of trans-disciplinary 
research 
Derek Robbins 
 
A Social Theory group was formed in 1983 at the Center for Psychosocial Studies in Chicago.  
During the 1980s Moishe Postone, Edward LiPuma, and Craig Calhoun were involved in a 
series of readings and discussions of Bourdieu’s work.  These culminated in a conference in 
March-April, 1989, which Bourdieu attended.  The outcome was Bourdieu:  Critical 
Perspectives (Calhoun, LiPuma, & Postone, 1993), which ended with Bourdieu’s reflections on 
the comments of his critics, entitled “Concluding Remarks:  for a Sociogenetic Understanding 
of Intellectual Works”.  In this article, Bourdieu makes two typical points.  The first is to insist 
that his work should not be appropriated by what one might call ‘theoreticism’.  He wrote: 
 
“If you will allow me an image true to the spirit of my theory of practice (and thus 
of scientific practice), I blame most of my readers for having considered as 
theoretical treatises, meant solely to be read or commented upon, works that, 
like gymnastics handbooks, were intended for exercise, or even better, for being 
put into practice; that is, as books that put forth so many programs for work, 
observation, and experimentation.  This way of conceiving scientific work 
(absolutely irreducible to the kind of pure ‘theoretical work’ that has come back 
into fashion this past decade in American social science and in all the countries 
still strongly dominated by it) was in perfect agreement with the conviction – 
which, from the very beginning, inspired my research strategies – that one 
cannot grasp the most profound logic of the social world unless one becomes 
immersed in the specificity of an empirical reality, historically situated and dated, 
but only in order to construct it as an instance (cas de figure) in a finite universe 
of possible configurations.” (Calhoun et al. 1993, 271-2) 
 
As stated here, the corrective to theoreticism is the recognition that research is essentially 
practical.  Also, however, Bourdieu argued that his practical work derived from his social 
dispositions – from a fundamental anti-intellectualism: 
 
“I think, without being able to prove it, that my propensity to anti-intellectualism, 
by progressively converting itself into a systematic will to bracket intellectual 
doxa – that is to say, the presuppositions that intellectuals accept as part of the 
background of their activity – was at the root of a series of more or less profound 
ruptures bound to shock, sometimes very profoundly, intellectuals.” (Calhoun et 
al., 1993, 269) 
 
This Introduction joins together three seminar sessions which were designed to generate 
consideration of what should be the nature of the involvement of individual researchers 
within the collective, institutionalised context of a multidisciplinary School of a modern 
university.  My contention is that Bourdieu first developed a notion of reflexivity as an 
extension of the sociology of knowledge.  What started, however, as epistemological 
reflexivity gradually came to be articulated anthropologically or ontologically. The essence of 
collective activity had to be immersion in research practice which was fully conscious of its 
origins in pre- (or anti-) intellectual motivations.  The first section explores this issue by 
reference to Le métier de sociologue, written in 1968 by Bourdieu, Chamboredon and 
Passeron.  The second section invites the use of Bourdieu’s sociology of students and 
student sub-culture as a possible perspective on the pre-intellectual origins of research 
problems generated by PhD students.  The third section suggests that consideration of 
Lyotard’s introduction to Phenomenology might lead to a fuller understanding of the 
ontological dimension of Bourdieu’s epistemology. 
 
1. 
Bourdieu was trained as a philosopher at the Ecole normale supérieure, Paris, from 1950-
1954.  He gained a diplôme d’études supérieures with a translation of Leibniz’s critique of 
Cartesian epistemology and a critical commentary.  This suggests not only that Bourdieu was 
trained in ‘continental’ rationalist philosophy – as opposed to training in the British 
‘empirical’ tradition – but also that, within the ‘rationalist’ tradition, he was hostile to the 
mind/body separation of Cartesian dualism and, instead, sympathetic to the emphasis of 
engagement in Leibniz’s thinking  Bourdieu began to plan research for a doctorate which 
would have been a philosophical study, from a phenomenological perspective, of the 
temporal dimensions of affective relations.  It was to have been supervised by Georges 
Canguilhem, who was both a philosopher and a qualified medical doctor, but, instead, 
Bourdieu was conscripted to serve in the French army in Algeria in 1956 at the beginning of 
the Algerian War of Independence.  I think Bourdieu managed to be posted with an 
intelligence division and, certainly, by 1958, he was already working as an assistant at the 
University of Algiers – teaching Kant and Saussure.  Whilst in Algeria, he began to explore 
empirically the issues which he was originally to have considered in the framework of 
speculative philosophy.  He called his work:  “Fieldwork in Philosophy”.  In Algeria, therefore, 
Bourdieu’s research problematic was an extension of his interest in the phenomenology of 
affective relations – modifying American acculturation studies to seek to generate a 
phenomenology of cultural adaptation from ‘traditional’ to ‘modern’ values, related to the 
enforced migration from rural to urban areas. 
 
Trained as a philosopher and with a philosophical problematic, Bourdieu’s attempt to carry 
out empirical enquiry was largely self-taught.  He learned research methods and statistical 
analysis as he carried out his research.  Both in practice and philosophically, Bourdieu was 
disposed to think that social research should not operate with predefined ‘methodologies’ 
but should develop appropriate research methods in practice.  Having undertaken research 
in Algeria in 1958-1961, Bourdieu published three books – Sociologie de l’Algérie, (Bourdieu, 
1958);  Travail et travailleurs en Algérie, (Bourdieu, 1963); and Le déracinement, (Bourdieu, 
1964).  These were the products of different stages of the same research project.  Sociologie 
de l’Algérie attempted to offer ethnographic case-studies of the status quo ante of modern 
Algerian society – analysing the social organisation of four tribes.  Travail et travailleurs 
attempted to measure cultural adaptation – providing one part of statistical information and 
a second part containing interpretative analysis, whilst there were also numerous appendices 
containing transcripts of interviews.  Bourdieu wrote an introduction to the second part in 
which he discussed the relationship between statistical and ethnographic analysis – between 
quantitative and qualitative procedures. 
 
On returning to mainland France, Bourdieu attended the research seminars of Lévi-Strauss 
and this is reflected in the second edition of Sociologie de l’Algérie, published in 1961, in 
which Bourdieu presented his accounts of tribal social organisation in terms of binary 
oppositions, often expressed diagrammatically.  He taught Philosophy at the University of 
Lille and, at the same time (in about 1962) became secretary to a research group established 
by Raymond Aron in the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales – the Centre de 
sociologie européenne.  Working in a team of young researchers, and mainly in collaboration 
with Jean-Claude Passeron, Bourdieu initiated a series of sociological research projects – on 
students, on museums/art galleries, and on photography.  The books which were the 
outcomes of these projects used sophisticated techniques of quantitative analysis.  Bourdieu 
was trying to establish a sociological research centre whilst remaining aware of the fact that 
the discourse of sociological explanation is only one culturally and historically contingent 
framework to deploy in understanding social reality. 
 
The publication of Les héritiers (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1964) contributed to the disquiet 
about French universities which reached a climax in the ‘May events’ of 1968.  As a response 
to the student unrest, the French government introduced higher education reform which 
included the establishment of an ‘experimental’ university – Paris VIII at Vincennes.  Several 
significant contemporaries – Foucault, Lyotard, Deleuze – joined the new institution but, 
instead, Bourdieu chose to try to institutionalise the practice of research rather than become 
involved in attempts to modify the curriculum which would be taught in the new university. 
 
The attempt to institutionalise sociological research practice rather than canonise 
sociological knowledge led Bourdieu to organise the production of handbooks for research 
students.  Several handbooks were projected, but only the first – Le métier de sociologue, 
1968, - with J.-C. Chamboredon and J.-C. Passeron – was actually published.  It outlined the 
‘epistemological preliminaries’ of sociological research.  The text has a long introduction to 
a collection of passages extracted from the work of sociologists working within different 
ideological traditions.  It attempted to demonstrate that the work of Durkheim, Weber, Marx 
and others was undertaken with a common methodological impulse – to understand social 
relations in terms of a discourse peculiarly appropriate to those relations – even though each 
had attempted to deduce different social theories from their findings. 
 
The conclusion to the long introduction to Le métier de sociologue is sub-titled “Sociology of 
knowledge and epistemology”.  Bourdieu et al. were anxious to emphasize that the 
‘sociology of knowledge’ should remain instrumental and should not become a body of 
knowledge in itself.  They were equally anxious to argue that although they were 
recommending the instrumentality of applying the sociology of knowledge to sociological 
production  (what Bourdieu was later to call ‘reflexivity’), they were not advocating this 
procedure simply to strengthen the status of Sociology.  They wrote: 
 
“The sociology of sociological knowledge can provide the sociologist with the 
means of giving epistemological critique its full force and its specific form, when 
it is a matter of bringing to light the unconscious presuppositions and begged 
questions of a theoretical tradition, rather than of calling into question the 
principles of a constituted theory.”  (Bourdieu et al., 1991, 69) 
 
Bourdieu et al. adhered to the ‘historical epistemology’ of Gaston Bachelard which required 
that social historical research should analyse the social conditions of emergence of 
intellectual disciplines and of explanatory competition between them, such as, for instance, 
physics and biology or sociology and psychology.  Reflexivity should question the grounds 
of existence of discipline discourses and should not be reduced to a methodological 
technique within discourses, designed to consolidate and legitimate them.  Le métier de 
sociologue should be read alongside an article which Bourdieu and Passeron had published 
together a year before -  “Sociology and Philosophy in France since 1945:  Death and 
Resurrection of a Philosophy without Subject” (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1967) – where they had 
tried to produce a social history of the French post-war period which would explain 
sociologically the competing movements in Philosophy and Sociology and simultaneously 
enable them to articulate the position which they were attempting strategically to establish.  
Le métier de sociologue was a manifesto which clarified their own position-taking.  
 
The position which Bourdieu and Passeron tried to adopt was, therefore, unashamedly 
particular to the circumstances of France in the late 1960s.  They argued against the ‘neo-
positivism’ of American sociological research on the grounds that it was philosophically 
flawed but also on the grounds that it had become excessively professionalised.  They 
regarded their philosophical and social objections as inseparable: 
 
“In contemporary French sociology, the attraction exerted by positivism is perhaps 
due not so much to the intrinsic seductions of this brief philosophy of scientific 
practice, or to the place occupied by sociology in a hypothetical evolutionary pattern 
valid for all sciences, but rather to a set of social and intellectual conditions.” 
(Bourdieu et al., 1991, 69-70). 
 
Or, again: 
 
“The professionalization of research, linked to the use of substantial grants, the 
growing number of research staff, and therefore the appearance of large research 
units, has led to a technical division of labour that owes its specificity to the ideology 
of the autonomy of operations which it has engendered.” (Bourdieu et al., 1991, 71). 
 
In opposition, Bourdieu et al. tried to establish an anti-positivist philosophy of social science 
and to establish a social space within which this social science could be practised in such a 
way that it did not endorse the presuppositions of system-world sponsors or funding 
agencies.  For them, it was necessary to construct an autonomous social space within which 
to practise reflexive research.  Against positivism, they insisted that no research or social 
analysis can be presuppositionless: 
 
“The code that the sociologist uses to decipher the behaviour of social subjects has 
been constituted through socially qualified learning-processes and always partakes of 
the cultural codes of the different groups to which he belongs.  Of all the cultural 
presuppositions that the researcher is liable to involve in his interpretations, the one 
which operates most insidiously and most systematically is his class ethos, the 
principle which in turn organizes the acquisition of his other unconscious models.  
Because each social class derives the fundamental principles of its ideology of the 
functioning and evolution of society from a primary experience of social reality in 
which, among other things, determinisms are felt more or less directly, a sociologist 
who fails to perform the sociology of the relation to society that is characteristic of 
his own social class is likely to reintroduce into his scientific relation to the object the 
unconscious presuppositions of his own primary experience of the social, or, more 
subtly, the rationalizations that enable an intellectual to reinterpret his experience in 
accordance with a logic which always owes something to the position which he 
occupies within the intellectual field.” (Bourdieu et al., 1991, 72-3). 
 
The necessary reflection on the presuppositions which condition the selection of research 
problems and research findings was not, for Bourdieu et al., the prelude to the isolation of 
epistemological purity: 
 
“If, in order to reflect on himself reflecting, each sociologist has to resort to the 
sociology of sociological knowledge, he cannot hope to escape from relativizion by a 
necessarily fictitious effort to tear himself completely away from all the 
determinations that define his social situation and to attain the ethereal standpoint 
of true knowledge where Mannheim situated his ‘free-floating intellectuals’.” 
(Bourdieu et al., 1991, 74) 
 
On the contrary, the necessary reflection could only be achieved by immersion in the social 
processes which impinge on research practice: 
 
“Every scientific community is a social microcosm, furnished with institutions for 
control, constraint, and training – academic authorities, juries, critical forums, 
research councils, co-option panels, etc. – which define the norms of professional 
competence and tend to inculcate the values that they express.” (Bourdieu et al., 
1991, 74) 
 
It is only by participating in such a community and by contributing to the communal self-
definition of scientific values that academic researchers can resist the influence of the 
system world on scientific enquiry.  In spite of their philsophical opposition to Durkheim’s 
positivism, it is significant that Bourdieu et al. end their conclusion with a quote from 
Durkheim which indicates that they acknowledged that they shared Durkheim’s commitment 
to the institutionalisation of social scientific practise precisely so as to make social research 
socially functional in securing social democratic participation against the intrusions of state 
intervention: 
 
“In short, the scientific community has to provide itself with specific forms of social 
interchange, and, like Durkheim, one is entitled to see a symptom of its heteronomy 
in the fact that, in France at least, and even today, it is too often responsive to the 
non-scientific enticements of intellectual ‘wordliness’:  ‘We believe,’ wrote Durkheim 
at the end of The Rules of Sociological Method, ‘that the time has come for sociology 
to renounce worldly successes, so to speak, and to take on the character which befits 
all science.  Thus it will gain in dignity and authority what it will perhaps lose in 
popularity.’” (Bourdieu et al., 1991, 77) 
 
Bourdieu et al. attempt to argue that the institutionalisation of a discourse of sociological 
research practice is not just a matter of consolidating a discourse and a particular scientific 
terminology but also of establishing a community of researchers committed to the same 
goals.  The habitation of autonomous social space and the construction of a scientific 
discourse were necessary concomitant actions to counteract the intrusion of state control in 
determining social self-understanding.  Although Bourdieu still at this stage recommended 
the use of the sociology of knowledge to strengthen the practice of sociological research, in 
the 1970s he was to develop a personal approach – which could be called ‘post-structuralist’ 
– by which he sought to reintroduce his earlier phenomenological thinking so as to generate 
a phenomenological critique of scientific discourses. 
 
2. 
Although Bourdieu was quickly thought to be a ‘sociologist of education’ as a result of his 
work on students and their studies in the early 1960s – particularly in anglo-saxon countries 
after the publications of the translations of Les héritiers (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1964) and La 
Reproduction (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1970) into English in 1979 and 1977 respectively – in 
important respects the research which led to these publications pursued further the 
problems investigated in Algeria at the end of the 1950s.  Firstly, Bourdieu had attempted to 
analyse the process of cultural adaptation of Algerian tribespeople as they settled in Algiers, 
modifying ‘traditional’ attitudes towards, for instance, time and work in an urban, ‘modern’ 
environment.  Secondly, Bourdieu had analysed the condition of the Algerian ‘sub-
proletariat’ and had contended that, in the colonial North African situation, Marxist analysis 
was only useful deployed relatively rather than absolutely.  In other words, Bourdieu argued 
that social thought and behaviour are not socio-economically determined in an identically 
universal manner.  Rather, the extent to which they are ‘conditioned’ is a function of the 
nature of the social condition. The life chances of socio-economically disadvantaged people 
are more conditioned by their socio-economic condition than are the life chances of those 
people who possess the capital which enables them to transcend their situations.  There is a 
spectrum of socio-economic determinism rather than an absolute formula. 
 
Bourdieu chose to analyse the situation of students precisely because he thought that they 
constituted a social sub-group which, as a result of the process of educational instruction, 
was likely to be less ‘conditioned’ by class difference than most of the population.  The 
purpose of the investigation was to go beyond Marxist analysis to argue that ‘class’ 
differentiation occurs even in a sub-group of the population where it might be thought to be 
most explicitly eliminated.  Bourdieu took the statistics of class and regional factors in 
admission to French higher education at the time as a given – acknowledging that there were  
obvious class discriminations, but he wanted to demonstrate that, additionally, 
differentiations and distinctions are socially constructed after admission within a context 
which might be thought to be relatively independent of class determination.  Les héritiers 
explores the mechanisms of cultural differentiation within higher education institutions – 
analysing the effects of a range of factors such as domestic working conditions, part-time 
working, and residential situation.  He showed that universities are not the guardians of 
autonomous knowledge content but that, for instance, the choices made by students – 
whether, in the case of his sample, to study Sociology or Philosophy – are choices which 
relate to their social trajectories generally.  He also began to suggest what he developed 
more strongly in La Reproduction and then, later, in La Noblesse d’état (Bourdieu, 1989) that 
choices of institutions are self-fulfilling – that, in other words, there is a reciprocal 
relationship between the status of universities in the hierarchical structure of universities 
and the social trajectories of staff and students in those universities. 
 
The contemporary relevance of Bourdieu’s research of the early 1960s needs close 
consideration, particularly in relation to the post-1992 marketisation of higher education 
institutions in the UK and to the effects of post-1997 government policies.  Are we seeing 
written large the phenomenon which Bourdieu identified within existing French universities?.  
Is the attempt to remove class discrimination and to widen access to higher education to 
accommodate 50% participation occurring alongside a masking of continuing forms of 
cultural discrimination within institutions and between institutions within the Higher 
Education system?  How do these issues relate to our perceptions, as staff and students, of 
our situations and to our definitions of the kinds of research which we try to undertake? 
 
3. 
Bourdieu initiated a research seminar at the Ecole Normale Supérieure in 1969 at which he 
inaugurated a series of research projects which aimed to produce a sociological analysis of 
artistic and intellectual production during the French 3rd Republic (1871-1940).  It was here 
that he undertook the research on Flaubert and Manet which generated articles on both and, 
finally, Les Règles de l’art (Bourdieu, 1992) – translated as The Rules of Art (Bourdieu, 1996).  
Equally, this research seminar generated the body of research on the intellectuals of the 3rd 
Republic published by Christophe Charle.  Bourdieu subjected artistic and intellectual 
production to sociological analysis, using his concept of ‘field’ to mitigate crude Marxist 
analysis and to argue that ‘fields’ of production generate their own autonomous rules whilst 
the ‘fields’ themselves can be understood as the contingent products of historical, socio-
economic changes.  Bourdieu’s changing attitude towards Flaubert’s work is indicative of his 
own changing position in relation to sociology and art between 1969 and 1992.  Initially, 
Bourdieu argued that Flaubert’s social observation – his proto-sociology – was diminished by 
his accession to the rules of literary production in transmitting his insights, whereas, 
by1992, Bourdieu was celebrating the capacity of art to be socially critical – in contrast to 
the discourse of sociology which had become acquiescent in an unacceptable social system. 
 
There were similar factors in the intellectual trajectories of Lyotard and Bourdieu.  Both were 
influenced by Phenomenology and both were affected intellectually by their experiences in 
Algeria in the 1950s.  Lyotard’s early introduction to Phenomenology (Lyotard, 1991, first 
published 1954)) was a brilliant short account of the key ideas of Phenomenology and of the 
influence of Husserl and of Merleau-Ponty on post-war French thought.  On returning to 
mainland France, Lyotard wrote several books in which he developed his critique of Marx 
and Freud and moved towards a position which had affinities with the Nietzschean 
influences on Foucault and Deleuze.  He carried out research in Paris which led to the 
production of a thesis on Discours, Figure (published in 1971) in which he argued that the 
power of artistic expression had been neutralised by attempts of criticism to subject art to 
rational analysis. 
 
Lyotard became disposed to identify different kinds of narrative – one generating discursive 
science and the other expressive creativity. Although Bourdieu was prepared to acknowledge 
that scientific discourses are socially constructed, he also believed that this was true of 
literary or artistic forms of expression.  Bourdieu’s solution, therefore, was to try to allow 
sociology to operate at a meta-level so as to create social analyses both of science and of 
creative expression.  The key difference between Bourdieu and Lyotard, therefore, is that 
Lyotard’s differentiation between kinds of discursive and figurative expression tends to be 
dualistic, whereas Bourdieu tries to subject a spectrum of expressions to sociological 
analysis.  By attempting to do this, of course, Lyotard would have argued that Bourdieu was 
colluding in a neutralisation of the potential influence of art. 
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Chapter 1 
Sexuality Narratives of Two Generations of ‘Modern’ 
Women in Turkey 
Cigdem Esin 
 
It was my first encounter with discussions of the connection between “being a feminist” and 
“sexuality” in the late 1980s when I was a younger woman at high school. One of my 
classmates, who was not reluctant to voice her belief in gender equality and used to be 
called a “feminist”, brought a book to the class. It was written by one of the feminist activists 
of the newly emerging feminist movement in Turkey. The book called “Woman Has No 
Name” was about the relationships of a woman including sexual ones. It created a scandal 
when it was first published, and was categorized as ‘naughty publication’ by the high 
censorship board of the time. The publications under this category used to be sold within a 
plastic cover in order to inhibit their offensive influences against the moral values of the 
society. My friend was labelled as a “loose” girl because of the book. However, she had 
created a question mark –at least- in my mind: A question mark on the connection between 
sexuality and gender equality. Having been brought up by a mother who was one of the 
teachers of “modern” Turkey, I had strongly believed in the equality of women and men in 
public life. However, I had not even thought about sexuality as an issue that could be raised 
in the public sphere before. Thinking of how the private part of our lives was political at the 
same time was beyond my imagination then. I had not realized that I was one of the 
candidates of the ‘emancipated but unliberated’ (Kandiyoti, 1997a) women of the Turkish 
modernisation/westernisation who was at the edge of a transformation in seeking for her 
identit(ies) as ‘modern’ woman.   
 
When I started my PhD research, which aims to understand the complex and antagonistic 
discourses and practices interwoven in the domain of sexuality for well-educated young 
women in contemporary Turkey, I was aware of the necessity that my analysis should include 
the discourse of modernisation. Since our, women’s narratives of personal histories and 
identities have been relational to either dominant or counter narratives on the modernisation 
project of the Turkish Republic. However, the strong emphasis on being ‘modern’ in one of 
the respondents’, Zuhal’s interview made me think about contextualising the individual 
narratives of sexuality within Turkish modernisation.  
 
Throughout the history of the modernisation project of the Turkish Republic, the identities 
of women have been constructed and reconstructed by nationalist-modernist discourses as 
subjects (or objects) of politics. Similar to nationalist and ethnic processes in other 
geographies, the control of women and women’s sexuality has been at the centre (Yuval-
Davis and Anthias, 1989). Women’s identities were constructed as the carriers of the culture, 
symbols of the national differences, and ‘mothers’ of the nation (an ‘official’ responsibility in 
nation-building processes).  
 
Although many analyses were made, and many stories were told on the modernisation 
history of Turkey, there are still grey parts in this history for which researchers should listen 
to women’s unheard stories. These are the stories that will tell us the reconfiguration 
processes within the gender regime of modern Turkey. This paper presents my initial 
analysis in my attempt to trace these stories within the context of the Turkish 
modernisation. In the following section, I will briefly introduce some critical moments in the 
construction of the modernist discourses on gender and sexuality in modern Turkey. Shaped 
by the contemporary feminist analysis on the modernisation and gender in Turkey, this 
introduction aims to reveal the instances of discursive productions in shaping the 
regulations surrounding the sexuality of ‘modern’ women.  
 Emancipating Women: A Strategy of Modernisation Project 
  
After the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the 
modern nation state, with his fellow founders instituted a series of reforms. These reforms 
were designed so as to make huge socio-political transformations towards creating a secular 
westernised modern society.  Secularisation was put as the main principle of this 
transformative project. The notion of ‘secularism’ was crafted on the binary of ‘secularism 
versus religion’ in Kemal Ataturk’s modernisation model (Mardin, 1981). As Durakbasa 
(2000:152-3) points out, the huge socio-cultural changes in the history of modernisation in 
Turkey were an effect of its attempt of secularisation, which was crafted so as to cut off its 
bonds with Islam and wipe out the influence of religion in all civil institutions. This 
transformation process was not limited to the religious parts of the society, but also aimed 
to institute a western type of ‘culture’. 
 
Saktanber (2002) argues that in the process of building a new secular Turkish society, the 
aim was not only the establishment of a new political regime, but also the re-construction of 
a ‘subject constitution regime’ (2002:121). According to her, within the specific historical 
conditions of the process of making a Turkish nation, this regime is based in the regulation 
of the social life by secular principles. It required transformations so as to create rational, 
modern individuals.  
 
De Lauretis (1987:2) defines gender as a social relation, which is constructed and re-
constructed through the ‘technologies of gender’ as interwoven in the complex network of 
social technologies such as cinema, institutionalised discourses, power relations, and 
everyday practices. She argues that there is a gender system in each culture, which is 
constituted on the cultural conceptions of female and male genders. (1987:8) According to 
her, this gender system is a system of meanings correlating gender to its cultural contents. 
This system includes social values and hierarchies, and is always connected to political and 
economic factors in society. The modernist, secularist discourses of the 
modernisation/westernisation have created a gender regime with its unique characteristics. 
The idealisation of women’s emancipation has been the core of this transformation process. 
Therefore, understanding the construction of the gender regime within the 
modernisation/westernisation project is crucial in analysing how this gender system shape 
the stories of women in contemporary Turkey.   
 
The modernisation/ westernisation reforms of the Turkish Republic prioritised the women’s 
emancipation and construction of women as equal citizens of the nation. In its way towards 
modernisation, the early republican state under the leadership of Kemal Ataturk passed laws 
and implemented policies aimed at re-shaping women’s social and legal status as well as 
their position within the mixed gender relationships.  
 
A series of reforms were made in order to constitute women as patriotic citizens of the new 
Turkish Republic (Sirman, 1989: 9). The new patriotic citizen (albeit female) had the role of 
educating the nation as well as fulfilling their traditional roles as mothers and wives. 
Professional women, especially those with teaching careers, became an important symbol of 
the Republican regime in its attempt to distance itself from the Islamic heritage of the 
Ottoman empire and to institute a secularised lifestyle.  
 
The citizenship rights of women had a strategic importance in the modernisation process, 
which was constituted on westernisation. The legal equality of women was provided by the 
adoption of a modified version of the Swiss Civil Code in 1926, which abolished polygamy, 
marriage by proxy, and gave equal rights to women and men in divorce and child custody 
matters. The enfranchisement of women was a two-stepped process; the right to vote were 
granted in 1931 and later the right to be elected was granted in 1934 with the change of the 
Turkish Constitution.  
 
Kandiyoti (1988) argues that the women were essential part of the modernisation project as 
“actors or symbolic pawns”. As Çagatay and Nuhoglu-Soysal (1993: 329-331) state, equal 
rights would support the mobilization of women in increasing their participation in the 
public sphere, and in providing their integration into the political and economic system in 
nation-state formation. However, the conditions and limits of this public participation were 
strategically defined on the basis of the public-private dichotomy. The boundaries of this 
dichotomy were drawn by the male state elite of the modernisation. As argued by Arat 
(1997:100) it was the state elite who decided on different levels of contribution of women 
from different classes to the modernisation process. While a group of elite women were 
encouraged to involve in public life as well-educated professionals, a large number of ‘other’ 
women were channelled to perform traditional gender roles in private life as western type 
housewives by bringing ‘order’ and ‘rationality’ to homemaking through girls’ institutions.  
 
Education has been one of the sites of modernisation in the mobilization of women with 
professional identities in the public sphere. Actually, higher education of women in the first 
generation of the republican era has had long-term positive influences in the legitimisation 
of women’s presence in the public sphere. However, later work done by feminist researchers 
revealed that the modernist-nationalist discourse had one basic reason in supporting 
women’s education: educating ‘enlightened mothers’ (Tekeli, 1990).  
 
The mobilization of women as public figures (or actors of the nation-state building) meant 
neither an achievement of a full gender equality nor transformation of gender hierarchies in 
the private space of home and family. The gender regime of the modernisation project in 
Turkey did not aim to construct public identities for women who would also join the power 
mechanisms and create a possible threat to the male domination in the public sphere. In the 
private sphere, women were expected to perform their traditional domestic responsibilities 
in order to reproduce new generations of the nation and to educate the nation by western, 
rational ideals. The state elite did not only draw the boundaries of the public, but also of the 
private as Yuval-Davis (1991) argues. 
 
Durakbasa (2000:147-8) argues that the female image created by the modernist discourse is 
shaped by the contradictory discourses on women’s identities. Turkish modernisation as a 
project has aimed to create a new femininity for women in Turkey. In the process of 
creating, modern, rational and scientific women, their participation into the public life 
through education and professional careers was the main objective of organisation made by 
the state. Compared to their traditional domestic counterparts, educated, professional 
women were given a higher status. However, as Durakbasa (2000: 143-145) argues, the 
public recognition of women did not challenge the gender hierarchies within the domestic 
sphere. On the contrary, it narrowed down the space for women at home as the claim of 
westernisation/rationalisation of the domestic sphere brought extra responsibilities to 
women about the home-economics, hygiene, and scientific child raising.  
 
 
The reconfiguration of women’s identities did not only include positioning them as 
responsible ‘actors’ in modernizing the nation, but also as ‘symbols’ of the 
modernized/westernized Turkey. The new public image of Turkish women was the flag of 
nationalist-modernist ideology of modern Turkey (Kandiyoti, 2003: 276). 
 
Kandiyoti (1997a: 71-72) argues that Turkish reforms, which had been planned and imposed 
from the top in the absence of a women’s movement, have been blind to the inequalities in 
sexuality or the definition of women’s roles in gender relations. This blindness has created a 
generation of “emancipated but unliberated” women in Turkey. There was a consensus in 
society that the modernisation reforms emancipated women. Not only professional elite 
women who were educated in westernised secular institutions of the modern state, but also 
housewives who knew their daughters would benefit from these reforms, accepted this 
notion of ‘emancipation.’ They were ‘emancipated’ daughters of the Republic with full faith 
in the reforms of the project of modernity, which upgraded their status to ‘modern’ women 
and ‘equal citizens’. However, they were still ‘unliberated’ women being lack of their own 
political voice. For a long time, the ‘emancipated but unliberated’ women in Turkey would 
not necessitate to question gender hierarchies, which were not transformed by the legal 
equalities they were ascribed.  
 
Towards the Analysis of New Forms of Subjectivity in Modernisation  
 
In her argument on the ‘missing dimensions in the study of Turkish modernity’ (1997b), 
Kandiyoti reminds us of the necessity of analysing the modernisation beyond two opposed 
narratives, which frame the studies of experience of modernisation in Turkey (p.113). On the 
one hand, the narrative of ‘modern’,  which is originated from official Kemalist discourse 
equating modernisation with progress. On the other hand, the narrative of ‘tradition’, which 
presents the modernisation project as a “totalising and authoritarian project that marginalizes 
and even destroys the life-worlds of those purported to represent the traditional” (p.114). She 
continues to suggest that it is time to analyse complex social and cultural transformations 
created by the modernisation project which constructed new identities and new forms of 
subjectivities.  
 
While aiming to create a homogenised union in society through eliminating the traditional 
characteristics of it by a series of socio-political reforms, the Turkish modernisation created 
a gender regime within its specific version of patriarchy. This regime based on the sexual 
modesty of women doubled the moral responsibilities of ‘modern’ women (Durakbasa, 
2000: 148). In addition to the traditional notion of female modesty ‘that is, the traditional 
values of virginity before marriage, fidelity of the wife, and a particular public comportment 
and dress’ (ibid.), women became the respectable representatives of the nation state, which 
made them avoid their individuality and sexuality. 
 
Similarly, Arat (1997:105) points out to the construction of a specific space for women within 
the Turkish modernisation, which would legitimise their presence in society as citizens. The 
boundaries of this space were constituted on the control of sexuality, faith in education and 
professionalism, and respect for the community over the individual. On a similar line, 
Kandiyoti (1998:278-284) argues that the modernisation process in Turkey included a 
refashioning of gender, which created a regulatory discourse on sexuality that attempts to 
institutionalise monogamous heterosexuality as the normative ideal. 
 
Kandiyoti (1998) traces the concern with marital sexuality back to Ottoman society when new 
governmental technologies that redefined subjects as a ‘population’ had emerged (1998: 
281). These redefinitions mandated new orientations and disciplines for both women and men 
resulted in the refashioning of gender, which created new images of femininity and 
masculinity. Although these new images symbolized the break from the tradition, they carried 
their own ambiguities and tensions. The break from the Ottoman tradition was expressed in 
relation to paternal roles of men.  The new image of masculinity presents ‘modern man’ of the 
republican period as an ‘attentive spouse and engaged parent’ in contrast to the Ottoman 
figure of ‘remote, authoritarian, and foreboding’ father (1998: 281). On the other hand, the 
image of femininity based on a discourse of sexual purity that involved ‘a persistent anxiety 
over sexual morality’ (1998: 282) of women in relation to the discourse of family honour.  
 
Modern women of the Turkish Republic had to have an “asexual” identity, which would 
enable them to go out and work in the public world of men in which social interaction used 
to be constituted over the absence of women. In a society, where femininity was unsuited 
with the public presence, veils were replaced by symbolic armours, of which significant 
components were discipline of femininity and sexual modesty. This symbolic armour 
involved the construction of a set of codes and practices by women in order to give the 
message of sexual unavailability by de-highlighting femininity.  
 
Emergence of a Feminist Discourse: A Response to the Modernisation 
 
The women whose identities have been under construction since the beginning of the 
modernisation project have responded to these processes by developing social and political 
strategies within and beyond the existing gender regime. Kandiyoti (1997b) argues that 
there have been differences in the experiences and responses of the modern women in 
Turkey that were created by the class differences between them (Kandiyoti, 1997b:127). The 
urban upper class women were able to manage the identity transformation and tensions they 
experienced in mixed-gender groups at education institutions and at the workplaces. 
However, they protected themselves from direct contact with the other public spaces such as 
streets, buses of which main inhabitant were still men. In doing so, they used the means that 
their class positions made available to them, such as private cars. On the other hand, urban 
lower middle class women, who had to share all public spaces with men while working out 
for income generation, managed their new identities through formulations that would 
protect them. The male and female workers’ keeping different timetables for tea breaks at 
the mixed-gender factory canteens was an example of these formulations.  
 
Political resistance by the women came later by the emergence of the feminist movement in 
the second half of the 1980s. The women in Turkey had not had a significant political 
activism to question or transform their lives particularly in connection with the 
modernisation project in terms of “woman question” before the second wave feminist 
activism. First of all, because, ‘the productive role of power relations’ (Foucault, 1998:94) 
worked and created a ‘state feminism’, the discourse of which have had identified itself with 
the official discourse of the Turkish Republic. The well-educated, professional modern 
women have been the main actors of state feminism to publicize their faith in the 
transformative reforms of the modernisation which upgrated their status to ‘modern’ women 
and ‘equal citizens’.  
 
Major criticisms of the feminist movement have articulated the deconstruction of the gender 
system of the modernisation. This process has been constituted around the positions 
inhabited by  
the ‘state feminists’  or ‘daughters of the Republic’, who internalised the gender discourses 
of the modernisation. This deconstruction included both the questioning of female identities 
constructed by the modernisation project, and the position of the earlier ‘emancipated’ 
generation who voiced the dominant discourse of the modernisation project on women’s 
responsibilities and progress.  
 
Feminist women distanced their political position from the one of the earlier generation of 
Republican women. Based on their analysis of the ‘educating the nation’ responsibility given 
to women in modernisation of the country, they have claimed that this process had created a 
notion of ‘saving the ‘other’ women of the country’ who could not benefited the 
opportunities of the republican era, therefore, could not be emancipated. It was this notion, 
which constituted a hierarchy between ‘emancipated’ and ‘un-emancipated’ women. The 
political position of the feminists based on the denial of being the ‘emancipated’ women 
who aimed to save ‘other’ women. In the construction of a new discourse, feminist activists 
would define themselves ‘we women’ instead of speaking for ‘other’ women (Altinay, 2002).  
 
As Arat (1997:104) argues, this position indicates a very significant shift both in politics and 
the individual lives of women in Turkey since the late 1980s. This was a shift in the positions 
of women from being objects or pawns of modernisation towards being the subjects of 
feminist politics, who claimed subjecthood in their own lives.  
 
The second wave feminist politics have led to to the emergence of new version of gender 
regime in modern Turkey. Having redeployed the ‘emancipation’ discourse of 
modernisation, this new gender regime is shaped around the possibility of ‘sexual’ identities 
for women. Politicising the private so as to deconstruct the power relations and gender 
hierarchies has been a core element within this version of the gender regime.   
 
I do not have enough space within the scope of this paper for another section discussing the 
continuities and discontinuities between these two versions within the Turkish 
modernisation. However, it will not be too wrong to say that the feminist critique of the 
modernisation project, and subsequently the feminist activism developed over the universal 
categories was the product of modernisation/westernisation in the Republican Turkey. 
 
I would like to continue with the individual stories of Zuhal and Asli, a mother and a 
daughter whom I interviewed for my research. These two women represent two generations 
of the  ‘modern and modest’ women in the modernisation history. I suggest that these 
narratives might guide us in the research of grey areas in the picture I summarised above. 
 
 
Untold Stories or Had They Been Told Before? 
 
 
What is specific with these two generations? The historical time in which they were born and 
socialised refers to historical moments of transformations in women’s lives in connection 
with the shifts in political discourses in Turkey. Asli represents the young women whose 
knowledge, ideas, and practices are being influenced by the `women’s liberation` discourse 
of the feminist activism whereas Zuhal represents the earlier generation of urban women 
many of whom were mobilized in leftist political activism during the 1970s, and witnessed, if 
not participated in, the emergence of the second-wave feminist movement in Turkey.   
 
Zuhal, Second Generation of the Daughters of Republic 
 
“Zuhal: (…)My mom, I can say that was an intellectual housewife. She was never 
conservative. That’s what I observed during the time I lived with them. They had 7 
children. I’m one of them, the third daughter…My father didn’t aim to leave an 
inheritance to us. Instead he wanted all of us to be educated well. Education was 
indisputable. Although I was the third daughter and accepted to the university in my 
third year, I was sent to courses when they had financial problems. Not only me, but 
all my sisters and brother were given the same opportunity. Daddy had only a cheap 
flat bought by dept when he died. I can say that he spent all his money for education. 
All of us are university graduates. (err) I’m proud of it. I’m a “Journalism and 
Broadcasting” graduate(…)” 
 
These are the first lines in Zuhal’s interview, a 44 year-old journalism graduate. It is a 
narrative which is constructed by a progressive woman of the Turkish modernisation. From 
her first description of her mother (the first social generation of the modernisation project) 
as an ‘intellectual housewife’ who was ‘never conservative’, Zuhal makes her position 
explicit. She presents her mother as the ideal mother in the modernisation discourse who is 
a western type housewife who will bring rationality to homemaking, and who is responsible 
to educate the nation. Similarly, her description of her father fits into the new image of 
masculinity constructed in modernisation discourse: A modern father who is an engaged 
parent unlike the ‘traditional’ model. Zuhal also refers to the binary opposition of modern-
conservative/traditional, which is the core of the modernisation/westernisation discourse. 
Zuhal refers to this binary opposition at different points of her narrative in order to position 
herself and her family on the side of the modern/progressive. Her initial emphasis on the 
importance given to education in her family is one of the main components of her modern 
portrait she draws in this narrative.  
 
Presence in the Public Sphere 
 
“Zuhal: I (err) started working there. The chief of my department was a man who 
used to work during the day, and attend evening classes after work. H (err) was a 
very good friend of mine. We liked each other very much. We were friends for two 
years. I used to ask everything to him at the beginning (err) I might have 
exaggerated. Since he was my senior. (err) There was a political atmosphere. There 
was an association of Highways officers. (err) He was a board member in that 
association. My family was quite open-minded. I became a member. We started to 
work together. We used to organize meetings together, participate into demos 
together. We had difficult days together. Throughout this activism, we understood 
that we were harmonious (err). However, we were friends for one year. (err) Our 
families became part of this relationship when we thought that we were serious and 
would marry…” 
 
This is Zuhal’s narrative on her meeting with her current husband and the first phase in their 
relationship. The year was 1977. As she tells us, there was a political atmosphere when the 
political discourses of the opposition were multiplied by the emergence of the leftist 
movement. As she is the second generation of Republican daughters, there is a modification 
in the mobilization of women in the public sphere. The boundaries of the public sphere for 
women were not limited to education and working, but included political activism in those 
years. Her ‘open-minded’ (modern) family let her join a political organization. However, this 
‘permission’ still represents the non-transformed gender hierarchies within the family. As a 
well-educated, professional urban woman in the public sphere, she still represents her 
family’s reputation which is under the control of her father who is the one to approve her 
public participation.  
 
The other interesting point in this extract is Zuhal’s asexual or neutral tone while telling us 
about her relationship. Although her progressive position enables her to have a private 
relationship in public sphere, she prefers to keep her ‘symbolic armour’ made up of 
discipline of femininity and sexual modesty in her story. What she tells us about this 
relationship is not love or sexual attraction, but a ‘harmony’, which refers to a shared 
political position between her husband and herself. Here, she voices the dominant storyline 
of the leftist politics, which positions women as ‘sisters’ on the denial of their sexuality, and 
defines a relationship between two ‘comrades’ legitimate only in case of marriage.  
 
In her story, Zuhal positions herself within the dominant discourse of modernisation, which 
constructs women as emancipated but unliberated from the patriarchal relations. The way in 
which she tells me about her relationship and marriage decision; her emphasis on the 
approval of the families clearly reveal her discursive position within the dominant storyline.   
 
This position becomes stronger while she refers to sexual relationship. Her definition of 
their relationship as ‘being friends’ but not partners, meaning not having sex with him, until 
“…we thought that we were serious and would marry…” when families were involved in this 
relationship at a moment of marriage decision (when it is legitimatised), shows her position 
within the regulatory discourse on sexuality.  This discourse constituted the conditions of a 
sexual relationship for a woman whose ‘sexual modesty’ is the main issue.  
  
  
Asli, Second Generation of Feminist Politics 
 
If Zuhal’s story is constructed on her references of ‘being modern’, her daughter Asli tells 
her story within the new discourse on woman’s sexuality created by the ‘emancipatory’ 
politics of feminist activism in Turkey. She represents a new generation for whom, the 
meaning of being political is not identified with only being ‘modern/progressive’ unlike her 
mother’s generation. Telling sexual stories, speaking out experiences of body and sexuality, 
deconstruction of gender identities of modernisation project are included in the sphere of 
politics in this historical moment. Although this new emphasis on the politics of the private 
and sexuality keeps its marginality within the dominant discourse of mainstream feminist 
politics which still works through the categories of modernisation, there is no doubt that it 
has impacts on the construction of new ‘technologies of gender’ (De Lauretis, 1987) which 
includes modified forms of social, political, and cultural configuration of gender as a relation 
by the multiplied social and political discourses within the current phase in the Turkish 
modernisation.  
 
Telling Sexual Stories 
 
“Asli: I cheated on my partner and I slept with him, O (err)…How did it happen? I 
stopped him that night. Other friends had to wake up early the following morning. O 
wanted to wake me up to have breakfast together. I wanted to leave. He said, “You 
want to run away this atmosphere.” The next time we met, he was like a very old 
friend. As if nothing happened. I thought, “Oh my god! What a comfortable person 
you are!” We went to listen to them. It wasn’t planned. He sang somewhere with the 
ex-partner of a friend of mine. We went there. There was sleepover arrangement 
again. I thought I would never sleep with him. Ah! It never happened like that. 
Anyway, we had a chat. He never touched me. He had a huge bed. We were on the 
opposite edges of the bed. He organized our sharing of the bed. I would sleep with 
my girl friend, he would sleep with his boy friend if we liked to do so. He made an 
arrangement, and we found ourselves together again. In the middle of the night, he 
said, “You thought I jumped in you last time. I would like you to sleep here in order to 
prove that nothing will happen.” He has proved until 7am. It happened after 7 am 
(smiling).” 
 
Unlike her mother, Asli told me stories of sexual experience in her relationships.  
In this story, she positions herself outside the regulatory discourse on sexuality which 
presents monogamous, marital sexuality as a norm in which ‘sexual purity’ is the key to 
woman’s sexuality. Her agency is in there. She positions herself outside the dominant 
discourse on modern and/but modest women. In this story of her affair, she inhabits a 
position within the current gender regime in Turkey, which gives space for telling sexual 
stories. The way Asli tells her story also voices a counter narrative in which women are 
constructed as the subjects of sexuality who are active parts of the power games in 
sexuality.  
 
Speaking about Sexual Experience 
 
“Asli: I enjoy making love. I sometimes get orgasm (lowering her voice). However, at 
the penetration moment something happens to me, I pass into that bad mood. It’s a 
strange and very strong pain. Whenever I tell somebody, they say, “You’re not 
relaxed enough.” If I know myself, it’s not psychological but physical. But it has an 
impact on my psychology as well. There is a physical problem. A has understood my 
pain. He said, “we haven’t got to do it if you’re hurt.” The number of our intercourses 
is very limited. I’ve noted them on my agenda. We’ve had fifty times in five years. We 
haven’t been doing it regularly. Because it is easy to feel that I’ve got pain.” 
 
This is an extract from Asli’s longer narrative of her experience of penetrative sex, which is 
dominated by her pain. It again represents a discontinuation from her mother’s narrative on 
sexual experience and emotions of body that she told by a neutral tone. On the other hand, 
it is similar to narratives of western young women on sexual experience (Martin, 2002). At 
this point, I would like to ask an experimental question. Might the western style of this 
narrative, which articulates a scientific discourse on body and sex be read as a modified 
form of a ‘sexual armour’, at least at discursive level? Is it a strategic use? Would speaking 
through a western genre create a space for this new generation of modernisation in Turkey 
to cross the boundaries of private and speak out sexual experience?  
 
 Conclusion or Towards Deconstruction of Contemporary Positions…  
 
“Asli: Controlling? Maybe control is not the right word. I can never be a person like, 
‘Leave her to do whatever she likes.’ I’ve never expected my mom to be like that 
either. No, my daughter can’t do this. I’ve remembered times when I would never let 
my daughter stay a night over although my mom had let me stay. (laughing) If you 
make her lie to you, I mean, if you don’t listen to her, you make fun of what she tells 
or blame her, she will never tell you again. You can’t change anything that you don’t 
know. My imagination will be limitless if I don’t know anything. She may sleep with 
ten people or have a terrible experience. Of course, no daughter will tell every detail 
to her mom. But, receiving the signals and interpreting them is important. I don’t 
know, you’re able to interpret when you are a mom. So, it’s not a control, but having 
information on her life in order to look after her when necessary. (…) Therefore, you 
may be more authoritative on your kid’s life through talking to her. Actually, I don’t 
mind to be authoritative. But it is necessary to prevent anything bad that will make 
her upset. Because it is impossible to forget that we live in Turkey. I may seem 
comfortable in telling you, but I am not. The society has an influence on me too. I 
don’t like to publicize my relationship. This may be even holding hands. Why will an 
uncle someone see me holding A’s hand? It’s better not to be seen. I don’t die to hold 
his hand, I can do it at home (both laughing). So, my daughter will have similar 
difficulties in this country. She might sacrifice something in order to have minimum 
difficulties. She might have learned about sexuality earlier if she had been born 
somewhere else.”  
 
I will conclude with the narrative of Asli, who tells us her relationship with an imaginary 
daughter. I think this extract clearly maps out the connection between modernisation in 
Turkey-which is a project in progress- and discursive positions of her generation in the 
Turkish modernisation. There are discontinuities in their experiences and stories between 
these two and earlier generations, but this does not mean a break. The positions of both 
Zuhal and Asli are constructed by the discourses of the Turkish 
modernisation/westernisation although they represent different but interrelated phases in 
this project. That is what creates the continuities in their stories as Asli describes while 
making a distinction between the discursive and the real. As soon as she changes her 
position to a mother, she goes back to the dominant narrative on the regulation of women’s 
sexuality.  
 
While Zuhal’s generation represents an early stage in the transition to westernisation, 
Asli’s generation is in a further stage of this transition, westernised in many ways; in 
telling their stories, and expressing power on the control of sexuality (as in this specific 
extract). However, it is necessary to take into account that the discourse of 
modernisation/westernisation project itself is still a work in progress. It includes many 
contradictions and ruptures some of which are shaped by the local characteristics of 
the modernisation experience. It is these blurred spaces that shape the positions of 
women from different generations; and within these spaces it is difficult to discuss 
clear-cut boundaries between generations.  
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Chapter 2 
“What do we see when we look at ourselves?”–  Visual 
dissidence towards post(colonial) sex/gender 
organisations within post-apartheid South African culture  
Henriette Gunkel 
 
 
Southern Africa has recently witnessed an emerging visibility of discussion and proclamation 
of sexual identities. Along the question of cultural authenticity and that of gender equality, 
the subject of rights has been brought to the fore in local attempts to define the post-
colonial nation states. While post-apartheid South Africa was the first country in the world 
that explicitly incorporated lesbian and gay rights within the Bill of Rights of the post-
apartheid constitution, the surrounding countries chose to exclude lesbians and gay men 
from citizenship rights. During the Book Fair in Harare 1995 the Zimbabwean president 
Robert Mugabe, for example, gave an infamous speech in which he described lesbians and 
gay men “as worse than pigs and dogs”. But this was just the start. In 2000 he declared 
homosexuality “as an abomination, a rottenness of culture” imposed upon Africans by 
Britain’s “gay government”. Several politicians from different African countries followed 
Mugabe’s lead. Namibia’s minister of home affairs urged new police recruits in 2000 to 
“arrest on sight gays and lesbians and eliminate them from the face of Namibia” (Epprecht 
5), while in 2006 Nigerian’s president Olusegun Obasanjo declares homosexuality as “un-
Biblical, unnatural and definitely un-African” (Horn 7). 
 
The public speeches that in a populist way proclaim the idea of homosexuality as un-African 
are also part of the discourses forming within South Africa itself. In fact the idea that 
homosexuality is un-African proliferates in public discourse and it is a shared opinion by a 
significant portion of the population (Gevisser; Van Zyl). Despite the constitution organized 
religious leaders, politicians and nationalist voices in South Africa continuously feed the 
homophobic discourse in the name of tradition and culture (Gevisser). To give the 
statements some weight they refer to a history of colonialism, yet – as I intend to show - a 
populist understanding of the colonial history in order to push through postcolonial 
nationalism. I argue that postcolonial homophobia is central to contemporary nationalisms 
and processes of postcolonial nation building. 
 
The connection between colonialism/cultural imperialism and (homo)sexuality, however,  is 
not new and it is not made exclusively on the African continent. In different historical 
periods homosexuality has been considered as un-American, un-Indian, un-Iraqi, etc 
(Sinfield; Meghani). And during apartheid homosexuality was read as un-Afrikaans by a 
range of cultural and religious organisations that feared wealthy Jewish and English men 
were corrupting Afrikaaner boys (Gevisser 31). In fact there is a long history of constituting 
homosexuality as something outside tradition and culture and thus outside the nation. Alan 
Sinfield, for example, discusses how homosexuality figured in American discourse during 
the Cold War. Sinfield argues that homosexuality was considered to undermine constructions 
of masculinity, femininity and family values of the American society; lesbians and gay men 
threatened the distinct and superior American (therefore similarly Western) morals and 
values. Sinfield concludes that the recognition of homosexuality as supposedly un-American 
is not directed towards queers but that homophobic discourse aimed to control and 
discipline the heterosexual majority of the population. 
 
Following Sinfield’s analysis this article argues that postcolonial homophobia, as articulated 
in the populist notion of homosexuality as un-African, is not interested in historical and 
cultural forms of same-sex sexuality and intimacy on the African continent. In fact this 
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nationalist and rightwing discourse is not referring to older and culturally specific forms of 
same-sex intimacy. Instead (South) African forms of female intimacy and their underlying 
sex/gender organizations, which are dissenting colonial sex/gender regimes and Western 
cultures of sexual identities, are discursively disciplined and re-conceptualized. In fact, the 
historical and contemporary Westernization of sexuality and gender in (South) Africa 
requires a Western standard of homophobia which was introduced as an act of colonialism. 
By highlighting colonial discourses of race and sexuality the essay argues that homophobia 
became a Western act of colonialism and that postcolonial homophobia actually re-
introduces the colonialist, racist discourse of sex/gender through postcolonial 
homosociality.  
 
Against this background the article turns to cultural interventions and visual dissidence in 
discourses of sexualities within post-apartheid South Africa. And it is the “global” context of 
this discourse that makes its analysis and its resistance so interesting.  By focusing on the 
work of black lesbian artist and activist Zanele Muholi this essay examines the dissent in 
racial, sexual and gender-related identity formations in contemporary South Africa. In her 
work Muholi documents some of the key issues within the black lesbian community in 
Johannesburg and by doing so resists heteronormativity as well as homonormativity in the 
country. The photographs reveal the dissenting position of the photographer who 
dismantles both the cause and the effect of postcolonial homophobia. The images point to 
Muholi’s dissidence towards postcolonial nationalism and its proclamation of a decolonized 
African heterosexual identity. I develop this argument by focussing on Muholi’s images 
Aftermath (2004) and Period (2003), which both reveal the tension between the post-
apartheid constitution and post-apartheid homophobia, as well as Muholi’s Safe Sex II 
(2003).  
 
This essay analyses Muholi’s images before it presents a discursive and scientific 
contextualization of Muholi’s work by highlighting historical and contemporary discourses of 
sexuality and race. The article explores the historical use of photography as a tool of 
constituting (colonial) discourses of whiteness and heteronormativity and points to the 
intricacy of postcolonial homophobia by highlighting its colonial heritage. By doing so the 
essay raises the question of what place should be given to deviance in the representation of 
already stigmatized dissident identities? Until today, Africa as a continent serves as a 
reference point in the negotiation of a European white identity. Postcolonial homophobia 
needs to be situated in this context. Mikki van Zyl, for example, points out that African 
leaders response to homosexuality is also a response to the racist images of African 
sexualities in Europe as being opposed to European/white conceptions of sexuality. The 
claim “homosexuality is un-African” hence cannot be understood outside dominant Western 
images of African sexuality that have their roots within the colonial project and needs to be 
seen as the expression of an internalized racism stemming from colonialism. By bringing the 
dissenting voices in postcolonial South Africa into a Western academic framework therefore 
allows us to rethink the white/Western gaze and orientation of queer studies. 
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Aftermath 
 
 
Aftermath (2004) 
 
I saw Muholi’s image Aftermath for the first time when I was visiting the Month of 
Photography exhibition Is Everybody Comfortable? at the Castle of Good Hope in Cape Town 
in 2005. Muholi’s Aftermath was outstanding in the effect it had on me (and other viewers), 
generating various, contradictory emotions. Aftermath shows the body of a black (lesbian) 
woman from just above the belly button down to the knees. The woman is only wearing 
pants from the label “jockey”, a signifier of lesbian identity. Her hands, at the centre of the 
picture, are grasped over her genitals. In the subtitle of the image Muholi states that “(m)any 
lesbians bear the scars of their difference, and those scars are often in places where they 
can’t be seen…”. Just underneath the hands on the right thigh a big, long scar makes this 
violation of the body visible. The scar almost covers the entire thigh and it takes the viewer’s 
attention away from the centre of the picture, the hands covering the genitals. The eyes, 
however, return to the hands immediately once the viewer realizes that the scar is already 
healed, thus illustrating Muholi’s comment on scars of difference that often ‘can’t be seen’. 
So it is in that moment that the gesture of the hands becomes central. The gesture does not 
imply shyness, possibly due to the woman’s nakedness in front of the camera. Instead the 
gesture functions as a form of protection where the hands also expresses a certain fragility 
and vulnerability. So while the scar on the thigh is already healed the gesture of the hands 
implies a more recent violation of the body. And it is this reference to the violated lesbian 
body that uncompromisingly creates a sense of accusal, of vulnerability, agency, intimacy, 
discomfort, pain and anger all at the same time. 
 
The temporal order/composition of the scars, visible and invisible, in the image Aftermath 
can be seen as a metaphor for the historical and contemporary discourses of (neo)colonial 
sex/gender organizations. The first scar, the one that is visible on the thigh is healed but 
will nevertheless remain visible on the body: it will always mark the black body in the image. 
This scar therefore can be read as the signifier for the violation of the black body through 
colonial discourse that particularly targeted the black female body for European self-
identification and gratification. Within the construction of the European Self particularly 
African women’s availability was taken for granted and was thus constituted as such, finding 
its expression in the act of rape. As Monti has pointed out the colonial invasion of the land 
was often equated with the conquest of the woman: “(t)he seduction and conquest of the 
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African woman became a metaphor for the conquest of Africa itself. A powerful erotic 
symbolism linked a women’s femininity so strongly to the attraction of the land that they 
became one single idea, and to both were attributed the same irresistible, deadly charm.” 
(Nicholas Monti, quoted in Young 63).  
 
The image Aftermath, however, is historically positioned in the post-apartheid context and 
refers to the violation of the lesbian body through rape. The image is therefore not only an 
analogy for the colonial history but also a metaphor for postcolonial homophobia. In fact, 
Aftermath reveals starkly the tension between the post-apartheid constitution and post-
apartheid homophobia by linking the contemporary dimension of anti-lesbian violence to the 
post-apartheid era and the aftermath of the liberation movement as the very name 
“aftermath” may imply.  
 
 
Period (2004) 
The same blood that defines us as women, is the same blood which we shed in the attacks 
against us, while some make a meal of their hatred of us as women, as lesbians. 
  
Similarly Muholi’s image Period deals with the issue of hate crime against lesbians. But 
unlike Aftermath in which the body is used as a signifier for a lesbian identity, it is here 
removed from the picture. Period shows a used sanitary pad on a plate framed by a knife on 
the right and a fork on the left. While the fork is in line with the pad, the knife is not as 
parallel, pointing rather away from the pad. It is the knife that seems to be the disturbing 
moment within the picture, the active part in it, the element that goes along the squiggled 
silver fork. It is a sharp knife, of those used to cut meat. It can be considered as threatening 
and thus useable in an attack. Period is a still life, a composition or arrangement of 
inanimate objects, each with possible symbolic significance. The image provokes what 
Walter Benjamin calls the visual ‘shock’. It is this picture within the exhibition that has been 
perceived as most disturbing and evoking disgust. Not because of the connotation to hate 
crime as indicated by Muholi’s strong subtext to the image but because of the connotation 
to women’s monthly period. The sanitary pad is a symbol for the period and thus for 
womanhood that girls enter with their first period. Womanhood is therefore closely linked to 
female sexuality as well as to women’s culture. Muholi makes the link between the period 
and the attack in form of hate crime that leaves the woman behind bleeding. She uses blood 
as a signifier for womanhood and female sexuality while this same womanhood and a 
specific form of sexuality, namely lesbian sexuality, is the target in the attack against her. 
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Muholi’s images in the exhibition all deal with issues of black women’s sexuality. Similar to 
the images Aftermath and Period, this work de-romanticizes sexual pleasure by pointing out 
practices and commodities that dissent normative perceptions of (hetero)sexuality. This is 
achieved by introducing strap-ons, breast-wrapping and dental dams, for example. By doing 
so Muholi’s images reflect on the different issues that are predominating the different 
lesbian communities in contemporary South Africa. In South Africa it has only been since the 
turn of the twenty first century that there is a growing visibility of lesbian sexuality and 
identity within the visual arts in general and photography in particular. One exception seems 
to be Jean Brundrit who started to focus on feminist and lesbian issues in her work from the 
1990s onwards. Her work focuses mainly on the white lesbian community in Cape Town. She 
describes a particular comfort zone, a safe space that is often linked to the private sphere, 
which white lesbians to a certain extent inhabit. This becomes particularly visible in her 
series of photographs titled Does Your Lifestyle Depress Your Mother? (1999), which shows 
lesbian couples in the domestic space. In one photograph two women are lying in bed 
together while drinking their morning tea/coffee. They seem to be naked, covered by a big 
duvet. Another one shows two lesbians in a bathtub obviously enjoying themselves. Here 
again, the nakedness is only indicated. Intentionally, as Brundrit argues: “I wanted to show 
‘real’ lesbians. By not showing anything hardcore, I've taken away the voyeuristic angle that 
might have otherwise been there for the viewer.”1  
 
What Muholi’s Aftermath precisely lacks and in fact dissents is this comfort zone. The 
majority of Muholi’s images instead raise issues such as HIV/Aids, gender dissidence, 
performativity and passing. The political message that underlines Muholi’s images is the 
most striking difference between her images and Brundrit’s, which seem to mirror the 
efforts of assimilation of the mainstream gay and lesbian community since the 
implementation of the sexual orientation clause within the constitution. In contrast Muholi’s 
work takes up the issues central in the work of predominantly black lesbian and gay 
organizations in Johannesburg over hate crime, gender and HIV/AIDS. In a way these 
different images by contemporary South African lesbian photographers demonstrate who 
has access to the rights inscribed into the constitution and who not. More importantly the 
images reveal starkly that South Africa is still culturally and politically constituted along the 
colonial lines and that the new constitution is in fact not an effect of a wider deconstruction 
of the sex/gender regime that underpinned apartheid. 
 
Accordingly, the responses of the media to Muholi’s exhibition, which was first staged in 
Johannesburg in 2004, mainly reflected on the political dimension of the work and its impact 
on questions of lesbian and gay rights in the country. Gail Smith for example argued that 
Muholi’s “photographs are not artistically or technically brilliant - and some are downright 
disturbing, but the exhibition, and the response to it, show some movement towards 
addressing the staggering absence of ‘out and proud’ lesbians in South African society” 
(Smith 90). In her article “Is Anybody Comfortable?” Nonkululeko Godana similarly highlights 
how the political project is central to this exhibition by contextualizing the work, and 
Aftermath in particular, as a direct translation of Muholi’s activism into documentary 
photography. Godana states that Muholi has been documenting violence against lesbians 
over the last years in Gauteng townships and she informs the reader that Aftermath was 
taken two days after the woman in the image had been raped by a male “friend” aiming to 
show her that she is not a man (Godana 91). In the conversation with Godana, Muholi 
explains that the subject in the image “called me a couple of hours after the incident with no 
one to confide in. She already has a scar from a past incident, yet received new emotional 
scars from her rape” (Muholi in Godana 91). 
 
The image Aftermath, however, does not only tell the story of victimization. It also tells the 
story of agency and dissidence. The subject in the photograph is raped two days before the 
image was taken but she is willing to speak out, to expose her body again in order to make 
a difference, in order to document this trauma. She is not willing to hide her sexual identity. 
Hence, this picture not only tells the story of the subject but also Muholi’s story as the 
                                                
1 <http://www.artthrob.co.za/04mar/artbio.html> (Accessed 25/02/2006). 
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photographer whom those women allow to take such intimate pictures, in moments in which 
they are in fact very vulnerable. Muholi knows the women she is visualizing and that she 
portrays. The women are her friends, her colleagues or women she meets within her work as 
an activist: “These are not only subjects, these are my people, this describes the person I 
am.” (Enraged by a Picture). 
 
Muholi usually invites the audience who attends her exhibitions to write down comments 
and reactions to the images. She has also shown her images in the streets of Johannesburg 
and has made a short documentary about it, titled Enraged by a Picture, which was produced 
for “Out in Africa”, the Gay and Lesbian Film Festival in South Africa in 2005. Muholi included 
some of the responses to her work in the documentary. Some members of the audience are 
in distress, some overtly express homophobia, and some commentators even go further by 
expressing strong anger and directly threatening the artist: “you need a smack” and “you 
must be hung” while one paints a penis with big balls saying “I believe this is art, but then 
this would also be art”. However, there was also strong positive feedback that viewed the 
images as “eye-opening” and “mentally stimulating”, and that welcomed the space that could 
be opened through these kind of debates on sexuality: “…excellent. I think it’s about time 
people stopped being so ashamed about human sexuality. For centuries women have been 
‘desexualized’ and, I just feel that people need to embrace their sexual identities.” 
 
In order to understand why the reactions of Muholi’s work are so divided it is important to 
develop an understanding of the impact of colonialism and colonial discourses on post-
colonial homophobia, particularly its underlying colonial constructions of sex/gender and 
race.  
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“Only Half The Picture” – the discursive and scientific contextualization of 
contemporary images 
 
 
Safe Sex II (2003) 
 
The responses to Muholi’s exhibition and the image Aftermath also reveal how race and 
gender operate in the construction of contemporary post-apartheid homophobia. One 
common response to Muholi’s exhibition is that her images of the black female body are 
either degrading for all (black) women or alternatively, are demeaning for the community, 
the nation or the race, as one of the respondents wrote in Muholi's response book at the 
exhibition: “It is truly unacceptable for you to undermine our race’s especially black 
portraying nudity and sexual explicit content images as if they are the only one who are 
involved these inhuman activities. After all Black was African and proud of its roots and 
cultures until you inflicted pain and trash to our community. Get a life you people.” Another 
visitor similarly expressed her anger about the “nature” of the images: “(y)es, art is an 
African thing. However, when degrading of women’s (make that black woman) bodies, it is 
no longer a question of art and beauty but of discrimination – the nation cries.” The 
responses to Muholi’s exhibitions highlight the strong resentment of portraying the black 
body naked while provocatively dissenting normative constructions of gender and sexuality. 
The history of, for example, the fantasmatic projection of outsized genitals on to men and 
women of African descent led to the ambivalence and resentment towards public images 
that represent the black body’s relationship to sexual dissent.  
 
Muholi, however, does not protect a collective body from misrepresentation but instead 
demonstrates that there is no homogenous body and sexuality. This becomes particularly 
visible in her image Safe Sex II shows a black woman’s naked body, either in the process of 
strapping on or taking off a dildo. The fact that the dildo is of white colour hints to the 
racialization of commodity culture in the country. According to artist and curator Gabi 
Ngcobo, Muholi, however, acknowledges the gaze and challenges its biased nature (Ngcobo 
5). Ngcobo highlights the questions that Muholi poses in her work. One of Muholi’s work 
titles “What don’t you see when you look at me?” was further developed through Muholi’s 
question “What do we see when we look at ourselves?” (Ngcobo 5). With her work Muholi 
reclaims, to borrow Ngcobo’s words, “the (visual) culture that was historically denied” 
(Ngcobo 4). Pumla Dineo Gqola argues in her essay on Muholi’s images that “the work is less 
about making Black lesbians visible than it is about engaging with the regimes that have 
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used these women’s hypervisibility as a way to violate them” (Gqola 84). According to Gqola, 
black lesbian bodies were never invisible in society, but were in fact “highly visible 
manifestations of the undesirable” (Gqola 83) expressed, for example, through hate crimes 
such as visible in the image Aftermath. Very similar to Ngcobo, Gqola is not only interested 
in the question of what Muholi makes visible but in fact how she makes it visible.  
 
Despite their differences, the position of the two scholars, Ngcobo and Gqola, and the 
position of the respondents in the exhibition space, they all raise the question of 
representation and its historical relevance/implication within the (South) African context. I 
use the term “representation” within a classic cultural studies framework by referring to 
Stuart Hall’s representation theory. According to Hall representation is “the production of 
meaning through language” (Hall 16). Representation is hence always mediated and in fact 
connects language to culture: “Representation is an essential part of the process by which 
meaning is produced and exchanged between members of a culture. It does involve the use 
of language, of signs and images which stand for or represent things” (Hall 15). The 
responses to Muholi’s exhibition are concerned with the representation of the black female 
body and so raise questions about who is representing whom, under which conditions, and 
with which purpose? Linked to this is the question of who has the right to look? And despite 
their differences the positive and negative responses to Muholi’s images encourage the 
viewer to think about (historical and cultural) representations of black women’s bodies, 
particularly in relation to sexuality.  
 
Gender, Sexuality and Race: Colonial Politics of Representation and 
Photography 
 
And in fact, in the (South) African context in particular, the use of photography as a tool to 
challenge representations of the body and sexuality is a loaded one and remains 
controversial for various reasons. In Europe photography has been historically used as a tool 
to demonstrate that the cause of “deviant” sexual behaviour was found in the (degenerated) 
body. Photography was used historically to produce knowledge/power of sexuality through 
the surveillance of the body as Tessa Boffin and Jean Fraser argue: “The writings of 
sexologists such as Krafft-Ebbing and Havelock Ellis established the ‘medical model’ of 
homosexuality, and the eye of authority was now focused through the medium of 
photography on the ‘homosexual body’.” (Boffin and Fraser 15). L.R. Broster’s et al. medical 
study, for example, The Adrenal Cortex and Intersexuality shows how sexual “deviance” was 
located in the physiological elements of the subject. The authors use images of so-called 
“physical hermaphrodites” to underline their argument that sexual “perversions” are 
inscribed into the (“abnormal”) body. These images reveal the significance of photography as 
being an important tool to give “scientific evidence” that “deviant” sexual behaviour must be 
found in the physiological elements of the body. So-called physical anomalies are captured 
by the camera’s gaze on the naked subject and are then situated within a medical research 
that links the (degenerated) body to sexual difference. Sexual “deviants” are thus objectified 
and constituted as the sexual Other from a norm that is defined in opposition to the subject 
position of the so-called pervert. The specification of the pervert within the development of 
medicine is hence important since it enables the specification, and the surveillance and 
control through discourse, of the entire population/race. Sex is therefore historically 
dependent on sexuality – and vice versa. As Lorraine Daston and Katharine Park argue, the 
moment the genitalia became a synonym for “nature”, heterosexuality became normative. 
  
In 19th century medical discourses of non-normative bodies the objectification of the gender-
ambiguous body, as visible in the hermaphroditic or intersex subject, was not the only 
marker of difference used to control the population body and the individual body. Racial and 
sexual discourses intersected in a historically specific way within the episteme of colonial 
knowledge that produced an anatomy of pathological bodies. Again the intersecting 
elements of sexuality and gender within scientific racism are displayed in a whole range of 
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images that shows the European gaze on the naked or semi-naked African black body. Leni 
Riefenstahl’s study of the Nuba people of Sudan is one prominent example. The female 
figure specifically became a predominant subject in colonial photography, the photographic 
lens often trained on women’s breasts and buttocks, as visible in popular images of Sarah 
Baartman for example. Throughout colonialism and to a certain extent in contemporary 
discourse, black women were systematically denied control over their bodies.  
 
In order to understand processes of colonialism and its relationship to the history of 
sexuality it is therefore crucial to understand colonialism and sexuality as apparatus – a 
heterogeneous ensemble of discursive and non-discursive elements – that is not fixed and is 
in fact contested daily. Following Foucault’s argument Somerville points out that in early 20th 
century discourses of sexuality and colonialism constituted each other to surround the 
emerging bodies of homosexuality (Somerville). In the course of European expansion into 
other parts of the world the body became the focus of new technologies of power that 
targeted the individual body as well as the population as a whole. This technology witnessed 
the birth of sexuality, as well as racism, aiming to differentiate bodies and groups within the 
bio-mass of the population in order to regulate them. Racial and sexual discourses 
intersected within the episteme of colonial knowledge that produced pathological bodies 
through anatomy. In fact travel narratives and a medical discourse of anatomies not only 
function as colonialist discourses but also urge colonialism into being. Anatomy provides the 
map connecting race, gender and sexuality (Stoler). 
 
At the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century the focus shifted from 
anatomical markers of biological differences to psychological discourses of “abnormal” 
sexual object choice as identified in interracial and homosexual relationships, as evident for 
example within the biopolitics of apartheid South Africa. While the aim of the apartheid 
government was to entrench racial discrimination through law it simultaneously introduced 
laws that regulated the apparatus of race through sexuality by linking sexuality directly to 
race. Sexuality, within the apartheid project, was the biopolitical interface between the 
individual body and the population body and for this reason it became the main target of 
power.  
 
From the beginning the apartheid regime focussed on sexuality as a regulatory factor of the 
race regime. This focus is highlighted by a series of acts it introduced over the first ten 
years; in 1949 it introduced the Prohibition of Mixed Marriage Act, No.55, in 1950 the 
Immorality Act and in 1957 the Sexual Offences Act. Kopano Ratele discusses the 
sexualization of apartheid and argues that the apartheid government’s interest was in 
“intimacy and subjectivity and the private life of race”, thus in the micro-politics that regulate 
the individual body (Ratele 29). The main focus of the laws was to prevent marriages 
between “Europeans” and “non-Europeans”. The apartheid government was concerned about 
the white race only; it was not interested in the other racially constructed communities. 
Interracial heterosexuality is thus perceived as threatening the power of whiteness “because 
it breaks the legitimation of whiteness with reference to the white body”, as Richard Dyer 
argues (Dyer 25). According to Dyer the concept of race is always linked to heterosexuality. 
Heterosexuality is seen as securing the reproduction of racialized bodies – as race itself is 
always about bodies.  
 
The importance of the sex, gender, race nexus for the apartheid regime became visible in 
1968 when the apartheid government tighten the already existing laws to sexual “deviance” 
and for the first time “deviant” female sexuality. While lesbian sex remained unrecognized by 
the law, the use of dildos – as portrayed in Muholi’s Safe Sex II - became the subject of 
criminalization. In order to understand the fear or rather (moral) panic generated by the 
dildo one needs to look back to the 19th century discourse of sexuality that discursively 
produced the link between gender, sex and sexuality and that tied the penetrative subject to 
masculinity. The erect penis serves as the signifier for penetrating male dominance over 
women. However, as Karin Jurschick argues, the phallus loses its power if it becomes 
separated from the male body, is commercially available and strapped-on the women’s body 
for female pleasure and satisfaction. So while the dildo is used in heterosexual sexual acts, 
when women solely use it the dildo becomes a threat to male dominance. In this process of 
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re-appropriating gender attributes the relevance of gender categories is transgressed and 
questioned. The phallus, as a signifier for male dominance, loses its power the moment it is 
recognised to be a cultural construct and thus able to be played upon; as Jurschick asks 
what is the meaning of the phallus if anyone can have one?  
 
It is the penetrative use of a dildo that shows the shift from the monstrous body to the 
monstrous use of the body - a monstrosity that all women were potentially capable of, 
whether they are heterosexual or homosexual, at least according to the apartheid 
government. In fact the central concern was white women’s sexuality and linked to this white 
femininity. The discourse of female sexual perversion thus returns once again back to the 
linkage between heterosexuality, femininity and reproduction and hence to the white 
women’s responsibility to reproduce the white race. A normalizing discourse of female 
sexuality that concentrates on reproduction acts as a means to secure male control and thus 
the gender regime within society. A sexuality that is in line with reproduction does not only 
reflect women’s ability to give birth but her “willingness to perform that labor” (Traub 163).  
 
This means that this heteronormative approach to reproduction does not only aim to 
(re)produce the species, the race, etc. but also a gender regime built on male dominance. 
This is an important argument and serves as a crucial historical reference point for the 
understanding of contemporary claims such as homosexuality is un-African. It once again 
reveals that the notion of homosexuality as un-African is not so much targeting lesbians and 
gay men in the region (although they remain the targets of hate speech and physical 
violence). The interest/focus of this claim is in the securing of normative femininity - as 
represented through normative heterosexuality and its political institution, the family. 
Mugabe, for example, gave the speech in which he declared homosexuals as “worse than 
pigs and dogs”, during “Heroes Day” the Zimbabwean memorial day of the freedom fighters 
who died in the Liberation War. He added that “animals do not copulate with mates of the 
same sex but turn to the opposite sex in order to procreate” (in Aarmo 262). Mugabe has 
chosen to stimulate discourses of sexuality on a day that stands as a national symbol of 
liberation and decolonization for the whole of Zimbabwe. While he celebrates the heroes of 
the past he simultaneously focuses on procreation and an idealization of motherhood and 
culture. For Mugabe homosexuality is not a suitable signifier for a decolonized nation-state 
in which sexual subjectivities are produced and reproduced in the name of culture and 
tradition. Sexuality is thus used as a national/cultural identity-building project that leads to 
the homogenization and naturalization of culture. Nationalist narratives like this constitute 
national myths of identity, national imaginaries of the Self and the community that provide 
cultural material for the subject to constitute a personal sense of gender and sexuality. As a 
consequence, nationalism defines cultural and social boundaries within a community and 
excludes those who do not fit the moral values from the community of the majority (Aarmo 
266).  
 
In fact nationalism is dependent on a gender binary that is constituted through sexuality. 
The role of women in post-colonial Zimbabwe, as well as in post-apartheid South Africa, has 
shifted – and in this process has been reduced - from the position of the “comrade” within 
the liberation struggle to the identity of the mother. Motherhood defines women’s roles in 
relation to their community and the national collective and in doing so removes them from 
the public into the private sphere. In this speech Mugabe thus uses/introduces a discourse 
on homosexuality in order to restore the gender regime that was troubled throughout 
colonialism - at least in relation to the black majority - and within the liberation movement 
with reference to culture and tradition. 
Conclusion 
In the image Safe Sex II Muholi once again shows not only her dissent towards a colonial 
reading of race as a concept that constitutes sex/gender organisations but also towards the 
re-introduction of sex/gender organisations through postcolonial nationalism. As this article 
has argued nationalism – either in (South) Africa or Europe – is always linked to 
heterosexuality and its political institution, the family and is therefore always a gendered 
process. Through her work Muholi resists the fact that postcolonial South Africa is still 
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constituted, in cultural and political terms, along the colonial lines and its sex/gender 
organization by separating masculinity from maleness and men. By doing so Muholi gives 
way to acknowledging older and culturally specific forms of same-sex cultures that were 
rather constituted within discourses of intimacy and kinship than through discourses of 
citizenship. This means that Muholi dissents a reading of same-sex intimacy in South African 
history and culture within the European frame (that is homosexuality versus heterosexuality) 
and by doing so questions globalized identity formations.  
 
This obviously means that the biopolitical procedures of homophobia in post-apartheid 
South Africa concern more than just South African lesbian and gay communities. An analysis 
of postcolonial homophobia needs to be also incorporated in Western theory and politics, 
such as within queer theory, gender studies, critical race theory and in research of global 
capitalism. This also means that the issues that have been raised in this article cannot be 
positioned as the ‘exotic margin’ of Western interest. Instead these issues needs to be 
understood as a challenge for Western discourses, particularly discourses of sexuality, which 
tend to constitute themselves as a reference point of modernity – a modernity that has done 
so much damage to conceptions of sexual cultures and gender organisations in South Africa. 
 
 
References 
Aarmo, Margarete. « How Homosexuality Became ‘Un-African’: The Case of Zimbabwe ». In 
Female Desires. Same-Sex Relations and Transgender Practices Across Cultures. Edité 
par Blackwood, Evelyn et al. New York: Colombia University Press. 255-280. 
Benjamin, Walter. Illuminations. London: Fontana, 1973. 
Boffin, Tessa et Fraser, Jean (eds.). Stolen Glances: Lesbians Take Photographs. London: 
Pandora, 1991. 
Broster, L.R. et al. The Adrenal Cortex and Intersexuality. London: Chapman and Hall, 1938.  
Daston, Lorraine et Park, Katharina. « The Hermaphrodite and the Order of Nature: Sexual 
Ambiguity in Early Modern France ».  GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 1 : 4 
(1995). 419-438. 
Dyer, Richard. White. London, New York: Routledge, 1997. 
Enraged by a Picture. Directed by Zanele Muholi [Film] South Africa, Out in Africa Films, 
2005.  
Epprecht, Marc. Hungochani. The History of a Dissident Sexuality in Southern 
Africa. Montreal, Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004.  
Gevisser, Mark. « A Different Fight for Freedom: A History of South African Lesbian and Gay 
Organisation from the 1950s to the 1990s ». In Defiant Desire: Gay and Lesbian Lives 
in South Africa. Edité par Gevisser, Mark et al. New York, London: Routledge, 1995. 14-
86. 
Godana, Nonkululeko. « Is anybody comfortable? ». In Only half the picture. Edité par Muholi, 
Zanele. Cape Town: Michael Stevenson et STE, 2006. 91-92. 
Gqola, Pumla Dineo. « Through Zanele Muholi’s eyes: Re/imagining ways of seeing Black 
lesbians ». In Only half the picture. Edité par Muholi, Zanele. Cape Town: Michael 
Stevenson et STE, 2006. 82-89. 
Hall, Stuart. « The Work of Representation ». In Representation: Cultural Representations and 
Signifying Practices. Edité par Hall, Stuart. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage 
Publications, 2001[1997]. 13-74. 
Horn, Jessica. « Re-righting the Sexual Body ». Feminist Africa 6 (2006). 
 12 
Jurschick, Karin. « Die Sexlösung. Lust und Schrecken lesbischer Pornographie ». In Blaue 
Wunder. Neue Filme und Videos von Frauen 1984 bis 1994. Edité par Hohenberger, Eva 
et al. Hamburg: Argument-Verlag, 1994. 158-185. 
Ngcobo, Gabi. « Introduction ». In Only half the picture. Edité par Muholi, Zanele. Cape 
Town: Michael Stevenson et STE, 2006. 4-5. 
Ratele, Kopano. « The Sexualisation of Apartheid ». University of the Western Cape, 2001.  
Sinfield, Alan. Cultural Politics - Queer Reading. London: Routledge, 1994. 
Smith, Gail. « Outlaw Culture ». In Only half the picture. Edité par Muholi, Zanele. Cape 
Town: Michael Stevenson et STE, 2006. 90-91. 
Somerville, Siobhan. « Scientific Racism and the Emergence of the Homosexual Body 
». Journal of the History of Sexuality 5 : 2 (1994). 243-266. 
Stoler, Ann Laura. Race and the Education of Desire. Foucault’s History of Sexuality and the 
Colonial Order of Things. Durham, NC, London: Duke University Press, 1995. 
Traub, Valerie. « The Ambiguities of ‘Lesbian’ Viewing Pleasure: The (Dis)Articulations of 
Black Widow ». In Body Guards: The Cultural Politics of Gender Ambiguity. Edité par 
Epstein, Julia et al. New York: Routledge, 1993. 305-328. 
Van Zyl, Mikki. « Shaping Sexualities – Per(trans)forming Queer ». In Performing Queer. 
Shaping Sexualities 1994-2004. Vol. 1. Edité par Van Zyl, Mikki et al. Roggebaai: Kwela 
Books, 2005. 19-38. 
Young, Lola. Fear of the Dark. ‘Race’, Gender and Sexuality in the Cinema. London, New 
York: Routledge, 1996. 
 
 
 Chapter 3 
Realising Turkey’s potential within the European 
Information Society Project1 
Aygen S. KURT 
 
 
Information society (IS) and its technologies play an integral part in the European research 
policies and its Framework Programmes (FP). For most of the European Union’s (EU) 
perspectives and regulations affect the policy formulations in Turkey as an accession 
country, the European Information Society strategy allows Turkey to adjust its policies and 
realise its own potential within an information society prospect.  
 
Turkey’s adventure on the route to EU membership involves adoption of and adaptation to 
the European ‘ways’ and ‘strategies’ in various political and economic areas. However, 
whether this journey has a happy ending or not, we need to figure out Turkey’s research, 
innovation and science and technology (S & T) capabilities as fundamental bases for 
enhancing its economic growth not only in relation to Europe but to the global information 
and communication technology (ICT) markets. For this reason, although integration of an 
acceding country to a supra-national network (the EU) may be considered to be linked to 
several political questions; our main intention is to investigate Turkey’s status in the 
European information society, thereby excluding the debate on political integration as the 
core of analysis. 
 
This paper is part of an on-going PhD research titled, “The Turkish ICT Sector and the 
European Information Society: Innovation for Integration?”, but it is also about the European 
IS polices in general, and Turkey’s recent situation within such political context in particular. 
A review of the previous work on the information society theory will allow us to set up the 
theoretical scene before giving a general picture of the notion of the IS in European policies 
focusing on the last decade (1994-2005) and Turkey’s response at state level. However, 
although adjustments are made at state level in Turkey, the producers, traders and 
operators of the information society technologies should be taken into account as one of the 
main players in linking Turkey to the European information society. For this reason, our 
focus will also include a few insights derived from the empirical findings about how a 
number of ICT producers and experts2 interviewed in Turkey during October 2004-January 
2005 interpret the European and Turkish IS policies and their future in relation to integrating 
into the European networks. 
 
Encountering with the notion(s) of information society 
 
Even though there are different perspectives in the current information society theory (e.g. 
Bell 1973, Lyon 1988, Heap et.al 1995, Dutton 1996, Castells 2000; Mackay et al 2002, May 
2002, Webster 2002), the whole argument appears to stem from the technological 
innovations that allowed convergence of information and communication technologies (ICTs) 
since the 1970s and the increasing usage of ICTs that have enabled major changes in the 
ways society and economy are structured. In relation to the theoretical perspectives, the 
Information Society in European politics has shown that technological developments and 
                                                
1 An earlier and shorter version of this paper was presented at the UEL Post Graduate Conference, 25-26 May 2006, 
Contexts, Fields, Positions: Situating Cultural Research; as part of the Panel on “Turkish media and information 
society in the European Context: Approaches in Analysis” 
2 In total, 27 high level managers from ICT firms and 14 experts were interviewed.  
 convergence which allow ICTs operate at the core of all economic activity are taken into 
account seriously (Ducatel et.al, 2000).  
 
Confrontation with the information society, as a concept and a political product has become 
unavoidable. The term first appeared in a study mapping information sectors of the US 
economy in 1960s (Machlup, 1962) and its usage in the policy agendas of national 
governments and international organisations have increased within the last two decades. For 
instance, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has 
characterised the role of national governments in the global information society as a 
catalyser for the development of ICTs, and secondly as becoming more active users of ICT-
based services (Iversen et al, 1998). The concept of information society has been used 
interchangeably with numerous notions that are highly related but different from each other. 
As listed in Box 1, such notions seem to have flexible and unclear borders, and are often 
used persuasively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Initial attempts in understanding the changing structure of the information sectors of the 
economy resulted from a number of increases in informational jobs, and a broad usage of 
ICTs in work place. As early as late 1960s and early 1970s, the idea of the information 
society (IS) gained wider acceptance in the post-industrialism debate with Alan Touraine’s La 
Societe Post-industrielle (1969) in France, Bell’s the Coming of Post-industrial society (1973) 
and Alvin Toffler’s the Third Wave (1980) in the US.  
 
The IS concept, rooted in the postindustrialism literature, considers an emerging society as 
the end of the industrial era and the new arrival of a service and leisure economy (e.g. Bell, 
1973). This new society is celebrated, because the technologies enabling the IS were 
considered as cures of our societal and economic problems. Therefore, initial IS policies in 
the agendas of several advanced countries and international organisations aimed to 
establish strong infrastructures that would carry information with the highest speed 
possible.  
 
We need to note that the specific purposes of this paper allow us to exclude any deliberate 
discussions about the theoretical and philosophical analysis of the existence of the IS, nor 
does it intend to cover any discourse analysis of the IS policy texts. Happily, comprehensive 
work documenting the theories of information society exists (Webster, 2002; 2004). James 
Martin states that the emergence of the IS theory is said to be ‘either as a social forecast or 
as a model of social possibilities, and that these have somehow been translated into views 
of reality and perceptions of actual societies’ (1995: 11). On the other hand, Webster’s 
(2002) taxonomy of the theories of information society comes to the conclusion that social 
BOX. 1. Different but closely related notions of 
the Information Age 
 
Information society 
Post-industrial society 
Informational economy 
Knowledge-economy 
Control Economy 
Learning economy 
Digital society 
Network society 
Informational capitalism 
Digital capitalism 
Consumer society 
Post-modern society 
Wired / Internet society 
Surveillance society 
 
 
 scientists have, to differing extents, demonstrated a technological determinism when 
dealing with the impact of ICTs in society.  
 
Admittedly, the speed developments in ICTs have transformed economic transactions and 
communications worldwide. Some evidence in 1990s indicates that the escalating power of 
ICT usage has created a ‘technological revolution’ in the sense that the ICT market and 
industry structures have changed enormously due to a cluster of technological innovations 
(Freeman et al, 1991).  While several works on the role of ICTs in our societies and the work 
place have gained attention in literature; the characteristics of information and knowledge 
and how ICTs can be used to improve efficiency in business studies provided major areas for 
attention, too (e.g. Head, 2003). However, among others, Lyon situated the information 
society idea in a recycled version of postindustrialism, and suggested that ‘it should be more 
than just focusing on social adaptation to IT, rather how IT may be designed to suit people’  
(1988:8). For such reasons, there has been an alternative line of argument focusing on the 
‘social’ side of the information society and the society’s role in shaping the ICT 
developments (e.g. Wyatt et al, 2002). 
 
Among the thinkers who emphasise the systemic change by suggesting the concept of an 
information society on the one hand, and ones who explain the present society contending 
the continuities of the past on the other; Castells’ (2000) argument of a ‘network society’ 
appears to stress the fundamental changes due to technological innovations since 1970s 
and the union of capitalism with the ‘informational mode of production’. In this way, the 
notion of network society seems to stand in the middle of two strands and attempts to 
comprehend structural changes in the society declaring a new society which has been 
enabled by ICTs with the priority of establishment of networks for information flow (Castells, 
2000). Establishment of such networks and integration of scientific and technological 
knowledge in Europe have been at the core of European research collaboration programmes 
since 1980s accelerating with the First Framework Programme in 1984. Why and how has the 
notion of IS found a significant place in the EU’s strategic policies that are related to 
economic growth and industrial progress? How has the EU treated the concept of IS? The 
following section reviews the European IS policies briefly. 
 
The European ‘rhetorical’ Information Society project 
 
The information society and its technologies have been in the core of European research 
policy since 1980s. The EU support programmes for ICTs officially starts with the ESPRIT 
(European Strategic Programme for Research in Information Technology) in 1983 followed by 
the first Community Framework Programme in 1984. The Framework Programmes have been 
the key instruments for EU to support innovation and S & T related pre-competitive research.  
These Programmes meant two things: ‘the EU’s involvement in scientific and technological 
matters which made serious commitment to “Europeanize” the production of advanced 
knowledge; and enshrining the pursuit of competitiveness, which has become a major raison 
d’être of the Union’ (Borrás, 2003: 1). 
 
The key initial IS plans at European level were mainly market-driven initiatives promoting the 
competitive position of the ICT sector in Europe. Formation of the European Single Market 
and the IS policy agendas embraced the market as the driving force behind technological 
innovation. It could be noted that the EU’s IS policies had major technological and political 
motivations. First, speed developments in high-technologies, particularly in ICTs, shortened 
the life cycles of various products and service applications in the ICT industry. This was 
caused mainly by the opportunities and possibilities available for technological convergences 
and also the increase of innovative capacity of organisations, regions and countries with the 
influence of a general trend in realising the importance of research and development (R & D) 
in advanced economies. With such a technology-driven approach in its agenda, the infamous 
Bangemann Report prepared for the European Council (European Commission, 1994) was 
envisaging the development of an IS Europe-wide and warning the European policymakers, 
 industrialists and governments not to be sole respondents and passive users of the coming 
IS, but masters of the IS by meeting the challenges it will bring: 
 
All revolutions generate uncertainty, discontinuity and opportunity. Today’s no 
exception. How we respond, how we turn current opportunities into real benefits 
will depend on how quickly we can enter the European information society. […] 
The race is on at global level and those countries which adapt themselves sooner 
rather than later will set the technological standards for other countries to 
follow. […] Given its history, we can be sure that Europe will take the 
opportunity. It will create the information society (European Commission, 1994: 
4-5). 
 
The race, it seems, – for Europe- was obviously about tackling with the strategies of not 
being excluded from the so-called ‘globalised, informational and networked economy’ 
(Castells, 2000) at a time when the Al Gore- Clinton Administration in the US had already 
declared their ambition to build the information superhighway by investing in the global 
information infrastructure. On the other hand, Japan’s presence in the global ICT markets 
(particularly in semi-conductor industry) started to become stronger in early 1990s and the 
Japanese government’s plans to set up a national IS since 1970s continued to take a 
significant place in their innovation policy.  
 
The Bangemann Report treated technology as an exogenous factor affecting the changes in 
society. Although the report’s technologically determinist approach was accused of 
undermining the impact of societal forces on the ways that ICTs are developed (de Miranda 
and Kristiansen, 2000; Goodwin and Spittle, 2002);   perhaps, this was a clear reflection of 
how innovation and technological developments took over regulatory policies. Actually, the 
report had a profound impact on the formation of European IS Action Plans and ICT research 
programmes late 1990s. Europe’s “immediate” action in producing IS policies was also an 
attempt to realise the tension between regulation and innovation. Until then, technological 
innovation led the ways which regulations and policies were formulated. Now it was time to 
politically construct the paths in which ICTs, their applications, access, usage, and public 
acceptance strategies would be located. It is essential to realise that since mid-1990s, this 
political activity at European level –“building the European IS” - has never underestimated the 
role of technology in economic competence. It has rather been the power struggle policy 
makers wanted to win by “shaping” the environment where an IS would be “created”, but not 
evolve.   On the other hand, it can be agreed that the European IS policies in 1990s, 
including the Bangemann’s suggestions, had been “pushed” by the technology already 
present in the market. For this reason, the European IS policies in 1990s embarked a market-
driven approach which later in the beginning of the new century turned towards a more 
demand-driven shape. For instance in a few years after the Bangeamnn Report was released, 
the Commission itself challenged the technologically determinist approach, and issued a 
report emphasising the significance and power of the societal forces in shaping the ways ICT 
are developed (European Commission, 1997). The EU’s strategy included first, a regulatory 
framework envisaging the legal matters related to the rapid convergence of technologies 
and the protection of individual rights in the IS, and secondly, the start of e-Europe Action 
Plans3, which later were spread to the inclusion of candidate countries through the e-Europe+ 
Action Plan. These plans were setting the strategic goals and what needs to be done in a 
specific time for building the European Information Society.  
 
The new millennium welcomed the European IS strategy with a well-determined goal for 
Europe to become ‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy by 2010’4. 
Issued at the European Council’s March 2000 Lisbon Summit, the Lisbon Strategy has 
become the most momentous reference point to measure science, technology and 
                                                
3 The first e-Europe Action Plan2002 was launched in 1999 followed by the e-Europe Action Plan 2005 launched in 
2002.  
4 Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon European Council, 23-24 March 2000 
 innovation activities of the EU member states and candidate countries. As part of the Lisbon 
Strategy, Information Society Technologies (IST) Research was the single largest priority in 
the European 6th Framework Programme as in its predecessor, with a €3,6bn figure, 
accounting 30% of all thematic programmes. EC states that the main reason for this is 
because ICTs have an integral contribution to overall economic performance and they offer 
great amount of benefits to society at large (European Commission, 2005). 
 
In 2004, a group of high-level industrialists led by W. Kok evaluated the extent that the 
EU has achieved in relation to the Lisbon Strategy. Kok’s report stated that Europe’s 
lack of political commitment to operate the Lisbon Goal is threatening the targets need 
to be met (European Commission, 2004): 
 
External events have not helped achieving the objectives but the European Union 
and its member states; have clearly itself contributed to slow progress by filing 
to act on much of the Lisbon Strategy with sufficient urgency. This disappointing 
delivery is due to an over-loaded agenda, poor coordination and conflicting 
priorities. However, a key issue has been the lack of determined political action. 
 
The new EC Presidency under Barosso reviewed the IS policy as soon as he came to power. 
I welcome the Kok Report. It provides a realistic, but worrying, assessment of 
progress. It shows that we must act now to make up for lost time (European 
Council, 2004, original emphasis). 
 
As a result, the Directorate General - Information Society was expanded to include media 
(which was formerly under education and culture). This had natural reasons linked to the 
developments in communications and media technologies. The technological convergence of 
ICTs and media has brought the convergence of markets in these areas and the DG 
Information Society and Media was formed with the aim of supporting the development and 
use of ICTs for the benefits of all European citizens. Due to the speed emergence of 
converged technologies and markets, a single Information Space, i2010, has been 
established as the key part of the Commission’s renewed IS policy. i2010 is a new strategic 
plan, which succeeds the former eEurope Action Plans, for an open and competitive digital 
economy. With the new programme, EC also creates a single space for policy convergence in 
order to revise the IS regulations in areas like supply of content and the operation of 
networks. 
 
In general, the European IS policies can be seen as a framework in which concepts including 
market economy, S&T, innovation, networking and ICT revolution play a major part. Above 
and beyond that, the same framework is a component of the European innovation policies at 
a larger scale and is a result of economic and technological challenges from the US and 
Japan, technological convergences and scientific advancements since 1970s, and Europe’s 
aim to become a leader in the global markets. When Garnham (1997) situated the European 
IS policies in a ‘rhetoric’ at late 1990s, he saw the same decade as the successor of previous 
failures the European Community made especially when the European market was still 
dominated by the European telecom monopolies during 1980s. Still, it is possible to suggest 
that the ‘rhetorical’ side of the project continues to overlook the policy realm, because the IS 
project itself attempts to create a polity venue where a consensus building process among 
member and candidate states could be run for the purpose of reaching a common goal (the 
Lisbon goal, envisaged by the EC) that the future of Europe lies in ICTs. It also seems to be a 
dominant political and ideological choice combined with the “push” power of the existing 
(and developing) technologies in the market. However, it should be noted that when IS has 
become a political and ideological goal for advanced economies (perhaps also with the help 
of agendas set by international organisations), the developing and underdeveloped countries 
are motivated to establish political strategies to “construct” an IS for the sake of “catching-
up” and take part in the global networks as quickly as possible. The celebrated digital 
revolution, though, created a digital divide which has widened the information gap between 
those who were striving to catch-up and “transfer” the required technologies as quickly as 
 possible and those who were “producing” and innovating such technologies and increasing 
their power in building the information infrastructure of the world. In this picture, 
questioning the ways of which ICTs are “embedded” in political frameworks of the 
underdeveloped countries has become desirable (e.g. Wilson III, 1998; Audenhove et al., 
1999; Sahay and Avgerou, 2002).   
 
As mentioned before, this on-going study considers Turkey’s position in relation to the IS 
policy and ICT markets as evolving due to its accession process into the EU. However, as a 
developing country which has to consider international binding policies like the EU criteria, 
Turkey’s direct adoption processes of the European IS strategy needs to be questioned by 
taking into account Turkey’s own capabilities and advantages within the European context. It 
is possible to observe that there is a tendency towards technology acceptance and 
increasing ICT usage in Turkey; however, in order to become a “player in the game” by not 
only accessing but also having a decisive role in IS networks in Europe, and in order not to 
depend upon the technology producers (in advanced economies); Turkey should invest in 
technology production and change its reputation for being a sole ‘market’ for technology 
consumption. The next section briefly reviews how Turkey has responded to the IS policy 
developed in the EU and what the main IS strategies have been at state level. 
 
Turkey’s perspective in building an information society 
 
Turkey’s reflection in this picture is directly influenced by the accession procedures to the 
EU and its tendency towards market economy ideology. Whether we believe in it or not, 
globalisation of trade have brought binding policies in relation to the global organisation of 
economic activities. We can even agree that this have resulted in more disadvantageous 
conditions for the developing and underdeveloped parts of the world, whilst at the same 
time favouring the corporate multinational big companies based in advanced countries. 
Accessing the European ICT market and taking part in European networks appear to be 
significant (and powerful) channels for Turkey to reach global markets.  
 
Turkey’s recent attempts to “build” an IS and set-up a “national” science, technology and 
research policy framework are mostly shaped by the binding policies of the EU and 
mainstream ideologies centred on neo-liberal market economy. Turkey has applied to join 
the EU and the Europeanization process is taking place in numerous policy areas. For 
instance, its integration process into the European (ICT) markets has been strengthened by 
joining the Customs Union in 1996.  
 
Turkey’s involvement in global and European organisations is not a recent issue. It is a 
founding member of various global institutions, including OECD (Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development), the United Nations (UN), and World Trade Organisation 
(WTO). At European level, it is the founding member of the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 1975, and became a member of the Council of Europe in 
1950, one year after its establishment. In S & T related organisations, it is a founding 
member of the European Cooperation in the Field of Scientific and Technical Research 
(COST) since 1971, and according to an EU-funded research done in 2003 (Stein, 2004)5, 
Turkey is a member of nearly 100 European S & T organisations including EUREKA and the 
European Science Foundation. Recently, it has taken part in the latest EC 6th Framework 
Programme project funding schemes. In this respect, questioning Turkey’s integration and 
establishment of networks with the European Research Area and the European Information 
Society is possible, but how?  
 
                                                
5 Own elaboration of a data set collected for (Stein, 2004). The data collection phase for the EC-funded SEGERA 
project (www.segera.ruk.dk ) included mapping of nearly 400 S&T related organisations in Europe. For each 
organisation, data were comprised of listings of members from the EU, non-EU and associate states.  
 Turkey ranks 48 among 115 countries in 2005 with no score attributed to it in the 
Networked Readiness Index (NRI) prepared by the World Economic Forum6. The NRI 
illustrates the degree of readiness of a nation to participate in and benefit from ICT 
developments. In 2002-03 Turkey ranked 57 with a score of 3,57 and in 2004-05 ranked 52 
(out of 104 countries) with a score of -0.14. The picture demonstrates that although 
Turkey’s rank relative to the countries increases, the score for the country’s readiness to 
take part in an information society does not show a promising increase. As the World 
Economic Forum explains, the NRI is composed of three component indexes which assess: 
(a) environment for ICT offered by a country or community; (b) readiness of the community's 
key stakeholders (individuals, business and governments); and (c) usage of ICT among these 
stakeholders.  
 
Moreover, relative to the EU-257, Turkey falls behind in ICT expenditures in 2004 (EIS, 2004) 
and according to the same European Innovation Scoreboard in 2005, its status has changed 
from catching-up to falling-behind between 2004 and 2005 (EIS, 2005).  Compared to former 
six candidate countries8 and the EU-15 average in 2003, Turkey still lags behind in ICT 
applications, production and investment (European Commission, 2003). But the same report 
suggests that among other candidates, Turkey is the fastest catching-up country in 
technology and innovation:  
 
Turkey is the only country with specialised governmental and non-governmental 
agencies with a track record of managing funding and assistance to enterprises 
for innovation (European Commission, 2003: xx).  
 
We can realise that the picture does not solely tell us that as a developing country in the 
accession process, Turkey’s investments in ICTs and ICT research are inefficient. When we 
look into the telecoms and information technologies sub-sectors separately, in 2004, the 
Turkish telecoms sector’s share in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 3.3%, which is quite 
close to the OECD average of 3.2%; however it was quite distant from the OECD average of 
2.9% in IT being 0.8% of the GDP (SPO, 2006). The Turkish ICT market’s status in the 
European and global ICT markets demonstrates a promising growth tendency, although the 
domestic market is not huge in relative sense (Ça layan and Bener, 2006: 41). 
 
The table below summarises the key milestones in Turkish IS policy as part of the national IS 
policy. The e-Turkey Project, which is called as the e-Transformation Turkey Project9 now, 
was the initial step in adjusting the government’s IS policy to the EU’s e-Europe Action Plans 
which was declared in Feira in 2000. The e-Transformation Project, operated by the 
Information Society Department of the Turkish State Planning Organisation (SPO), could be 
considered as the first official attempt in determining a national IS strategy in Turkey as 
former political attempts did not create a promising goal to sustain an IS prospect for Turkey 
as this project. E-Transformation Turkey’s main objectives are to provide the necessary 
conditions for the citizens to gain access to higher quality and faster public services through 
Internet; revise the ICT policies with regard to the EU’s strategies and prepare an Action Plan 
in the light of the e-Europe+, an Action Plan including the candidate countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
6http://www.weforum.org/en/initiatives/gcp/Global%20Information%20Technology%20Report/index.htm  [last 
accessed on 24 June 2007] 
7 The former 15 member states plus the recent 10 members joined to the EU in May 2004.  
8 Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, and Slovakia. 
9 http://www.bilgitoplumu.gov.tr/eng/default.asp  [last accessed on 02 April 2007] 
  
Table 1. Turkish Government’s selected IS-related policies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acceleration of the Turkish IS policy during 1990s was not a coincidence at a time when the 
convergence of technologies in ICTs has begun to increase throughout the world with a 
greater emphasis on innovation, know-how creation and R&D. The spread of Internet after 
the first half of 1990s in Turkey have speeded up an on-line societal life and e-business 
transactions as it had naturally happened elsewhere.  
 
Information Society policy in Turkey and Europe: selected empirical 
findings  
 
Turkey’s strategy in general appears to be the adoption of the Lisbon Goal in all senses as 
part of the EU accession process. In a way, the aim of becoming the most competitive 
knowledge economy of the globe (for Europe) is itself an integration process for all European 
countries at S&T related fields and mainly research and innovation, since this is significantly 
related to the enlargement and regional integration prospects of the EU. Thus, Turkey’s 
synchronised policies make sense. However, one major problem in the EU’s course of policy- 
making and implementation of IS policies is the different institutional set-ups and cultures 
that exist in member states and the differing ways of responding to the EU’s directives at 
nation state level.  As a supranational entity, EU’s directives and their calls for coordinated 
policy programmes at national levels seem not to be working yet as the Kok Report 
highlighted (European Commission, 2004).  
 
One of the foremost problems in Turkey is its lack of continuous political commitment and 
the digital and economic divide between the highly industrialised parts and the rural regions 
of the country. Still, it has an opportunity in highly qualified human resources allowing to 
develop in the middle term strong ICT services and an R&D sector (Skulimowski, 2006). The 
empirical field work of this research revealed that there is high level of politicisation in 
management of S&T and its institutions. For instance, in 1998 the TUENA project (Turkish 
National Information Infrastructure Master Plan) started with great ambitions as a scenario 
building tool for the future of a Turkish IS by 2010; but as soon as the new government 
elected in 2002, the project lost its attention and interest within the political realm. The 
Year Policy Document or Plan 
1983 
 
1993 
 
 
1994 
 
 
1996-98 
 
 
1999 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2005 
Major Policy document: Turkish Science Policy: 1983-2003. 
 
Second Major policy document: Turkish Science Policy: 1993-
2003. 
 
Declaration of a national S & T policy: Establishment of a national 
innovation system 
 
TUENA – Turkish National Information Infrastructure Master Plan 
for 2010 
 
Turkey obtains candidacy status in Helsinki Summit 
 
Turkey is invited to join eEurope+ Action Plan  
 
eTurkey Action Plan declared 
 
e-Transformation Turkey Project (continues) 
 
Liberalisation of the Turkish Telecom market 
 sample of firms interviewed in this research stated that they need to see an IS policy 
superior to all political parties to be implemented without any distraction by power holders.  
 
Another problem is the transmission of the European IS policies into the Turkish context. 
Turkey’s plans about aligning the e-Europe Action plans in 1990s did not include a 
systematic approach. The process of adopting the European regulatory framework without 
much questioning was highly criticised. It even looked like that the IS policy in Turkey meant 
a ‘meaningless and an aimless’ activity just for the sake of showing off an image of an e-
Turkey (Respondent # 2).   
 
The Turkish IS society policies are a direct, insipid and plain translation of the 
European IS policies. How should they be? We need to embed their [Europe] 
philosophy into our thinking, and think what can be done on behalf of a 
competitive Turkey. On the European side there is an implicit conservatism, a 
secret protectionism’ (Respondent # 7) 
It is clearly stated above that taking the European IS policies and the EU’s Action Plans 
as guidelines is not the real problem. The main dilemma is whether Turkey should take 
everything as given or whether it should attempt to grasp the relevant policies behind 
the conditions and realise how to benefit from the European IS policies. Naturally, it is 
our main concern here to propose that Turkey should find its own way; however, on 
the route to taking part in the European IS; following the European regulations and 
applying them to the national context also sound meaningful. 
 
The majority of the interviewees suggested that the Turkish State’s R&D support 
programmes are favouring big and powerful firms in the market. Therefore, small and 
medium sized enterprises (SMEs), although provided with opportunities like state initiatives 
and tax exemptions in industrial incubators; they also suffer from politicisation of the 
support mechanisms. This seems to be because of the inefficiency in the flow of information 
about project calls, training seminars and policy updates through state channels. Firms 
interviewed do not have time to read all comprehensive information. For that reason, most 
of them are not aware of relevant European funding schemes like EUREKA and COST. 
However, FP6 is more popular. This is perhaps there is more attention in publicising the FP6 
in  the National Scientific and Technical Research Council’s (TÜB TAK) and universities’ 
agendas. Interestingly, only six out of 27 firms applied for European funding in this 
research.  
 
Although the figures we covered earlier in this paper suggest that there is low investment in 
ICT production in Turkey (EIS, 2004); the “snapshot” of the ICT sector in this research told us 
that there is a great ambition for domestic technology production. All of the selected 
participants in this research were success stories in the specific ICT product areas they were 
operating. As in the words of one respondent (# 5), concentrating on technology production 
within the borders of the nation and increasing the competitive capacity of the sector were 
at the core of a successful ‘national’ ICT sector integrated into the European and global ICT 
markets: 
 
Let us produce technology! We do not have time and energy to deal with the EU’s 
issues and EU’s policies. We must produce our own technology! That is the 
solution!’ (Respondent # 5) 
  
Integration into the European IS project and the European collaborative funding applications 
does not only mean a policy flow from the EU to Turkey. It is important to see whether there 
is a tendency towards ‘networking’ with European comparators, i.e. do the firms use the 
existing funding opportunities? In what ways do they attempt to collaborate and 
communicate within the sector, with the nation state, with the EU and with their comparators 
in Europe? 
 
One of the experts warned the situation in Turkey, suggesting that the ICT sector was not 
 able to create its own communication channels although several platforms, such as sectoral 
NGOs (non-governmental organisations) existed. He used an interesting analogy: 
 
Networks?.... NOT-works! (R&D consultant, Expert # 2).  
 
It was observed during the Field Work that the majority of the firms in this research had or 
found their own channels to communicate and network with Europe. The state’s, namely 
TÜB TAK’s communication and informing tools were found complex. On the other hand, the 
sector’s own collaborative works happened through first informal networking; and second, 
through formal and procedural funding applications at European level. However, partnership 
searching in Europe did not seem to fit with their ways of business-making. First of all, they 
did not want to spare time for project applications as the nature of the EU funding needed to 
be understood well which was costly for them in terms of time and human resources. One 
software firm which had been highly successful in the EU project applications suggested 
that: 
Our firms go to Europe, apply for FP6 for money. Stop there! You should go to 
the EU for networking. Lisbon Goal is fine, but, be careful! In order to create a 
competitive Europe, EU aims to put customers and industrialists together. We 
should understand this very well (Respondent # 12). 
 
Although the FP6 was popular, it was found that the number of applications were very low 
among the firms in this research. However, according to TÜB TAK’s figures, among all other 
themes, the thematic areas of Information Society Technologies (IST) showed the highest 
number of project applications from Turkey in the EU’s FP6: nearly 20% of the 2947 
applications came from the IST area (TÜB TAK, 2006). Conversely, if we look at the success 
rate in the total number of funding applications; only 15,4% of the applicants were able to 
take part in projects (ibid). So, where could the above figures have come from? The same 
indicators suggested that, nearly half of all applications to the EU’s FP6 (54%) were received 
from the universities; whereas only 17% of the applicants were SMEs (TÜB TAK, 2006). 
The initial empirical results showed that a high demand in time and human resources, 
financial capital, language barriers and lack of knowledge in business making in the 
European style and with the European culture (as they claimed) were the problems 
firms had encountered in project application processes. Therefore, national funding 
sources were preferred more. 
Do all these matter? 
 
Instead of concluding, it is better to start asking the question– is there a potential in the 
Turkish ICT sector compared to Europe, then? Is the Turkish course of action in IS-building 
promising for the future development of the country? It appears that technology and R&D 
are not very old concepts for the Turkish ICT sector; however, indigenous technology 
production and the development of domestic technology production capabilities take a 
significant place in the agendas of the firms interviewed in this research; because, they see 
this process an essential factor for the enhancement of innovation-based economic growth 
in Turkey. 
 
The S & T integration at European level motivates the member states, candidate countries 
and other associate countries to produce a technological product and an innovative idea 
together; to share research prospects and ‘understand’ the ways which each part makes 
business. However, the direct policy flow from a supranational institution needs to be 
questioned and adapted to the national context by ‘realising’ one’s own needs and potential. 
The selected companies from the Turkish ICT sector seemed to have their varying views on 
collaboration with Europe; however, through networking and partnership projects will they 
only find the opportunity to encounter with their European comparators and to learn from 
each other. Since innovation and knowledge production is an interactive process (Lundvall, 
 1992), it is valuable to ask what the ICT sector as a sub-system in Turkey can do in terms of 
creating opportunities to integrate Turkey with the European Information Society. We guess, 
that has been our starting point which needs to be dealt in more detail.  
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Chapter 4 
Conceptualising feminism in Africa: is it merely politics of 
naming? 
Patricia K. Litho 
 
This chapter discusses the concept of feminism in Africa and seeks to explain how feminism 
functions within the African context including how viable it is. It questions whether African 
feminism is merely politics of naming or there is more to it. It then explores what the tenets 
of the African feminism discourse entails, highlights areas of commonality and difference 
with dominant feminist discourses and ends with its implications for understanding ICTs and 
the empowerment of women in Africa.  
 
Defining African feminism: the contestations  
 
… the power of naming is two fold: … [first is the] quality [of power] and the value… 
of that which is named- [ second is that] it … denies reality and value to that which is 
never named, never uttered. That which has no word or concepts is rendered mute 
and invisible ... [and] powerless to inform or transform … our understanding” (Du 
Bois 1983: 108). 
 
While these words were used to critique the claim for neutrality in social sciences and 
describe the position of women in knowledge production by Du Bois (1983), it captures the 
essence of this thesis. It highlights the concerns of African feminists and activists. African 
women are concerned with the power and right to name their own location and set their own 
agenda. It could therefore be said that African feminisms are concerned with issues of 
power, agency and subjectivity within feminism itself and in society, which are also evident 
in the empowerment discourse (Arndt 2002). But is there such a thing as African feminism? 
What does it constitute and what is so African about African feminism that is not in other 
feminisms? I have often been asked these questions and sometimes it is hard to give a clear 
answer as to whether African feminism exists or not, because of the complexities 
surrounding the idea of feminism in Africa. To say no to the existence of African feminism 
would be denying the fact that the women’s ideology against all forms of oppression do 
exist in Africa and yet to answer yes would seem contradictory because some women in 
Africa would rather be called activists and not feminists. What could be said however is that 
ideas that could be labelled feminist exist in Africa and so do feminists and I am not shy to 
admit that I am one of them because sticking with the terminology used by other women 
plays the political role of increasing African women’s participation in the production of the 
wider body of knowledge about their own experiences to the global picture (Oyewumi 2003 
and Johnson-Odim 1991). However as an African woman, I continually have to deal with 
challenges on how I define feminism, what it is constituted of and what “legitimate feminist 
foci and goals” ought to be (Johnson-Odim 1991). My definitions are often expected to 
comply with dominant perceptions of what feminism should be. These standards and/or 
expectations of what a feminist should be “functions like a filter through” which my position 
as a feminist is judged. At several conferences for instance, I have been accused of not being 
a feminist because of my argument that women and men need to work together to ensure 
gender equality and that women themselves sometimes play the role of oppressor not just 
to men but also to fellow women. As an African woman, I feel that the application of such 
standards fail to recognise and appreciate who I am and views my difference as a flaw. This 
view seems to reinforce a form of dependence on Western standards and paradigms that 
Afrocentric ideology (see Asante 1988) advocates against.  
 
A review of literature offers no explicit definition of feminism but what is clear is that 
feminism is essentially concerned with the liberation of women and is; 
 
 “… committed to work individually and collectively … to end all forms of oppression 
[against women based on sex differences and to work towards] uncover[ing] and 
understand[ing] what causes and sustains oppression in all its forms” (Maguire 
1987:79). 
 
The term ‘feminist’ is therefore used to refer to a female displaying a “range of behaviour 
indicating … agency and self determination” Oyewumi (2003:1). According to Oyewumi 
personal, cultural, political self determination and organising in groups (brought about by 
age group socialisation into regiments and/or through rites of passage ceremonies) has 
been a long term value of traditional African societies and not something taught to African 
by the West as often assumed but this relatively privileged position of some African women 
was abridged by slavery, colonisation and globalisation which has made the African people 
dependant on the West economically, politically and to some extent culturally. 
 
African feminism on the other hand could be defined as a theoretical model that shares 
common concerns with other feminisms; however its point of departure from mainstream 
feminisms is based on “issues of agency, subjectivity and power – the power to name oneself, 
one’s location and one’s struggle” (Arndt 2002:13). This agency is located in Africa’s 
historical realities of marginalisation caused by slavery, colonialism, racism, globalisation, 
and poverty (Oyewumi 2005 and Adeleye-Fayemi 2000). By implication therefore African 
feminism is “… anti-imperialist, socialist-oriented and aware of social injustices on a 
society… ” (Adeleye-Fayemi 2000:6). 
 
Like other Third World feminisms,  African feminisms calls for the consideration of its varied 
cultures, ethnicity, language and religion because these added dimensions have a bearing 
on the different ways women experience their lives as women and constructs a “different 
context in which Third World women’s struggles must be understood” (Johnson-Odim 
1991:314). The key argument here is that Western feminisms cannot meaningfully represent 
other women because different women have different value systems, challenges and needs 
(Adeleye-Fayemi 2004, Mohanty, Russo & Torres 1991 and Mikell 1997). Similar critiques are 
shared by other alternative feminist discourses including; ‘womanism’ (Walker 1983), 
‘Africana womanism’ (Hudson-Weems 1993), ‘Motherism’ (Acholonu 1995), ‘Stiwanism’ 
(Ogundipe 1994), ‘negofeminism’ (Nnaemeka 1995), ‘femalism’ and ‘Black feminism’ (Kohrs-
Amissah 2002). Theorising African feminism is therefore no easy task, first because it is a 
work still in progress and secondly because of the sheer size of the continent and the 
complexity of issues that the different regions in the continent face. This makes it difficult to 
have a single African feminist thought. The concept of African feminism may therefore “raise 
more questions than give answers” (Stoetzler and Yuval-Davis 2002:316).  
 
Before proceeding with this discussion, there is a need to define two key words used in this 
discussion; that is African and Western. Africa is used to refer to the Uganda context. I am 
aware that other African women share similar experiences of oppression but this thesis will 
not be able to deal with a wider scope because of the vastness and diversity of Africa. The 
diversity in Africa implies that women’s experience of oppression are different and therefore 
understanding of women’s empowerment may significantly vary because of ethnic, religious, 
economic, political and historical differences. While Western (or dominant) is used to refer to 
feminist discourses from Western Europe and North America. 
 
 
 
 
What constitutes African Feminism? 
 
Evidence from the literature indicates six key tenets of African feminism including; its 
location in the continent’s historical and cultural experiences of oppression, the genesis of 
feminism in Africa, the politics of naming, the production of knowledge, advocates for 
cooperation between women and men to achieve women’s emancipation and upholds 
motherhood. 
 
To begin with, it is important to acknowledge that there are some common themes between 
African and Western feminism and an attempt to redefine what is African in feminism usually 
has Western ideas resurfacing. According to Adeleye-Fayemi (2000) this is borne out of 
Africa’s Colonial history and globalisation. Common themes between the two kinds of 
feminism includes the rejection of gender oppression and inequality as well as consider 
patriarchal power as a deliberate structure to subjugate women, including the view that 
women experience the world differently and their view point may be different from that of 
men. The commonalities imply that all feminist could be relevant to each other especially 
when working towards broader and inter-connected issues like the Convention on the 
Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) as stated in the Uganda 
CEDAW Report (GoU 1999). 
 
As indicated earlier, Africa’s history has shaped the experiences of women and their 
relationship with the West. Additionally, feminism in Africa challenges institutionalised 
racism evident in global structures like the World Bank, United Nations and development 
agencies that sometimes undermines the continents development processes (Mama 1995). 
The two forms of feminisms are grounded in different contexts, experiences and realities, 
implying that the term ‘feminism’ carries different meanings for women in Africa and those 
in the West and else where in the World and this needs to be taken into consideration when 
analysing the experiences of oppression by women from the different worlds (Mwale 2002 
and Alleyne 1998).  
 
It could be said that those involved in women’s rights struggles in Africa are of two minds; 
the first is that they are feminists and the second is that they are not feminists but activists 
(Adeleye-Fayemi 2004, Tamale 2003 and Ardnt 2002). According to Adeleye-Fayemi (2004), 
the more dominant group prefers the ‘gender activist’ label because they feel that ‘gender’ 
is a safer word because it is accommodated by men unlike the term ‘feminist’ that they find 
threatening to the status quo because of its association to ‘power over’ and the negative 
stereotypes attached to Western feminisms for instance; “men haters, divorcees, 
uncompromising, extremists, atheists, hypocrites, imperialists and lesbian among other 
names” (Oyewumi 2003, Mohanty et al 1999 and Asante 1988).  Adeleye-Fayemi further 
explains that the fear of using the term ‘feminist’ is heightened by the fact that patriarchy in 
Africa uses “a system of rewards and punishment depending on whether one conforms or 
deviates” (Adeleye-Fayemi 2004:17).  
 
Women professing to be feminists and others advocating for the rights of others, do so at 
great risk. An example for instance is the brutal treatment faced by those fighting for gay 
and lesbian rights in Uganda. These women face challenges not just because same sex 
relationships is culturally forbidden in Uganda but also because homophobia is encouraged 
through governments laws of the penal code that legally outlaws homosexuality. 
Additionally, some of the press encourages homophobia by providing space for anti-
homosexuality messages and campaigns. In August 2006 for instance, the Red Pepper 
newspaper published names of 45 gay men and carried several stories which encouraged the 
public to harass gay people. In its 8th September 2006 issue, the Red Pepper run an article 
titled “Kampala’s notorious lesbians unearthed”. Besides listing names of lesbians women, it 
called out to the public to name and shame these kinds of women and encouraged more 
people to “send more name to us, [including] the occupation of the lesbians within your 
neighbourhood… [so that] we can shame them”. The Red Pepper said they were committed 
to exposing all the lesbians in the city so as to “rid our motherland of the deadly vice”. After 
these articles were published, most of the people whose names were mentioned were 
attacked in their homes by local residents, some lost their jobs, were disowned by their 
families, their homes searched by state agents and even arrested by police.  Some women 
have even been raped by men so as to “teach them a lesson” (Mukasa 2006:1).  
 
Despite these challenges, the ‘feminist’ minority like Dr. Sylvia Tamale, argue that the term 
feminist is a better label because it carries a harder “political punch” that the term activist 
lacks. According to Tamale (2003), the use of the ‘activist’ ‘ label has left the women’s 
movement in Uganda weak and can only be remedied if women’s rights activist are “… elated 
… and drunk on [women’s] cause … objectives … mission …[and] obligations”. Tamale 
further discourages gender activism because it has had the unfortunate tendency to lead to 
lack of enthusiasm, “comfortable complacency, dangerous diplomacy and even importance” 
(Tamale 2003:1). Exceptions like Tamale are generally considered radical and often criticised 
for promoting ‘foreign ideas’ that may erode African values.  
 
Tamale also advocates for the rights of gay people. During the revision of Uganda’s 
Domestic Relations Bill (DRB) for instance, Tamale pointed to the hypocrisy of government 
and feminists in Uganda for their double standards when it came to dealing with human 
rights yet in the same breath are intolerant to issues of same sex relationships, which she 
argues are also human rights that deserve to be recognised (Tamale 2003). Tamale’s 
advocacy outraged many Ugandans and caused President Museveni to force the withdrawal 
of the DRB in 2002. In a letter to the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, the 
president confessed he had ordered the Ministry of Gender to withdraw the DRB because “… 
the Bill was rather shallow and cannot address issues of the Ugandan society”. The President 
further warned all Ugandans against “… copying western ways of life which have caused … 
the stampede for self destruction …” (Kawamara-Mishambi 2003). 
 
African feminists also argue against the notion that the struggle for women’s rights in Africa 
started with liberation and anti-colonial struggles of the 1950s and 1960s and that the ideas 
of feminism reached Africa via Western Feminism. According to Mohanty, Russo and Torres 
(1991), this seems to ignore resistance to male domination by women in Africa and other 
Third World countries since the 1800s although not necessarily called feminism. In 1899 for 
instance, Qasim Amin, an Egyptian jurist wrote a book on Women's Liberation (Tahrir al-
Mar'a). The book criticised some of the practices prevalent in his society at the time such as 
polygamy, the veil, and segregation of women.  Prior to this book the women’s press in 
Egypt was already voicing such concerns since its very first issue in 1892 and were 
producing their own magazine, the L'Egyptienne by the 1920s (Mama 1995). 
 
In addition, the African form of communication has mostly been oral and therefore little 
documentary evidence exists on the actual period women’s activism started. For instance, 
through folk tales told to me by my grandparents, I have grown up knowing that centuries 
ago Warrior Queens and women soldiers existed. There are several other stories about 
unmarried powerful women who resisted arranged marriages and in protest eloped or lead 
celibate lives. Evidence from Uganda and other countries like Nigeria (see Adeleye-Fayemi 
2000); indicate that the institution of witchcraft has also been used to resist patriarchal 
practices like polygamy or wife battering. In other cases, older women protested unfair 
treatment by stripping and marching naked. Amongst the Japadhola from Eastern Uganda 
where I come from, it is a taboo to see the nakedness of your mother or grandmother. The 
mere threat of such acts acted as a deterrent to male oppressors.  I therefore see witchcraft 
and striping naked as examples of how African women have resisted patriarchy despite 
arguments that African women have accepted to be battered and depersonalised (Adeleye-
Fayemi 2000).  
 
Although one of the areas considered to be vehicles of oppressing women is religion, it is 
also an area were women have exercised power in Africa. There are several cases of powerful 
priestesses today and in the past within African traditional religion. However through the 
introduction of Islam and Christianity to Africa, women’s oppression deepened because 
these religions promoted the exclusion of women from work outside the home. Prior to this 
period, African women were involved in activities based outside the home like agricultural 
production and trading. These elements are still evident in rural areas of several African 
communities including Buwama and Nabweru in Uganda, were women till the land, look after 
the home, make crafts and are involved in trading. According to Mama (1995), Islam 
undermined women and depersonalised them through veiling, while Christianity emphasised 
women’s obligation to their husbands. These new religious expectations on women added to 
African women’s existing roles instead increased women’s burden. Women’s exclusion from 
public and wage waged employment is therefore part of the colonial legacy that African 
feminist have to deal with now. Christianity and Islam can however be credited for 
introducing African women to education that has served as a source of empowerment for 
some women (Mama 1995).  
 
Mbire-Barungi (1999), further argues that although the duality of roles is common, the 
degree of the burden distinguishes women from the South from those in the North. In Africa 
men are dependent on the women for their daily existence and women sometimes use this 
as a source of power to get the men to do exactly as they wish (Mbire-Barungi 1999 and 
Mama 1995). During the focus group discussion with women in Uganda for instance, it was 
revealed that their typical day involved domestic chores like cooking, laundry, taking care of 
the children and agricultural labour as indicated in table 3.1 below that illustrates Mr. and 
Mrs. Mukasa daily schedule. It shows that a woman in Uganda does almost 15 hours of work 
as opposed to her male counter part who does 5 to 6 hours less. Although this data is not 
representative of all women and men in Uganda, it gives a rough idea of what happens. 
 
 
Table 3.1: Daily activities of women and men in Buwama community 
Time Women’s activities Men’s activities 
05:00 Wake up & morning prayer  
06:00-0700 Sweeps house 
Prepares breakfast 
Prepares children for school 
Cleans utensils 
Milks cow 
Sell milk to buyers 
Tither cows 
Morning prayers and goes 
farming  
07:00-09:00 Goes to the garden  
09:00-12:00 Returns from garden 
Prepares lunch 
Washes clothes 
Returns from garden 
Rests  
Has a drink  
12:00-13:00 Eats lunch Eats  
13:00-16:00 Rests  
Make crafts  
Listens to radio 
Visits friends 
Goes to community meetings 
16:00-18:00 Collects firewood 
Checks livestock 
Fetches water 
Ps: women usually socilise 
during this time 
- 
19:00-21:00 Cleans up 
Prepares dinner (May get help 
from children if they back from 
school) 
Ensure children have had a bath 
Eats dinner  
Prepares for bed 
Returns home to check on 
livestock and family 
Listens to radio 
Goes out for drink with friends 
21:00-00:00 Gets up to warm husbands food 
Get him water to have a bath 
Go back to bed 
Returns home 
Eats dinner  
Bed  
 
 
During struggles for liberation in Africa, women’s political participation was evident through 
women’s wings that included women from both rural and urban areas for instance in Kenya’s 
Mau Mau rebellion, Algeria’s National Liberation Front (FLN) and Mozambique’s FRELIMO 
guerrilla force amongst other liberation struggles in Africa (Mwale 2002 and Mama 1995). In 
Uganda, women started with the formation of the Banakazadde be Egwanga (mothers of the 
nation) to protest the deportation of the Kabaka (king) of Buganda, Mutesa II in 1955 
(Ahikire 2005). These women also struggled against property restrictions and women’s right 
to vote. It was however common for women to work towards the common independence 
goal as opposed to organising to deal with gender relations specifically. Despite this, after 
independence, the new states sidelined women (Ardnt 2002). The common scenario after 
independence was instead seeing women as politicians’ wives quietly standing besides their 
husbands. Most of these women had been specially groomed in girls’ schools established by 
colonialists to prepare wives for ‘western-educated-African men’ (see Ahikire 2005).  
 
 It is therefore worth noting that even before the struggles for independence, patriarchal 
practices existed in Africa and women used several strategies to resist it including; “… using 
the institution of motherhood, access to political power [and] religious authority… [amongst 
others]”,  just that Africa’s contacts with the West added another dimension of oppression to 
Africa, were women had to bear a bigger burden including losing their previous positions of 
power and leadership (Adeleye-Fayemi 2000:6 and Johnson-Odim 1991). African feminism 
therefore questions the degree to which women can benefit from their political participation. 
As discussed in chapter 2, participation according to several empowerment scholars is one 
of the indicators of women’s empowerment; however women’s experience in the liberation 
struggles and in development projects today indicates that participation in political 
processes does not always lead to women’s empowerment. Feminist activism in Africa is 
therefore concerned with issues like revisiting constitutions, women’s relationships with the 
state, their civic rights and citizenship (Oyewumi 2003 and Adeleye-Feyemi 2000). 
 
Despite this post independence betrayal by men, women in Africa still feel that without 
collaboration with men, attaining women’s empowerment could face challenges. According 
to Etienne and Leacock (1980 in Johnson-Odim 1991), African women continue to seek such 
egalitarian relations because it was the African way of life in pre-colonial Africa and although 
patriarchy existed, the view is that it has been made worse by cultural and economic 
imperialism that continues to oppress both women and men in Africa. Women also need 
men not just to fulfil their biological role of motherhood but also to work towards 
institutional power structures that oppress African people. This is important because African 
women believe that for meaningful change to take place there is need to collaborate with 
their men. African women feel that the continued resistance to women’s liberation is 
because men have been eliminated from processes that could have changed their negative 
attitudes. This backlash is because of the fact that while women are ‘conscientised’, men are 
left with the same way of thinking and yet there is a need for the men to understand why 
women have to be addressed as a special group. Besides men are not just beneficiaries of 
patriarchy but also “products of patriarchal socialisation” (Arndt 2002:73). 
 
For this reason therefore, not just men should be viewed as oppressors but women too can 
be oppressors or partners in oppression or have the potential to become oppressors. For 
instance, cases were mothers-in-law oppress their daughters- in- law or even cases of 
matrilineal societies in Africa were women have power over men. Some of the matrilineal 
societies include; the Mang’anja of Malawi, the Akan of Ghana, Ngoni of Tanzania and the 
Akamba of Kenya who even have women to women marriages, also practiced in Uganda 
(Mutiso 2004). In these cases the women yield more power than men, the children belong to 
the woman and the man is expected to settle in the wives ancestral home upon marriage 
(Mwale 2002). Additionally, there are other institutional forms of oppression that are not 
necessarily related to people’s sex or gender but race and class. African women and men 
therefore need to work together to challenge these institutionalised forms of oppression. To 
African feminists therefore, feminists need not be in opposition to men and women need not 
neglect their biological roles because motherhood is a strength and seen as having a special 
manifestation in Africa (Ogundipe-Leslie 1985).  
 
Motherhood to several African women provides a sense of protection and companionship 
which they do not expect from their husbands unlike their Western sisters. This belief is 
evident in a common saying amongst the Japadhola that ‘Achandere pa dhako makunywol”, 
literally translated as; I am suffering like a women who has not given birth to children. This 
saying highlights the vital power that motherhood gives several women and having no child 
is viewed as a possible source of suffering. A child is seen as a source of comfort, so several 
women in Africa embrace their reproductive role because they see it as a positive element 
(Oyewumi 2003 and Ogundipe-Leslie 1994). Although motherhood is connected to sexuality, 
African scholars hardly cover this issue. According to Mama, it could be a deliberate move by 
African women to avoid an area that has been a “historical legacy of racist fascination with 
African sexuality” (Mama 1995:14).This has resulted into an ongoing prejudice of African 
sexuality. Most of what is emphasised are the problematic aspects of African sexuality like 
genital mutilation and epidemics like HIV/AIDS. 
 
Another area were African women experience institutional oppression and/or ‘power over’ 
from fellow women is evident in the difficulties they face in an effort to participate in 
“defining feminism and setting a feminist agenda” (Johnson-Odim 1991:323). According to 
Mama (1995), since the 1970s, educated African women have demanded that their voices be 
heard because they; 
 
were no longer content with merely being objects of studies, whose situation was 
used to test and verify theories conceptualised elsewhere by women scholars whose 
concerns and preoccupations often differed from their own (Mama 1995:3). 
 
Some of the steps African women undertook to increase their autonomy involved the 
establishment of women specific institutions like the Association of African Women for 
Research and Development (AAWORD) and CODESRIA's gender analysis seminars. 
Additionally, country specific institutions were launched. In Uganda for instance, women's 
desks were established in several government sectors and through affirmative action, 
policies were created to increase the representation of women in parliament to at least 30% 
and female students were awarded an extra 1.5 point to boost their entry to tertiary 
institutions (Nabachwa 2004 and GoU 1999).  
 
Through donor support, women in Uganda have been able to set up women specific 
organisations like the Uganda Media Women's Association (UMWA) and a women's studies 
department was established at Makerere University in Uganda. These institutions have 
however been hard to sustain because of financial difficulties and donor dependence has 
once again undermined the independence of these women organisations since the funds 
come with strings attached. Sometimes specific issues are funded and for survival these 
organisations have to change their focus. According to Johnson-Odim (1999), the limited 
resource that African women have has limited how much they can publish thus leaving the 
defining of African feminisms to those with more access to resources. This also means that 
African women have to publish in the West and by so doing have to comply with criteria that 
may sometimes relegate their views.  
 
Oyewumi (2003) further argues for a need to construct knowledge about African women by 
African women themselves, in their own terms and based on their own beliefs and needs. 
African women challenge the notion that one mode of feminism can be privileged above 
others and that knowledge production should be based on the experiences of women in 
Africa (Oyewumi 2003). African feminists are concerned with the way dominant feminists 
discourses has represented them; in the words of Oyeronke Oyewumi (2003:27) and Olufemi 
Taiwo (2003:45) the “misrepresentation” of African women. African women criticise Western 
perspectives for looking at women as a homogeneous group and yet gender is experienced 
differently. An example is the representation of the African women in Western Feminist 
discourse solely as powerless victims who are unable to define their own needs (Okome 
2003). However, as discussed earlier in this chapter and else where in this thesis, some 
women in Africa are in position of power and may sometimes be oppressors not just of 
fellow women but of men tool. Taiwo also illustrates this visor generalisation using the work 
of Kate Crehan (1983) on women in North Western Zambia that assumes that African women 
are the same. As indicated in the following quote, Crehan was in only one area of Africa for 
18 months but uses this data as a basis to generalise African women’s experience; 
 
The research was carried out between 1997 and 1989 during which time I lived for 
18 months in one small Kaonde Community in North Western Zambia. The main 
research method used was participant observation. Although the paper is in one 
sense specific and particular, the underlying processes described are similar to those 
found in many rural areas of sub-Saharan Africa. (Crehan 1983:52). 
 
This same pattern is evident in an article by Meeker and Meekers that describes the Kaguru 
women’s family relations, household power structures and educational opportunities. While 
they try to indicate that the rural Kaguru woman is different, they still go ahead to use her 
experience to represent experiences in rural African societies; 
 
Obtaining information from women themselves is essential for the formulation of 
policies and programs that are relevant to the needs of rural African women …while 
the situation of women in other societies may be different, many of the issues 
addressed by Kaguru women are relevant for other rural African socities (Meeker and 
Meekers 1997:36) 
 
According to Sexton this ought to be avoided because “generalising can be misleading, 
inadequate … failing to take into account the astonishing variations among women.[it is 
therefore worth noting that] women have not one but many voices …” (Sexton 1982 in 
Reinharz 1992: 4). Feminist scholarship must therefore create room for the inclusion of 
Afrocentric perspectives, acknowledge the position of African women in relation to her 
Western counter parts and be specific in identifying socio-cultural barriers to women’s 
empowerment and re-evaluate how they conceive women’s empowerment in Africa.  
 
Additionally, African feminists argue that for long they have been spoken for either by their 
men or men from the West and if by women, it has always been by women from the West 
who misrepresent them. As a result, the content available on African women reflects foreign 
values and experiences which they use as a yardstick to judge Africa (Oyewumi 2003). 
According to Mwale (2002), this reflects privileges of a few women over other women and 
how they use this as a position of power “to force upon ‘other’ women their own 
idiosyncrasies, terms and definitions [in other words] what they mean for themselves and 
others” (Mwale 2002:133). The issue for African women here is therefore not the origin of 
the term feminism per se but how feminist discourse engages Africa and its people. There is 
therefore a need to include African women’s experiences as authentic knowledge but also to 
go a step further to consider women’s position in relation to men as opposed to looking at 
women in isolation. 
 
African women challenge the way their contribution to knowledge has been categorised 
under courses liken race, development and postcolonial theory. For instance, feminisms 
within the West have been classified based on historical debates over the definitions and 
constructions of gender. The different categorisation of feminisms has been based on the 
degree of tolerance in the way different scholars have dealt with gender inequality issues 
and women’s oppression. Some of the common strands include; Liberal, Radical and socialist 
feminisms amongst others (These categories could also be found amongst African 
feminists). The categorisation of feminisms is sometimes based on chronological historic 
occurrence or waves. They include; feminism awakening (1790-1848), Feminisms first wave 
(1848-1920, feminism retreat (1920-1960, feminism second wave (19060-1982) and 
feminism third wave (from 1982) (see Adeleye Fayemi 2004, Brayton 1997, Maguire 1987, 
Black 1989, Humm 1989 and Stamp 1989). According to Cott (1987), the wave 
categorisation is flawed because it ignores resistance to male domination between the 
1920s and 1960s and other struggles against patriarchy which are located outside Western 
realities for instance that by ‘women of color’. This isolation leaves their work at the risk of 
not being read and as such their concerns are not being considered. This demonstrates that 
unequal power relations still exist within feminist scholarship (see Tamale 2000, Mama 
1995, and Mohanty et al 1991). I was actually quite surprised to find that even recent key 
feminist texts like Maggie Humm’s (1992) “Feminisms: a reader”, which mentions different 
genres of feminisms including Asian, Black, women of colour and lesbian feminisms, is silent 
on African feminisms. Although Black women share commonalities, in Humm’s book like 
several others, Black women are used to refer to Black women in Britain, other parts of 
Europe and the United States, meaning the African women are still left out. Additionally, 
African women disassociate themselves from other Black Anglo-American women like Alice 
Walker, and Cleonora Hudson Weems who speak on behalf of all Black women without really 
being informed about the situation in Africa.  According to Ardnt (2002) African women 
demand a re-examination of feminist discourse because it depicts a mindset that consider 
other races inferior and bestows privilege on a few. This is evident in the “coloring of 
feminist discourse to “black, white and brown” as opposed to African women who speak 
geographically (Arndt 2002: 11).  
 
According to Charles (1992) this limiting space under which African, Black and Third World 
women are allowed to speak depicts racism and imperialism. So they find it necessary to 
present their concerns within the very school of thought they oppose to ensure their voices 
are heard, that is taking the insider/outsider position (Collins 1990). Azziz further explains 
that this kind of representation continually presents Third World women as “victims” and not 
“agents” of their own cause as they would wish (Azziz 1992:292). Part of the concerns of 
African feminism is therefore ensuring that women’s diversity is reflected in feminist 
discourses. African women therefore lobby against politics of universalism, cultural controls 
and misrepresentation. According to Mama (1995), if scholarship is indigenously grounded, 
the conclusions are often different and more profound than that done by those from outside 
that context. Mama makes reference to scholars like Foucault who have developed their 
theory based on an in-depth understanding of their societies.  
 
African feminist are therefore trying to create new identities for themselves by questioning 
the relevance of models of thought and institutions which are of no value to the continent. 
The contestation with current models of feminism is that they have been created outside 
African experiences and realities and therefore serve to make African women invisible and 
disposable. However feminism is still unpopular in Africa and although some achievements 
have been attained in the public, in the private women suffer silently. In my case for 
instance, doing this PhD has confirmed to those around me my position as a feminist and as 
a result I have faced challenges even from my own family. Several times I have been accused 
of being blinded by Western ideas that do not apply to Uganda. I have also been accused of 
being too aggressive. As an African woman, I am expected to exude gentler characteristics 
like being caring, non-assertive and submissive, which to most African men implies 
accepting a position of inferiority to men and not challenging their 'authority'. Additionally, 
during interviews for this study, I was accused by some men of being “one of those urban 
based educated women who just want to confuse women in the villages”.  This happened on 
at least two different occasions. One of the men who made this comment was a husband to 
one of the women I interviewed and the other a government official at one of the sub 
counties I visited. Other women in Uganda involved in similar activities have to deal with 
unsupportive or even abusive partners in private, hostility from the state and even the media 
that ridicules activists and/or feminist as “frustrated women who want to mess up other 
people’s homes” (Adeleye-Fayemi 2004, Oyewumi 2003 and Tamale 2003). 
 
It therefore ought to be understood that African feminisms in all its multiplicity, is 
concerned with issues of who defines their issues, because for long what has been defined 
as acceptable has mostly been defined by men, women are treated as second rate citizens, 
women’s labour is not remunerated, her rights are subject to validation and her daughters 
share the same fate because she is socialised to sustain these oppressive structures. 
Rewards are given for compliance and punishment for rebellion (Adeleye-Fayemi 2000, 
Johnson-Odin 1991 and Mohanty et al 1991). 
 
 
Feminism in Uganda: challenges and contradictions 
There are two basic faces to feminism in Uganda. The popular group made up of ordinary 
women and the intellectual group considered more individualistic and are involved in setting 
up most of the women NGOs. This group also includes women within academia. The 
women’s movement in Uganda has influenced by international events like the United Nations 
(UN) International Conferences on women in Mexico City in 1975, the 1976 Wellesley 
conference on women and development, Copenhagen 1980 (Mohanty 1991: 75) and the 
third UN conference on women in Nairobi in 1985 which attracted a lot of third world and 
African women. More recently is the fourth world conference on women held in Beijing, 
china, 1995. 
 
The popular group, considered less threatening is a product of liberation movements during 
which women fought along side men for their country’s liberation. These groups of women 
are mostly illiterate but intelligent enough to take advantage of ongoing debates to improve 
their status. It is amongst this group that you find small scale traders based in mainly rural 
areas. Small and agro based trading is ingrained in the traditional African societies’ 
matriarchal system where women enjoyed some rights, although this was within a clearly 
defined space, the household and community management (Uchendu 1993 in Toure et al 
2003 and Mbire-Barungi 1999).  
 
The intellectual group faces more challenges because they are viewed as promoting western 
ideologies, acquired through western education and exposure to international debates on 
women’s rights. It is this group that has for many years challenged oppressive cultural 
practices like polygamy, forced marriages, female genital mutilation (FGM), widow 
inheritance and domestic violence and property rights amongst other issues. This group is 
also recognised for exporting debates on rights of women in Africa beyond African borders 
through international conference that they speak at and papers that they write. 
 
Although this group has had great impact in terms of advocating for changes away from 
oppressive cultural and legislative practices they are looked at as practicing “intellectual-
profit-seeking- feminism” (Toure et al 2003:2) and ‘careerism’ (Tamale 2003:4) which creates 
a monopoly by a few elite women and weakens women’s collective movement and 
continuity. Most academic women have set up organisations commonly known as MONGOs; 
an acronym for “my own NGO”. The MONGOs have had the sad effect of disadvantaging 
other women particularly rural women since a level of discrimination is practiced. As 
explained by one of the CEEWA beneficiaries in Buwama, for other women to channel their 
handcrafts for exports through these women NGOs they need to know someone within the 
organisation; 
 
The previous CEEWA officer used to link us with NAWOU1  and they would buy our 
crafts but since she left, NAWOU does not seem to know or even remember us. I went 
to NAWOU recently but they refused my crafts. It really hurts, other women’s crafts 
were being accepted because they have friends or relatives working at the 
organisation but mine was rejected” (focus group discussion, Buwama 2005) 
 
Clearly there is an absence of the rural face to the women’s movement in Uganda. The 
movement seems to rotate around Kampala (the capital city of Uganda). Women in Kampala 
continually talk on behalf of others and this limits the effectiveness of the women’s 
movement.  
 
Continuity is also limited because younger women are isolated from the feminist processes 
since there MONGO practice promotes founder member syndromes. Although younger 
women are blamed for taking a lukewarm approach to women’s issues, the founder member 
syndrome has meant that older women cling onto power and are not grooming younger 
women to take over (Tamale 2003). A closely related problem is the gap between theory and 
practice. Women in academia and the active practitioners work separately. According to 
Tamale, the failed relation between theory and praxis has contributed to a “half baked and 
truncated feminism”. Tamale further argues that these two groups need to work together 
because while theory leads to informed activism, it is also informed by practice, otherwise 
Uganda feminism will continue operating in “obscurantism” (Tamale 2003:4). 
 
One of the greatest challenges to women’s movement in Uganda is the fact that women’s 
rights and human rights in general are shrouded in uncertainty and to a large extend 
depend on the politics of the day. Politicians are aware of this and use it to buy off women. 
In Uganda for instance, President Museveni claims to have made the women’s movement 
                                                
1 National Association of Women of Uganda 
what is today and so women should allow him to be “… the driver of the vehicle of the 
women’s movement…” and expects women to forever be grateful to him (Tamale 2003 and 
Kabuchu 2005). This situation has seen several women activists bought off by offering them 
leadership positions and once they take up these positions they stop lobbying for women 
issues and instead work towards pleasing the appointing authorities. This “grateful 
sycophancy” syndrome is evident in Uganda’s 2001 presidential elections when a group of 
women claimed to speak for other women, constituted themselves into an organisation 
known as Women’s Movement for the Return of Kaguta (WORK) (Goetz 2003:121). WORK run 
advertisements to support the incumbent on the grounds that he had elevated the status of 
women in society. Women also fail to successful influence issues pertinent to them in 
parliament because of their small numbers, just about 18% of the parliament and yet to win 
in policy making is not just about voting on issues but about numbers (Matembe 1997).   
 
According to Tamale, political leaders like Museveni find it easy to hijack women’s 
achievements and get all the credit because women themselves have failed to claim their 
gains. This makes critics question whether indeed there is a women’s movement in Uganda. 
According to Ahikire (2005) however, the question is not whether there is women’s 
movement in Uganda but rather about the lack of leadership to show direction for the over 
grown movement. She argues that the movement is “… visible but lacks the power as a 
collective” (Ahikire 2005:5). Women activists in Uganda have also failed to sustain their 
benefits because they work in a fragmented and adhoc manner and only “come [together] in 
response to specific issues and don’t sustain the pressure even on those specific ones ... it is 
a crisis approach rather than a sustained continuous social movement” (Tamale 2003: 9). 
Ahikire further critics Uganda activists for failing to plan for resistance and failure and 
assuming that all their ideas to change the status quo will be embraced by the same men 
they seek to challenge. She points out the example of the Domestic Relations Bill (DRB) that 
seems stagnant because the women’s coalition had no fall back plan but assumed the bill 
would automatically be passed (Ahikire 2005: 7). The DRB proposes equal rights for both 
men and women and proposes the consolidation of all laws relating to marriage, separation 
and divorce (GoU 2000). Further challenges are evident in the several proposals being 
advanced by men to scrap sex-quotas and the policy of affirmative action.  
 
The culture of donor driven NGOs, has also overtaken the women’s struggle. This is looked 
at as leading to the advancement of mainly other people’s agenda as opposed to what is 
truly relevant for women in Uganda. Some critics attribute the defeatist approach that 
several women NGOs use to donor dependency. In a bid to get more funding proposals are 
written in a way that depicts women especially those in rural areas as ignorant suffering 
victims who can not stand up for their own rights (Tamale 2003). This is coupled with 
governments increasing obsession to control NGOs. For instance, NGOs in Uganda have to 
get their licence renewed annually and on the board that approves these licences are 
security operatives (Tamale 2003). 
 
A recent resistance to showing the play “Vagina Monologues” in Uganda is a clear 
demonstration that the women’s movement still faces challenges rooted in cultural 
orientation from not just men as individuals but also men use their advantageous position as 
the majority in policy making to undermine women’s efforts. Whereas the play is an adult 
play seeking to highlight sexual violence, it was stopped on the account of immorality. It is a 
show of double standards by government because pornographic material is allowed on the 
streets where even under age children have access. Clearly, “… the interests of men 
prevailed”. While pornography, depicting women as sexual objects is for men’s pleasure, the 
“V-Monologues are not” because they offer women an alternative out of sexual oppression 
(Ahikire 2005:13). 
 
Although efforts to address the gender equality gap in Uganda became more pronounced 
after the 1995 Beijing conference, government efforts to include women in social and 
political processes became evident in about 1986.  A Ministry in charge of women issues was 
established in 1988. This Ministry that started as the Ministry of Women in development has 
had several institutional and name changes and is now known as the Ministry of Gender, 
Labour and Social Development. This Ministry is underfunded, has a skeleton staff and has 
changed its approach to gender mainstreaming which has reduced its visibility as a ministry 
concerned with women’s issues (Nabachwa 2004). The changes in the ministry’s name and 
mandate are indicative of Uganda’s move towards a gender mainstreaming way of operation, 
which in my opinion diminishes the need to focus on women’s specific needs. 
 
Although gender mainstreaming is considered a more holistic and inclusive approach for 
dealing with gender inequality, it has the unfortunate result of further discriminating women 
and has made government less accountable to women. Gender mainstreaming seems to be 
looked at as if gender issues are cross cutting and so women issues remain a political 
rhetoric and policy document appendages devoid of real commitment to improve the 
unequal position of women and men (Ahikire 2005 and Tamale 2003). According to 
Rathgeber and Adera (2000), “gender-neutral” policies tend to favour men, as they usually 
have more resources and better education than women. This has been clearly demonstrated 
in the Uganda experience were just 2 women out of a 25 member task force directly took 
part in the formulation and drafting of the national ICT policy. These processes did not even 
involve the Ministry responsible for women. As a matter of fact the 1997 National Gender 
Policy emphasises the need to gender mainstream in planning processes and levels of 
national development.  
 
Implications for the study: using the standpoint of African women 
The methodological implications of the issues raised here is that the analysis must be 
grounded in Uganda women’s understanding of their own experience with ICTs. It ought to 
be understood that feminist research, “in all its varieties” challenges the “positivist notions of 
objectivity and truth” that they believe are men’s ways of defining reality and excludes 
women’s perspectives.  Feminist research therefore differs from traditional research for 
three reasons; (i) it seeks to remove the power imbalance between research and subject; (ii) 
it is politically motivated in that it seeks to change social inequality; and (iii) it begins with 
the standpoints and experiences of women (Stoetzler and Yuval-Davis 2002:315).  
 
This study also recognises that just like there are several feminisms, there are also several 
ways feminist research can be conducted. This study therefore employs Standpoint feminism 
which is of the view that “knowledge can be produced from … women’s unequal gendered 
social relationships …” (Ramazanoglu and Holland 2002:171). Standpoint feminism’s basic 
principle is to place women’s experiences as central. An African feminist standpoint 
therefore goes further to advocate that if knowledge on African women’s experiences is to 
be produced; it should be by African women scholars because they understand their values 
better. It is also a resistance to their continued marginalisation in the production of 
knowledge (Oyewumi 2003). Feminist theories will therefore be the overarching theory 
informing this thesis. 
 
Based on the standpoint feminisms principle for a research that “is on, by and for women” 
(Stanley and Wise 1983: 17), this study on African women, has been done by an African 
women, for African women and based on the African feminists epistemologies and ontology. 
However, it must be noted that, as a literate African women, I am a construct of the Western 
systems of knowing and therefore some of the arguments I present reflect this orientation. 
To start with, the very use of the English language, in addition to having undertaken this 
PhD in a European University means my work is heavily influenced by the Western academic 
and social value system. The output of this work, like other papers I have written based on 
this project will ‘unfortunately’ be in English, meaning that most of the rural women, whose 
experiences and insights into technology change and rural communities I use used to 
produce my work, will be denied access. As a strategy however, it is hoped that some of my 
findings will be disseminated through a channel more accessible to them in terms of 
language and infrastructure.  
 
Based on standpoint principles this study consciously focused on women living in rural 
Uganda because these women are a marginalised group who have been rendered invisible 
through processes that have silenced their voices. Worse still, even when rural women are 
targeted, their real needs are usually ignored by projects that are developed on assumptions 
of what is thought to be suitable for these rural women as opposed to asking them what 
they actually need. Positioning rural women as authorities of their own experiences has 
ensured that they are partners in the production of knowledge about their lived experiences 
and should hopefully led to their visibility.  
 
This chapter has argued that only by appreciating the context within which an experience is 
encountered and patterns of social relationships that influence people’s lived realities can 
we begin to work towards meaningful change. A critical review of the way in which new 
technologies have been promoted in Uganda is therefore necessary. Most of the studies on 
new communication technologies in Uganda seem to ignore the fact that social factors like 
gender relations and power dynamics shape technological and social change. The fact that 
technology and society are ‘mutually constitutive’ means that technology transfer to Africa 
will not necessarily lead to women’s empowerment as anticipated but may in fact reinforce 
already existing male dominance and negative social practices like domestic violence.  
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Chapter 5 
Situated outlooks on discourses of Europeanised 
cosmopolitanism: all-inclusive or exclusive? 
Ulrike M. Vieten 
 
 
This article discusses some perceptions of the Other within contemporary concepts of 
cosmopolitanism in Britain and Germany while looking at the writings of the political 
theorist Chantal Mouffe and the sociologist Jürgen Habermas. Both authors are 
advocating regional allegiance rather than cosmopolitan loyalty as the timely political 
response to the global transition of nation-states in Europe. It is argued that this 
paradigm is linked to the transnational ideological project of Europeanisation keeping 
territorial ideas of social solidarity in place. To help to understand this ideological twist, 
firstly, modern representation of Otherness are going to be discussed outlining 
implications of a critical discourse regarding contemporary racialised boundaries. Before 
turning to Mouffe and Habermas, the notions of difference and Otherness are analytically 
specified as these different layers shed light on the perplexity crossing the borders and 
boundaries of our contemporary plural societies. 
 
Introduction : A brief anchoring of cosmopolitanism in European history 
 
Historically, cosmopolitanism as a philosophical ideal evolved prior to concepts of 
nationalism and the nation-state in Europe though not prior to the metropolitan polis 
(Athens). If we break down the term ‘cosmopolitanism’ we come across the perception of 
‘cosmos’ and ‘polis’ introducing two dimensions: On the one hand it suggests a 
privileged belonging to a particular political community (polis) and the imagination of its 
extension to world scale (cosmos), on the other.  
Cheneval (2002) suggests that cosmopolitanism is rooted in the philosophy of modernity 
proposing the individual’s emancipation from absolutism through supposedly universally 
defined though particularly shaped interests. As he argues, the idea of cosmopolitan law is 
embedded in Kantian and contractual philosophical considerations (2002: 47). 
In his famous essay ‘Perpetual Peace’ (1795), Kant  promoted the utopia of a world wide 
peace, understood as an absence of eternal war. His vision presumed that states are’ 
organized internally according to “republican” principles, when they are organized 
externally in a voluntary league for the sake of keeping peace, and when they respect the 
human rights not only of their citizens but also foreigners.’ (Kleingeld and Brown, 
website) 
Importantly, Kant published his essay in a contemporaneous European context of French 
revolutionary upheaval and the international reception of Hobbes’ Leviathan. In difference 
to Hobbes proposing ‘a kind of fortress state that can overwhelm both internal and 
external enemies’ (Williams 2003: 219), Kant’s statement can be read as an effort to find 
a more peaceful and harmonious alternative beyond an authoritarian state guaranteeing 
international political stability. In the 20th century, Kant’s idea of a contractually based 
model of cosmopolitanism i.e. inspired post war transnational governance institutions 
such as the ‘League of Nations’ (1917) and most importantly, the codification of an 
nascent form of cosmopolitan rights, known as the United Nations Declaration of Human 
Right, in 1948. In the aftermath of war and the Holocaust as crime against humanity 
(Chandler 2002), the will to protect the individual as the universal human rather than as 
the national citizen against internal and external genocides was the driving force to 
establish transnational institutions of law.  
The renaissance of discourses on cosmopolitanism since the early 1990s underlines a 
cyclic interests and theoretical need to revisit the legitimacy of political community 
boundaries and the hope for a more peaceful and just integration of different nations and 
people all over the world. Consequently, cosmopolitan concerns have to address and to 
rethink any collective link between individual strangers belonging to particular and 
universal communities. The position of the self as an individual Other, but also in relation 
to potentially collective Others has to be interrogated when looking at actually existing 
national communities and the promise of an imagined cosmopolitan formation.  
Having said that cosmopolitanism in principle is meant to engage with the question of the 
relation to the Other, this relation does not only depend on having a world and 
experiences in common, but is also guided by an ethics that commands responsibility for 
the Other as stranger. The identification with or the rejection of the stranger as an alien 
determines the perspective of alternative visions of solidarity, justice and world 
community.  
In the multicultural world of today, group particularity and global universalism appear as 
antagonistic twins. Conceptually, cosmopolitanism has addressed the problem of 
universalism in political and philosophical terms, but it is burdened by the Eurocentric 
character of the discourse of universalism. Accordingly, contemporary discourses on 
cosmopolitanism have to be ascertained in terms of their visionary models of an all-
inclusive social solidarity. 
While thinking of the cosmopolitan do we deny her embedding in specific ‘imagined 
communities’? Does it make a difference whether the Other is territorially, spatially or 
spiritually identified? Who is the Other, anyway? 
In the following, I am going to discuss some perceptions of the Other within 
contemporary concepts of cosmopolitanism in Britain and Germany while looking, in 
particular, at the writings of the theorist Chantal Mouffe, born in Belgium and who is 
working in the UK and some of the writings by the German social theorist Jürgen 
Habermas. I am focusing on their contributions to a broader discourse on 
cosmopolitanism as both authors refer to modified symbolic political boundaries in 
Europe from different ideological though related angles.  
As far as the traditional notion of international politics is concerned we are confronted 
with rather minor differences between both academics. Both are advocating regional 
allegiance rather than cosmopolitan loyalty as the timely political response to the global 
transition of nation-states in Europe. I argue that this re-territorializing paradigm is linked 
to the transnational ideological project of Europeanisation keeping territorial ideas of 
social solidarity in place. Although both authors assume a profoundly critical position 
towards US unilateralism  and are rooted ideologically in Marxism, and as far as 
Habermas is concerned in Critical Theory, neither Mouffe nor Habermas dare to 
conceptualise cosmopolitanism as an ideological challenge to world capitalism.  
To help to understand this ideological twist, firstly, I will discuss briefly modernist 
representations of Otherness and outline the implications of contemporary racialised 
boundaries. Secondly, I will distinguish the notions of difference and Otherness. Those 
different layers shed light on the perplexity crossing the borders and boundaries of our 
contemporary plural societies. Finally, I will analyse more closely some specific texts by 
Mouffe and Habermas in order to detect in what ways they construct Otherness in their 
approaches to cosmopolitan society and their analytical response to the US-American war 
on terror and the factual rise of terrorist threats and suicide bombings. 
 
The problem of representation: the burden of racialised boundaries 
 
The image of the cosmopolitan from the late 19th and during the 20th century signified the 
transnational agent undermining, or even threatening the spatial logic of the nationalised 
nation-state, defined territorially. In the 21st century, we have to assume that a delusion of 
particular nation and state borders decodes the notion of ‘the cosmopolitan’. Symbolical 
representations of the Other are contingent and therefore, its racialised content has to be 
reviewed. Figures of the Other have to be interpreted as situated articulations of various 
modernisation processes. 
We come across representations of the modern Other when looking at sociological and 
cultural (studies) writings on modernisation. Both, the stranger and the hybrid could be 
identified as dynamic cultural representations of the Other engendered by particular 
modern western and secular Christian national societies in the 19th and 20th century. 
Simmel’s stranger1, for example, and Bhabha’s hybrid2 can be identified as urban images. 
Both representations introduce approaches to the phenomenon of migration and mobility. 
In contrast, the notion of the stateless could be addressed as the non-territorial position 
beyond the modern cultural boundary signifier of the stranger and the hybrid, inscribed 
and constructed as a non belonging to nation states in legal terms. 
Both, the stranger and the hybrid do not transcend the phenomenon of a territorially 
bounded political community though they clearly mark a critical turning point in its 
reading. We can think of a stranger obtaining a particular national citizenship, and 
similarly, of the cultural hybrid who possesses regular legal citizen rights proofing 
his/her formal inclusion. Traditionally, the stateless (in Arendt’ s approach) transgresses 
this legally secure position and signifies at the same time the essential importance of its 
presumption.  
At the end of 2005, 20.8 million refugees, asylum seekers and Others of concern to the 
UNHCR were officially counted3. As the numbers of illegalised people are steadily rising 
the tension of legal and symbolic boundaries has become a more complex and politicised 
issue.  While referring to Agamben (1997), Yuval-Davis (2005) advances the argument of 
‘bare life’ by saying that it is the non-legal status of ‘people on the move’, i.e. those 
without documents that leaves persons outside of institutional state protection in our 
contemporary world.  
Recent research on digitalised surveillance techniques, for example, stress the strict 
border/ boundary logic of the European Union. Broeders (2007: 76)  claims ‘Exclusion 
means separating the “ins” from the “outs”, the “deserving” from the “undeserving”.’ 
This statement gives a sound example in what ways othering of difference operates 
ideologically in a contemporary context. Hence, it is the discursive turning point that 
matters where Otherness as a collective signifier of uncanny and dangerous abnormality 
is put outside of ‘our’ enclosed civil order. The majority of refugees, internally displaced 
and stateless persons remains largely in camps in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. It is 
the camp that evokes the notion of a guarded and controlled place. Leaving them there, 
means leaving them outside. 
As state borders and political boundaries are blurring (Bauböck and Rundall 1998), we 
have to address critically an increasing dialectic phenomenon of  othering difference in a 
post-democratic European Union: on the one hand, authoritarian, legal measures are 
targeting a younger generation of minoritised orthodox faith groupings. On the other, EU 
anti-discrimination directives promise to target racism and social exclusion. This twist in 
legal measures and boundary construction has to be analysed further. What I am 
suggesting is the theoretical differentiation between ‘difference’ as the accepted plural 
mix of secular individuals and ‘alterity’ as the signifier of collective Otherness that is 
                                            
1 See Georg Simmel, “The Adventurer;  “The Stranger”, in Wolff (1959)  
2 Bhabha  1990; 1994 
3 http://www.unhcr.org/statistics.html 
beyond the hegemonic notion of deliberation. This Otherness is inscribed historically in 
different nation state practices and conceptualisations of ‘the political’. As far as the 
contemporary discourses on cosmopolitanism are concerned we are witnessing a 
paradigmatic change in processing symbolic boundaries. 
Contemporary cosmopolitan outlooks on political community and the 
‘Other’ 
The claim of cosmopolitan openness towards Otherness has to be situated in a particular 
historical context as the territorial paradigm of nation state borders and symbolic 
boundaries is shifting and transgressing to differently organised ideological systems. It is 
debatable indeed, how and to what extend contemporary visions of cosmopolitanism re-
conceptualise ‘imagined communities’ to larger regional patriotic systems rather than 
abandon territorially fixed allegiance.  
Further, it is important to differentiate the meaning of Otherness and difference in order 
to approach a more complex understanding of contemporary boundary construction in 
discourses on cosmopolitanism.  
As an ambiguous term Otherness was used by Hegel and has been also taken up by Lacan 
and other thinkers. Depending on the academic field it can describe the psychological 
dynamic of the individual self/ other or when referring to political theory and sociology it 
signifies hierarchical power relations (colonization, racializing of certain people). 
According to Iris Marion Young (2002), discourse constitutes a system of knowledge 
which ‘conveys the widely accepted generalizations about how society operates’ (2002: 
685)  and ‘the social norms and cultural values to which most of the people appeal when 
discussing their social and political problems and proposed solutions’ (ibid). 
Andrew Linklater (1998), Daniele Archibugi (1998) and David Held (2002) suggest the 
term ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ intending to cut down the modern paradigm of an 
exclusive sovereignty discourse. They argue towards the possibility of the co-existence of 
two political identities, e.g. citizen of the world and citizen of the particular community. 
Ideally, this would lead to a situation where territorially and nationally defined exclusive 
political identity loses its hegemony and ‘higher levels of universality and diversity’ 
(Linklater, 1998: 116) will be achieved at the expense of classical state sovereignty. 
However, these liberal concepts of cosmopolitan democracy argue multi- and bilaterally 
on the background of the status quo of an assumed cohesion of national society and 
nation-state. Contradictory group interests, in particular, class, gender and ethnic 
differences within any ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1991) are ignored or 
underestimated.  
Historically, certain groups, underwent othering processes (Jews, Armenians, Arabs, Sinti 
and Roma, Turks, Muslims, Black people, Irish Travellers, disabled people, gay men and 
lesbians). Sarcastically, we could even argue that the post modern notion of plurality 
contains what we cherish as the outcome of different stages of historical exclusionary 
practices, ethnic cleansings and the Holocaust in Continental Europe. More optimistically, 
we could say it is also connected with the struggle of minorities to gain rights within the 
Enlightenment promise of equality and participation. Nonetheless, we have to take into 
account that the ideology of modernity is ‘progress’; but there are analytically two 
dimensions to situated inclusion. 
While referring to Levinas, Cheyney Ryan (2002) suggests that behind plurality is 
‘difference’, symbolizing a ‘threat against totality from the inside’ (2002: 15). The second 
challenge to totality is produced or structured by the excluded ‘Other’ as an outside 
threat. Ryan discusses the critical potential of these two components as a ‘threat’ to 
totality. The first couple ‘Master /Slave’ suggest the ethical understanding that the 
‘liberation of the slave will ‘save’ the master as well. ‘Liberation suggest ‘becoming 
equal’. However, if we have a look at the second couple, ‘the Civilised/ the Savage’; there 
is a different story to tell. Here, the savage ‘progresses’ with his/ her domestication. 
Progress of ‘civilization’ is identified with expansion, such as conquering, removing, 
‘liberating’ the savage nation’ (ibid). 
Ryan (2002: 18) argues  
 the challenge is not one of multiplying voices but opening ears: the 
notion of ‘opening’ suggests why this form of postmodernism is 
associated with becoming more ‘hospitable’ – opening oneself and 
one’s own to ‘the stranger at the door. 
Accordingly, the multiplying of ‘the self’ as the condensation of the Western secular ‘we’ 
does not recognize the location of the Other as someone beyond a particular knowledge 
horizon. It is here, where critical theory in an Adornian and Horkheimerian reading, should 
start to challenge attempts to re-establish hegemonic binary in academic discourses on 
cosmopolitanism. 
In the last section of my article, I will examine more closely, how Mouffe and Habermas talk 
about cosmopolitan attitudes and political cosmopolitanism. I am interested, in particular, how 
the inclusion of the Other as historically othered  signifier, remains salient in their concepts 
and whether they actually transcend the binary of the ‘Occident/ Orient’,4 ‘secularism/ 
religion’, ‘enemy/ friend’ scheme. 
                                            
4 Said (1991, 1993) challenged the binary of Occident and Orient deconstructing ‘Orientalism’ as rooted in Western 
images and fantasies of the Muslim/ Islam Other. Said’ s efforts raised consciousness about the prejudiced 
negativism accompanying the notion of the Muslim Other as a central ideological bias underscoring complex 
cultural expressions in Western discourses. Bhabha (1996) critically assessed Said’ s criticism while hinting at the 
problematic issue that Said adopts the polar perspective and does not displace it. 
Two (continental) European voices: Chantal Mouffe and Jürgen 
Habermas 
In difference to political perspectives opting for a consensual integration of people into 
society and nation states, Chantal Mouffe argues that attempts to construct an ‘us’ 
without a corresponding ‘them’ will essentially fail the political sphere as the ‘condition of 
constituting an “us” is the demarcation of a “them” ‘ (2003, paper ZKM). 5 
In 2004, Mouffe published an essay on cosmopolitanism. The title, ‘The political world is 
a pluriverse, not a universe’ echoes one of Carl Schmitt’s statements. According to 
Schmitt ‘The world is no political unit but a political pluriversum. 6 
Schmitt was Attorney General (Kronjurist) of the Third Reich supporting its legal establishment 
in the early years of its regime. When he was introducing the term ‘multiversum’ he used a 
much older phrase suggested by Max Scheler in 1915, closely connected to his cultural racist 
idea of ‘Europäitat’ (1915: 280). The term ‘pluriverse’ had been actually introduced by the 
William James in his book ‘Pluralistic Universe’, in 1909.  
Mouffe refers constantly to the anti-Semitic legal theorists Carl Schmitt since the 1990s. 
Manemann (2002: 208) cites Mouffe7 while pointing at a problematic Schmitt reception of 
post-Marxists in the Anglo-American context. In general, the renaissance of Schmitt’s 
terms and his approach to ‘the political’ is primarily linked to a re-emergence of the ‘New 
Right’ in various European countries as well as in the United States (ibid).  
Mouffe (1992a; 1992b; 1993a; 1993b; 1999a; 1999b) clearly represents a left perspective 
and sets herself apart from the logic of ‘the enemy’ theorem while suggesting the term 
‘adversary’ (1999a: 4). Nevertheless, Mouffe’ s selective reading of Schmitt’s terminology 
and writings is most dangerous as it underestimates the racist implications of an ‘anti-
liberal’ led political discourse. In her reception of Schmitt’s work, Mouffe seems to 
neglect Schmitt’s ideological connection to the Third Reich leadership, which lasted 
officially until 1936.8 Whereas Mouffe continues to refer to Schmitt, in her earlier writings 
from the 1990s, she also discussed more contradictory aspects of political inclusion at 
the matrix of a cultural boundary dilemma. 
Back in 19939, Mouffe referred to Hans Kelsen and Hermann Heller 10. In difference to 
Schmitt, who was rooted in völkisch Catholic values, Kelsen and Heller represent Austro-
Jewish and German Jewish traditions of social democratic legal-political thinking at that 
time.  
Though Mouffe mentions Hermann Heller as a scholar criticizing Schmitt’s biased 
perspective on the preconditions of political community she does not mention that Heller 
yet in 1928 stressed that Schmitt completely neglected the contradictory inner dynamics 
of creating and maintaining political units (Ladwig 2003: 60). The then debates in the 
Weimar Republic on social divisions, class antagonism in particular, were conducted in 
controversial ways similar to today’s political discourse. The life stories of those three 
men are part of the German history of the bureaucratically and legally operating ‘willing’ 
supporter of National Socialism and its/ his  enemies. 
Heller was forced out of his professorship in Cologne as a consequence of the anti-
Semitic ‘Gesetz zur Herstellung des Berufsbeamtentums’  (law to re-establish the 
                                            
5 see also for details Mouffe 2005. 
6 Die Welt ist keine politische Einheit sondern ein politisches Pluriversum. Schmitt, cited  in Hofmann (2003: 7). 
7 Another British academic, Paul Hirst, wrote about Schmitt in the journal Telos in 1987. From a radical critic 
perspective Neocleous (1996) from Brunel University/ London challenges Schmitt’s enemy/ friend paradigm. 
8 After 1945 Schmitt was held in prison for a while. The charge sounded ‘intellectual groundwork for planning a pre-
emptive war (Angriffskrieg). The reports about his inquiry introduce a rather arrogant, self-confident character that 
was not willing to take responsibility for his part of guilt. Quite the opposite, he responded with religious phrases 
and as Quaritsch  (2000) underlines his so-called ‘Großraumschrift’ might be interpreted wrongly by the Nazi’s, but 
his own Anti-Semitic statements could only be regarded as political hatred (2000: 125). 
9 Mouffe ( 1993b: 128, 129) 
10 For further details see for example, Kranitz 1982; Horneffer ( 1926) 
profession of public servants) that was approved by Schmitt. Heller escaped the gas 
chambers, but died of a heart attack in his Spanish exile in 1936. Kelsen was forced to 
flee Nazi-German Reich, too, but attained exile in the United States. He left his intellectual 
legacy to those Socialists and Social Democrats, who, upon returning from exile or 
concentration camps, engaged in rebuilding post-Nazi-Germany based on a social 
compromise between different class interests. The post World War II West German 
Sozialstaatsprinzip11 (welfare state principle) encompassing the idea of the social welfare 
state and social democracy in Germany has to be understood, accordingly, as an effect of 
historical legacies of nationally rooted hybrid cosmopolitans. In Mouffe’ s writing in 1999 
those scholars are not cited anymore. It matters that those actual cosmopolitans who 
worked on social compromise are silenced post mortem.  
I will now turn to other difficult aspects of Mouffe’ s approach in typifying otherness and 
cosmopolitans. 
In her critical perspective on current cosmopolitanism, the typical cosmopolitan is identified 
with liberalism and connected to ‘pseudo-universalism’ (Mouffe, 2004: 72). Those who 
represent the group of cosmopolitans are labelled as those who do have an interest in global 
civil society and are powerful enough as ‘business and financial elites’ (ibid) to motivate states 
to act on their behalf. Mouffe criticizes this elite and individualist cosmopolitanism as the 
‘globalisation of the Western model’ (2004: 74).  
Her sceptical approach to cosmopolitan democracy intends to deconstruct its non-political 
and anti-democratic implications. In opposition to a mainstream discourse, she identifies 
the new forms of terrorism as linked to an antagonistic conflict encompassing 
globalisation and the new world order. Hence, she views terrorists as actors of a political 
conflict that reaches world scale rather than as individual fanatics. And, these terrorists 
are not an ‘Other’ to cosmopolitanism as introduced by a mainstream media discourse; 
rather they embody cosmopolitanism coming from its shadow world. Hence, Mouffe is at 
odds with perspectives that declare violent terrorist action simply as ‘pathological’ or as 
an ‘expression of irrational forces’ (ibid).  Despite this reflective perspective on the 
political causes of world wide terrorism, Mouffe’ s strategic turn to traditional 
international politics is rather disappointing. We learn from Mouffe’ s writings that she 
regrets the disappearance of the bi-polar world order.  But what does she mean when 
suggesting a multi-polar world order as constituted by a different ‘number of great 
spaces and genuine cultural poles’ (Mouffe, 2004: 74)?  
Traditionally, international politics views territorial and geographical regions as political 
units. Nation states are addressed as sovereigns and communities often imagined as 
automatically overlapping, culturally and politically. To follow this world view implies that 
intersected social divisions and for that reason, contradictory cultural and social relations 
cross cutting geographical and political lines all around the world simply do not exist. As 
Nira Yuval-Davis (2005) notes critically, Mouffe ‘does not distinguish between social and 
spatial locations, or between cultural identities and political value systems’ (2005, 
website). And further, she does not take on board the structural changes happening to 
the symbolic boundaries and matters of belonging relevant to any kind of politically 
bordered imagined community.12 Further, Mouffe widely neglects the patchwork of multi-
layered and complex arrangements of social divisions engendering transnational links 
and also cosmopolitan habits that subscribe to a less glamorous image of 
cosmopolitanism (Werbner 1999). Here, Mouffe adheres to a perspective that reduces 
regional communities to single units and also underestimates the capacities of working 
class cosmopolitans and the transnational networks they built along marginalizing 
hegemony.  
It is also remarkable that Mouffe’s proposal mirrors multilateral perspectives either 
mourning the fall of the second (Soviet) bloc or suggesting that new regional blocs (such 
                                            
11 For details, Schiek  2001 : Rn. 19 
12 On 31.01.2007, the British police discovered plans of a terrorist cell to highjack and captivate a Muslim soldier, 
who previously served in Iraq, in Birmingham. Despite the fact that both, the suspected terrorists and their victim 
are Muslims, the media focused on the increasing public risk coming from the Muslim community in Britain. 
as the European Union, the African Union) should become balancing military powers. As 
argued elsewhere (Yuval-Davis et. el. 2006) political and social analysis has to 
comprehend that the ‘modern’ state division of domestic and foreign affairs is rather 
obsolete. Accordingly, the pragmatic concept to balance imperial power by multi-polar 
regions misses the vernacular state of the cosmopolitan social that yet arrived. 
Next, I will turn to Habermas’s approach on cosmopolitanism and his proposal of 
‘constitutional patriotism’ in a ‘postnational’ Europe. 
Prominently, Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida issued a statement in 2003, 
condemning the US led military action in Iraq and expressing solidarity with the public 
protest against the war in Europe.13  
In 2004, Habermas celebrated the ‘birth’ of a genuine European public space (2004: 44) 
when looking at the huge public protest against the Iraq war. Habermas is in favour of a 
written constitution for the European Union that might unite European forces to develop 
their own foreign policy.  
 
As he demands ‘Europe has to bring its influence to bear regarding international relations 
but within the framework of the UNO. This is necessary to balance the hegemonic 
unilateralism of the United States.’ 14 
In resonance with David Held15, Habermas is concerned with social justice, deliberative 
democracy16 and individual autonomy (freedom) surrounding a growing legitimacy deficit 
inherent to ‘de jure’ territorial statehood and ‘de facto’ transgressing and shifting boundaries 
of diverse political communities. Habermas (1998b: 88) talks about a ‘cosmopolitan 
compulsive solidarity’ (kosmopolitische Zwangssolidarisierung) connecting single states via 
their civil societies and political public spheres. These civil orientations should engender the 
insight of global players to cooperate with respect to their mutually shared interests. Inherent 
to this kind of global solidarity might be a thinner idea of belonging than exercised in nation 
states by now (1998b: 89). 
Habermas, who grounds his overall arguments in Kantian philosophy17 is confronted with 
those critics who challenge a ‘Western-centric model of civilized development’ (Walker 
2005: 4)18. However, it should be acknowledged that the ideological construction of the 
‘Western model’ ignores different nation-state responses to democracy and nation building 
processes. In fact, Habermas proposes a very Germanic interpretation of the ‘European 
national state’ (1996: 286) arguing that it was the ‘cultural interpretation of political 
membership rights’ (ibid) that pushed a more ‘abstract level of social integration’ (ibid). 
Despite Habermas’s assumption that ‘Democratic self-determination’ (2001a: 64) is depending 
on the willingness of ‘subjects’ to culturally integrate into one nation, the purpose of a 
democratic state, the emergence of nations and outcomes of nationalism have to be 
differentiated more carefully. As Fine and Smith (2003: 480) argue 
(d)espite its name, German National Socialism is best conceived not as an 
extreme form of nationalism but as a movement opposed to the parochialism 
and nationalist politics in the name of global ambitions, opposed to the unity 
of the German nation in the name of race-thinking that posited race divisions 
within the German nation and race links beyond the German nation, and 
                                            
13 Habermas 2004b 
14 ‚Europa muss sein Gewicht auf internationaler Ebene und im Rahmen der UNO in die Waagschale werfen, um den 
hegemonialen Unilateralismus der Vereinigten Staaten auszubalancieren’. (2004: 45) 
15 See for example, footnote 22; here Habermas directly refers to Held’s writing  (Habermas 2001: 70). 
16 According to Ritter (2003) deliberative democracy in its normative theoretical substance demands that those who 
are affected by a political decision should have an equal say in its decision making. Thus, when talking about 
increasing deficits in democratic legitimacy a fundamental revision of political decision making processes seems to 
be appropriate to catch up with global transformation issues. 
17 See for details ch. 7 in ‘The inclusion of the Other’ (1998a). 
18 Walker (2005: 5) suggests a middle way, ‘a via media between cultural relativism and cultural imperialism’. This, 
however, sounds like a circular logic as it does not resolve the principally political reading of hegemonic values, 
intersected social divisions and contradictory interests. 
opposed to the institutions and structures of the German nation-state in the 
name of a parallel movement based on the leader principle. 
Looking at new modes of belonging (1998b: 116, 2001a: 75), ‘individualization and the 
emergence of ‘cosmopolitan identities’ (1998b: 116, 2001a: 76) in Europe, Habermas 
calls this state of affairs ‘The Postnational Constellation’. The term ‘postnational’ points 
towards Habermas’ attempt to equate ‘nation’ and ‘nation state’.19 As Will Kymlicka and 
Christine Straehle (1999) spell out the hegemonic agenda of the ‘nation-state’ should 
rather be identified as that of a ‘nationalizing state’ (1999: 70). Given the historical power 
of the state to ‘nationalize’ its sovereignty in homogenizing terms, the de-nationalizing 
discourse assumes a reverse move of ‘national belonging’. But nevertheless this discourse 
generalizes again its hegemonic perception. Also, it poses wider problems regarding 
Habermas’ perspective on cosmopolitanism and the notion of the ‘Other’:  taking for granted 
the overlap of territorial (spatial) and cultural (social) allegiance as far as the notion of a one 
nation state narrows down cosmopolitan solidarity to traditionally territorialized and 
bordered community purposes embedded in problematic Eurocentric  legacies. 
As suggested above, an ethnically constructed nation state membership frames the 
contemporary reading of law as well; thus the idealization of a European constitution that 
excludes Others in line with unchallenged elite interests has to be regarded as the 
fetishism of ‘constitutional patriotism’ (1985, 1999, 2001a, 2001b, 2004). In this sense, 
Habermas optimistic perspective of democratic methods for achieving a lawful order have 
to be confronted with the reality of social exclusion and the digital transnational 
instruments that move the border control outside/ inside society and state. Nonetheless, 
Habermas suggests that recognizing difference could create ‘common identity’. However, 
he refers to difference, he is not talking about the Other.20 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
To argue for multi-polar blocs does not challenge the formation of regional governance 
with its tendency of maintaining and constructing racialised boundaries. 
Chantal Mouffe, who vehemently criticises ‘liberal’ democracy theorists, follows a similarly 
sounding logic of territorial and cultural identity cohesion, actually not that different to Held 
and others. All of them give credit to a traditional idea of international pragmatic world politics 
(Realpolitik). But, even Realpolitik does attain a different meaning depending on classed, 
gendered or racialised positions within given societies, legally defined  interests and dissimilar 
nation-state legacies. 
The boundary construction of ‘we and them’ or in the 2007 ‘ s researcher’ s speech ‘ the 
Ins’ and ‘the Outs’, is actively constructed in the political realm and intersected with 
international legacies of racism and exclusion. Alternatively, the utopian potential of 
cosmopolitanism has to be understood as an ancient vision of sustaining bonds with 
humanity transgressing border and boundary of hegemonic inclusion. It clearly contains 
anti-capitalistic and even anarchistic spirits. Being conflated with up to date pragmatic 
international politic strategies it actually looses its critical appeal. 
Mouffe’s proposal advocates strong regional and geographical coherent blocs to balance 
unilateral US power and Habermas ideal of a peaceful and multi-vocal communication 
space is primarily connected to the new regional regime of the European Union. In a way, 
                                            
19 For a detailed discussion of this problematic equation, see for example Yuval-Davis (1997; 2002). Though 
Habermas himself emphasizes that ‘Theory-formation must avoid the “territorial trap” (2001: 70) his own 
understanding of the nation-state as national community is embedded in an implicit and explicit Germanic 
philosophy tradition. 
20 Likewise the tolerance of difference – the mutual recognition of the Other in his difference – could engender a 
common identity.  
 
Mouffe’ s ‘foreign’ politics argument complements Habermas’ s domestic, legal and social 
argument.  
In Europe, we had a religiously arguing and colonially driven conquista in 1492. The 
contemporary debate seems to be framed by a late modern version of a secular European ‘re-
conquista’21 proposing ‘cosmopolitan democratic civilisation, global human rights and 
multicultural equality’ as an emancipatory narrative to global poverty and injustice.  Guess, the 
Other does want to define liberation and belonging on her own terms. 
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 Concluding discussion 
Derek Robbins (DR), Cigdem Esin (CE), Aygen S. Kurt (ASK), 
Patricia K. Litho (PKL) and Ulrike Vieten (UV) 
 
This chapter attempts to reflect an ongoing conversation amongst the contributors about 
their contributions. The papers were discussed when given, but this chapter constitutes a 
virtual ‘Table Ronde’ conducted by e-mail after the submission of papers for this collection.  
There is an initial, editorial provocation which is followed by responses which are either 
related directly to this provocation or, cumulatively, to other comments as they were 
circulated.  They are reproduced in sequence as submitted.  They amount to a collective 
reflection rather than to any conclusion. 
DR:  
As you know, I try to hold rigorously to a materialist view of social science production.  That 
is to say that I think social scientific findings are the products of the particular social, 
economic, and political conditions within which they are generated.  They do not 
automatically possess ideal or transcendental validity.  They do not have any universal 
relevance that can be said to be intrinsic.  They have the capacity to become universalized, 
but universalization is dependent on their field of reception of findings which may bestow 
relevance to new situations beyond the specific conditions of production.  This process of 
bestowing relevance is also material and it therefore implies an encounter between the 
socio-economic conditions of production and reception of research.  My materialist view of 
social science knowledge production emphasizes subjectivity in as much as the selves which 
generate research problems and findings are themselves the products of specific socio-
economic, political or cultural conditions.  My view also emphasizes objectivity because it 
acknowledges that the definitions of situations by selves takes place by reference to 
previously objectivated subjectivities, embodied in institutions and instituted intellectual 
discourses. 
 
It follows from this statement that the intention of Yearbook I is to explore the subjective 
dimension of research production, and of Yearbook II to explore the objective dimension.  
These are not, however, distinct or separate.  they are complementary and are in a 
continuously dialectical relationship. 
  
In relation to Yearbook I, this leads me to pose the following introductory question: 
  
As it happens, all five of you have grown up and been educated outside the UK.  Can 
you comment on the ways in which your social background led you to undertake your 
current research?  What are the implications of doing that research in a UK institution 
and within a UK intellectual and institutional tradition?  How does your research reflect 
your social trajectory and in what ways do you expect its completion to affect that 
trajectory? 
UV: 
I will kick off this joint reflection with what I call ‘the limbo of thinking in-between’. 
In the following I try to reflect on my ‘rooting and shifting’1 in terms of social and intellectual 
backgrounds. Also, I would like to talk a bit about the challenge to write an English PhD 
thesis as a ‘non native’ speaker and the struggles and complexities involved in my ambitious 
trajectory to translate highly culturalised epistemic concepts (hybrid, i.e. Jewish-German 
Continental European social theory) into class-ifying language (English).  
                                         
1 This phrase is used by Nira (Yuval-Davis)  my spiritual study guidance since I entered the British academic scene.  
The latter, also has to take into account that UEL is a ‘new or modern University’ delivering 
concrete spaces in support of critical and innovative thinking on the one hand, but also 
restricting disciplinary cross-over due to its own institutional constrains (anxiety about ‘the 
clash’ of different academic disciplines; university rankings).  I start with some 
considerations regarding my social background and my disciplinary journeys that brought 
me to this place.  
Studying Social Science at a ‘Reform’ University (new university) in the North West of the then 
FRG in the 80s meant free choice of subjects in our discipline and also my personal freedom 
to organise politically and culturally in the local alternative sub-culture (anarchist 
movement). Yet back in Germany’s early 80s, it was certain that the idea to study ‘sociology’ 
hoping for a proper academic or professional position was simply naive. In fact someone at a 
job centre told me to study ‘Sinology’; booming China was yet in sight. My working class 
parents did not impose any pressure on me to go for a more ‘reasonable’ profession, and as 
a consequence their lack of guidance gave me this relative freedom to go for my own future, 
whatever it would hold in store. Though this was somehow difficult to take with 19 and did 
not become easier in my twenties, it marked my own social situation much more detached 
from the dominating cultural and normative system (career, consume, compromise). I 
suppose this is somehow different to middle classed raised and equipped students, who 
might get a more realistic idea what academia is about, perhaps ‘father’s’ networks and a 
certain kind of ‘cultural capital’ to organise sufficient support. Otherwise, it was me, the 
singular, who crossed this classed boundary of higher education making my family very 
proud (though they did and do not fully understand what I am saying, even if I talk German). 
Next, I will jump to the stage where I wrote my first MA dissertation, actually dealing with 
the main topics I am still engaging with though, of course, in a different way: I did research 
on the transition period between early and late German Enlightenment, focusing on the role 
of gender, or let’s say a particular notion of femininity. As a feminist I was interested to 
understand how history, the complicity of elite knowledge and agents influenced the way 
‘the German woman’ was institutionalised to support embryonic and bourgeois nationalism 
and how the failure of the 1848 revolution and its post-political apathy turned out. Does this 
ring a bell? No wander, I am working on discourses on cosmopolitanism in Britain and 
Germany, nowadays. But, in 1989 no one really seemed interested in my approach to the 
German nation state building. To make a long story short: After getting my degree, I had to 
cope with the social margins inventing my self again and again in different jobs. Moving on 
to another discipline in the early 90s – this time Law – I gathered even more critical insight 
how the German constitution, law in general, but European Union Law in particular, matched 
with my reservations about Germany’s long lasting shadow of ethnic-cultural and totalitarian 
history. 
Having studied two academic disciplines in Germany so far I was fairly familiar with 
canonical differences when I arrived at UEL. I do mention this, because this knowledge 
prepared me to take a more ‘critical’ perspective on the power of disciplines and their 
somehow methodological ‘absolutisms’.  
All in all, studying for my own ‘Enlightenment’ became a general pattern of life to me. There 
is this cliché of the ‘eternal student; it’s me. I can write this with an ironical twist, because it 
reflects struggle and will power not to surrender and, of course, encouraged me even with 
40-something to do a PhD, though definitely not by chance in the UK.  
Simply to share: anyone older than 35 will not get any kind of student- or fellowship, not 
even talking about a research position in the academic market in Germany. In this regard, 
Britain and UEL became a ‘refuge’ for my dissident voice. After finishing my MA in Gender & 
Ethnic Studies at the University of Greenwich in 2003, it was the studentship of the then 
School of Cultural, Media and Innovation Studies that enabled me to stay and continue with 
my research. Funny thing that I started in a Cultural Studies department; my third encounter 
with a specific academic discipline; my second encounter with studying in a British context. 
UEL as a rather marginalized academic place offered to me the inspiring intellectual space I 
was looking for and I had missed for years: international students and likewise international 
colleagues engaged predominantly very open minded with my contributions. Since I 
embarked with my Studies at Greenwich it became a thrilling experience to communicate 
with Others in a second language and to realize that someone understood what I was talking 
about, finally. 
Also we, ‘non native’ speakers from places all over the world, related to each other easily. 
Probably, this hesitant moment before you start to talk opens up another moment of 
communication; it slows down the rhythm and sound of the tongue; it simply happens and it 
happens to all of us. In this regard, we contribute actively to the transformation of the 
‘lingua franca’ in British academic institutions as our hybrid speech echoes ‘the world’ in a 
nutshell; ‘producing’ research in English while mediating the mixture of our individual social, 
cultural and national heritages. It is very fascinating to me though that this ‘vernacular 
cosmopolitanism’ is a rather troubling thing for those, who have to train us in the ‘right way’ 
of articulation, presentation and conveying British research. Standardisation is the response, 
but that is and should not our question.  
Finally, I am rather sceptical about my personal ‘career’ options: It is not really a ‘career 
aspiring’ habit to argue that  ‘cultural cosmopolitanism’ is used as an ideological container 
to create European belonging. And further, that this Europeanisation has less to do with 
cosmopolitanism, but with an attempt to bind together otherwise fractured post-democratic 
civil societies of various EU nation states. In fact, some EU frameworks are funding European 
academic research groups to do this at this very moment, exactly. Thus, I suppose in a way I 
moved on, but I am still where I started: stubbornly keeping myself to find out why and at 
what stage (certain) academics are bought in by political systems… 
CE:  
I totally agree with Derek about the ‘subjective’ conditions of research production in various 
levels. My own research is constructed by these ‘subjective’ conditions.  
 
My current research has not only been an attempt to pose an academic question, but also an 
attempt to understand my individual experience of being a well-educated woman in 
‘modern’ Turkey. The contours of this experience were drawn within the socio-political 
landscape of the country where I grew up.  
 
I am a very good product of the Turkish modernisation project. I was educated in a secular 
western education system to participate into the public life as a career woman; and raised by 
one of the ‘daughters of the Republic’ to be a ‘modern and modest’ woman. However, I am 
not a perfect product as I have been having problems with (particularly) the gender regime 
of the project for a long time. My positions of feminist researcher and feminist woman in 
addition to multiple others have been crafted by my own contradictions in this process. As 
feminist philosopher Maria Lugones says, I have been a traveller between different worlds of 
mine. My aim to understand the network of discourses and polymorphous power relations 
surrounding the sexuality of women in Turkey in my PhD research was shaped by a 
conversation between my multiple positions.   
 
The education system of Turkish modernisation could not make a perfect ‘modern and 
modest’ woman out of me, but equipped me with the skills necessary to trace and 
understand the ruptures and contradiction of the modernisation process where I located my 
research. I believe that it is these ruptures and contradictions what gives the Turkish context 
its unique characteristics. For me, without understanding the complexity of this context, a 
research with women in Turkey will be stuck in the dualistic surface of the question. Neither 
women’s lives nor their stories are constituted in the binary of modern vs. tradition in this 
context. Being an insider in the socio-cultural fabric of contemporary Turkey has been my 
advantage in understanding its multiple and intersecting layers. However, I am also an 
outsider in that fabric. My educational journey in sociology and gender studies introduced 
me to new worlds in academy and politics which gradually made me an ‘outsider’. My 
continuous travel between ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ positions enhances my analytical skills as 
a researcher. I think it is this travel that enables me to trace my research question in the 
grey areas of a ‘familiar’ context.  
 
I am doing a feminist research. My position as a feminist is constituted within that ‘familiar’ 
context. This position is a ‘westernised’ one, but still different from ‘western’ feminism. My 
PhD and social experience in a ‘western’ culture in the UK has made this difference clearer. I 
think the contexts of our feminisms create this difference. Maybe we ask similar questions 
to women, about women, but we contextualise and analyse them in different ways.  
 
Ulrike’s story about her disciplinary journey has reminded me of mine:  
 
Neither sociology nor gender studies were promising disciplines for a successful academic 
or non-academic career in Turkey in the early 1990s. They are still not if you do not come 
from an academic family. Everyone who knew me surprised when I chose sociology for my 
BA. Even my aunt, who was one of a few female university graduates of music education in 
the late 1940s, said that I should have chosen an administrative science discipline to secure 
my future. I still have difficulty to explain what sociology means when I meet someone while 
visiting my mother who lives in the south of Turkey. Sometimes they ask, ‘Is it a profession?’ 
In their eyes, university is an institution that gives degree to qualify graduates for a 
profession. Most of them do not understand why I am still a ‘student’ in my thirties if I do 
not have a position in a university. I am an ‘alien’… 
 
Gender studies have a long history of marginalisation within social sciences. Being an MA 
student in gender studies in Turkey was an extra marginal experience for me. I seriously 
struggled in the highly hierarchical and elitist structure of the program where I was a 
student. I was indirectly accused of not having a ‘good-enough’ academic perspective. I 
worked in a woman’s organisation throughout my MA study. I was really excited at the 
beginning: theory and practice together: a feminist ideal. It was a very challenging 
experience in another version of hierarchy.  Was not feminism about transforming all those 
hierarchies? When I asked this question, I was accused of being ‘too’ academic to work there. 
This time it was direct.  
 
Obviously it was not my challenging academic experience, but my passion for being a 
researcher led me to work in a research project, and apply for a PhD. But, the same 
experience was one of the reasons that brought me to a different academic system. My 
modernist part told me to choose Europe, the ultimate dream of modern Turkey. There were 
practical reasons regarding the academic boundaries and funding system in Turkey. Who 
would be interested in my relatively marginal proposal about discourses on sexuality? Maybe 
the cultural studies departments in one or two private university where I could not afford. 
Doing a PhD means the necessity of funding. The PhD funding is not a common practice in 
Turkish academic system since the state universities are still free. If you do not have a 
teaching assistant position in a university, you need to support yourself (alternatively your 
family can support you, which was impossible in my case). Yes, a PhD degree is definitely a 
class issue. Applying for a PhD fund abroad was the best possible option for me. My second 
language English has made my choice in Europe quick and easy: the UK. 
 
I would like to say a lot on doing my PhD as a ‘non-native’ in English language, in Ulrike’s 
words ‘class-ifying’ English, but to keep it short, I am going to say that it has been an 
experience of re-construction for my self in another context where I am the ‘outsider’. 
Nevertheless, this experience has also been contributing to the analysis of my self-position. 
Because telling stories in another language about/by women from my mother tongue 
inevitably means telling these ‘familiar’ stories to an ‘un-familiar’ audience. This necessitates 
re-shaping my style and position in presenting my work. It has not been an easy and simple 
experience for me. However, I am glad that I have been through this process, which has 
given me the space to think more carefully and reflect upon several ethical and analytical 
issues throughout my research. I believe that it enhanced my awareness on the boundaries 
of my ‘researcher’ position.  
 
Being more attentive to the (often) unheard stories of women like myself in Turkey was one 
of the objectives of my PhD research. Am I able to do that? At the final stage of my PhD, I 
still have questions in my mind. I hope to multiply them by sharing my points with more 
people in the further phases of my research journey. But, I am still an ‘alien’… 
PKL: 
Location of the self and my role as a researcher: 
 
This research is part of my individual and political commitment to changing the oppressed 
status of women in society, especially women in Africa. Like most feminists, my 
methodological approach is a reflection of my activism translated to research. This is partly 
based on the realisation that for one to change a situation, one needs a deeper 
understanding of it and research seemed the best option of furthering my understanding on 
the relationship between ICTs and women’s empowerment.  This strategy is based on a 
realisation that theoretical or praxis triumphs do not necessarily change much, however the 
two together yield better results.  
 
I consciously use the standpoint of African feminists as an overarching lens for 
understanding ICTs for women’s empowerment because the knowledge of African women 
has been marginalised and most studies on Africa are done from a western perspective by 
either men or women from the North who have used other values systems and beliefs to 
represent knowledge of African women. Besides opposing all form of oppression against 
women, like other strands of feminisms, African feminisms embraces collaborating with 
African men to achieve their goals of gender equality, emancipation and empowerment. They 
believe that only by working with their men can structures of oppression be transformed 
because women’s situation is relational and other factors impacting on their current status 
like gender relations have to be considered holistically for better understanding of women’s 
situation and eventual achievement of women’s emancipation. 
 
Undertaking a PhD therefore furthers my previous activism on gender inequality issues as 
well as ensuring that the voices of African women are visible in the production of knowledge 
about themselves. Previously I have worked on a professional and voluntarily basis in the 
areas of broadcast journalism and development communications. I have always been 
interested in ensuring that a platform is provided for women to air their views about their 
oppressive situation in the private and public spaces.  
 
As a strategy I have been trying to and will continue to disseminate my finding as widely as 
possible through contribution to journals, paper presentation at conferences and actively 
participate in women activism in Uganda. In addition, I am a member of some women 
organisation in Uganda that work towards the betterment of women. These include; The 
Uganda Media Women’s Association, where I serve as a board member, Uganda Women’s 
Network where I was once a board member and the Centre for the Economic Empowerment 
of Women of which I am a member of and as well as the Uganda Women’s Network. 
 
As a an African feminist researcher in a European university, like Patricia Collin Hill (1990), I 
take an insider -outsider position to critique some western epistemologies despite the irony 
of doing so within a European university. I believe that this gives me the benefit of accessing 
part of the audience I seek to address in addition to enabling me make use of best practices 
from the western way of looking at things. This is based on a belief that systems need each 
other. For instance, the use of the English language gives me access to a larger audience. I 
should also point out that I am a construct of the British system, as a result of British 
colonialism in Uganda, English as Uganda’s official language is one of the remnants of 
British colonialism and as a result I have been educated in English and although to the British 
my English may not sound right, I consider it my first language, I write and think in English 
and hardly literate in my own indigenous language, Japadhola. In addition, having this study 
done under cultural studies is a better strategy as opposed to being located within women 
studies, or shelved under an Africa studies section. I believe that only my being present 
within a context that I challenge can I significantly contribute to the debate and influence the 
key audiences for this discussion. 
 
I believe that as an African woman, concerned with gender inequality issues, I am better 
placed to understand the values and needs of rural women in Uganda because I stem from 
the same environment. Based on a value system I understand, I can present a better case for 
changing the situation of women in rural Uganda and to explain policy and development 
practice in Uganda. I digress from the usual practice where researchers try to study contexts 
they are unfamiliar with because this has the unfortunate result of giving results based on 
values or cultures different from those of the people studied.  
 
In trying to understand and document how women in rural Uganda experienced information 
and communication technologies (ICTs), I give due recognition to their contribution to the 
socio-economic development of their communities and the country. In Uganda, women in 
rural communities are mostly peasant farmers and contribute more to the country’s 
agricultural labour force and yet they are continually alienated from development processes 
including ICT advances that their urban counter parts seem to have exploited for personal 
and economic.  
 
My role as a researcher is to network those interested and involved in ICTs for development 
(ICT4D) in Uganda. Through this research process, I have endeavoured to provide an 
intellectual framework for understanding the social, economic and political situation of the 
women as described by them. I therefore hope that the findings from this study will 
stimulate change within feminist scholarship, policy making sector and development 
practice. I attempt to offer a better understanding of how empowerment projects that target 
women in rural communities can be implemented for more meaningful results. I recommend 
recognition of the fact that the use and adoption of ICTs is dependent on specific contexts 
and power relations. This recommendation is made against the recognition of the current 
practice that seems to assume that the benefits offered by ICTs will automatically benefit 
rural women. Through this research I have realised that although ICTs have been identified 
as a potential catalyst for development, women, especially those in rural areas are not 
benefiting much from it because of their restricted social contexts. Even though rural women 
have been deliberately targeted by some development projects, they still remain the last to 
benefit from the remunerations of development initiatives because rural areas, where most 
of the women reside are poorly served in terms of basic needs and telecommunications 
infrastructure that would have supported ICT access and use.  
 
In addition, studies on women’s empowerment and ICTs are mostly commissioned by donor 
agencies. The reports are therefore written in such a way that appeals to donor interests and 
are aimed specifically at getting more funding. In most cases, these studies have failed to be 
critical of development models that offer a hegemonic mode of operation like working 
towards the Millennium Development Goals amongst other generic frameworks (Heeks 
2005). These studies have hardly addressed the complex issues surrounding the interplay 
between power structures, gender, social-cultural context and technological adoption; 
instead they have offered prescription on how things should be done, which fails to take into 
account these complexities (Heeks 1999).  
 
This study goes a step further to address the scholarly concern of African feminists on the 
authenticity of knowledge acquisition and production about women in Africa. African women 
have continually expressed a need for diversity in knowledge. The argument is that the 
indigenous and specific experiences of women in Africa have been silenced. African 
feminists argue that knowledge available is mainly constructed using a single perspective; a 
western perspective. Dominant discourses therefore need to be more receptive to other 
perspectives.  
 
ASK: 
My subjective orientation in my research, within the ‘objectivated’ subjectivities (in Derek’s 
terms) is embedded in the institutional and intellectual settings in Turkey. As part of the 
1970s-born generation in my country, I suppose I am stuck between the leftist movements 
of the 1960s and the generation of 1980s which has ‘deliberately’ been directed towards de-
politicisation by mass media, consumerism and the political actors. Throughout this 
challenging picture, coming from a highly secular and middle class family, the culture of 
‘insitutionalism’ and ‘statism’ has been rigorously entrenched in my thinking via the 
modernist education in a highly-developed city.  
 
With a mixed background of science, maths, art and philosophy at high school and having 
had the opportunity of receiving secondary and higher education in English (and German as 
a second foreign language), my dedication to understand the “real” picture of a politically 
chaotic society led me to take a Political Science and Public Administration degree set in 
1960s in a highly prestigious university2. The university was established on an American 
campus model in late 1950s with the funds from the Marshall Plan of the US, but had a 
reputation of its pioneering and modernist (in Cigdem’s terms) ideals concerning the country 
as a free and independent state from any global institutions and their binding rules.  
 
The problematic issue of the “totality of sciences” was one of the first key concepts I had 
encountered with in my first year of the degree. Thomas Kuhn’s ‘scientific paradigms’ and 
P.K. Feyerabend’s anarchic attempt to focus on the non-universality of sciences should have 
had an impact on my present day’s “context-based” and subjective approach to 
understanding any social scientific issue. However, the same problem has highlighted 
another critical concern in my scientific orientation: isolation within the social science 
disciplines. Since we should all locate ourselves in the social sciences, particularly in the 
British system through the RAE and grant application procedures, the over-reliance on 
subjectivity and the mixture of several disciplines, which we usually tend to call “multi-
disciplinarity”, created a more problematic area to tackle for me. I will come back to this 
shortly when I mention studying innovation at UEL. 
 
My political science background was cultivated with a balanced approach between pure 
social and political theory, and economics and practice-based courses on contemporary 
politics and administrative/parliamentary characteristics of different political regimes at 
national and European levels. However, my main interest in science and technology policy 
appeared when a new concept (for 1980s), national systems of innovation (NSI), was used in 
economics and research policy literature increasingly in 1990s and also in the OECD’s and 
EU’s policy documents, at a time when the role of nation-state was stated to be diminishing 
in a globalising economy. Supposedly an institutionalist, I rather like to believe in the “true 
and just” administration of political institutions, be they formal or informal institutions like 
norms, regulations, government agencies, universities; should serve for the common good 
(in Communitarians’ terms) than diminishing the state’s role. For such reasons, NSI has 
demonstrated a promising analytical framework for me to question the Turkish state’s role 
in joining the EU, global markets, and multilateral agreements.   
 
My MSc degree in the same university, which was run by economists, sociologists and 
engineers, had the interdisciplinary approach with an aim of understanding the current 
developments in science and technology in relation to social change, sociology of knowledge 
and science, philosophy of technology, Information Age and how developing countries can 
catch-up by investing in innovation. Following on to that establishment, my masters’ study 
focused on the concept of technology foresight as a method of providing governments, firms 
and organisations a systematic policy tool for selecting the priority areas for investment in 
the immense diversity of science and technology. The main scope was about the UK’s 
Technology Foresight Programme and its main achievements; why and how foresight was 
chosen as a scenario building technique, and the main characteristics of the foresight 
programme declared by the UK’s Government in 1992. 
 
The main motivation behind my current PhD study is my concern with supranational 
institutions like the IMF, WB, particularly the EU and Turkey’s direct adoption of theses 
institutions’ regulations and the ways which such organisations enforce their regulations 
onto under-developed countries. The other side of the problem comes from the notion of 
information society and its technologies. If there is a so-called information society; what is 
                                         
2 Middle East Technical University in Ankara, http://www.metu.edu.tr  
actually that we are all forced to live in? Could it be an ideological and political project? Why 
innovation, science, technology and research funding is important? What is the Turkish state 
doing about that? I was acquainted with the idea that EU’s information society, ICTs and 
media regulations would –perhaps naturally- affect Turkey severely in some cases. Thus, it 
was unavoidably necessary for me to ask what the advantages and disadvantages of such EU 
policies on Turkey would be. Were there actually any mismatches? These were my starting 
points.  
 
Why UEL?  
I came across with the UEL’s Innovation Studies Department (of which roots could be seen in 
late 1970s) via the department’s membership in a Europe-wide network of nearly 16 
university MA programmes3 from the Science, Technology and Society Studies area (STS). 
UEL’s expertise was stated as ‘the Information Society in Europe’. It seemed to be the perfect 
match for my interest.  
  
Studying in a highly multidisciplinary Innovation Studies field is difficult both in Britain and 
Turkey with regard to locating one’s self within the social sciences. Whilst Innovation Studies 
is combined with Sociology at the moment here at UEL, and although there are common 
issues between the innovation studies and cultural studies, politics, communication studies 
and political economy of media; colleagues from other fields still ask ‘what is innovation 
studies?’ when I say I do my PhD there. It is possible to realise that studying innovation 
perhaps used to be a niche area in Europe, but now it has extended to numerous areas in 
social sciences with an emphasis that innovation is not solely a technological process but 
also a social process. The general picture at UEL seems to demonstrate that Innovation 
Studies might be shrinking in size, however, a new MA Programme in Innovation Studies is 
on its way to be launched and colleagues in the department have continued to collaborate 
with their European peers in the Europe-wide network of STS studies through meetings, 
thesis supervision and as external examiners. Second, although it might not be pronounced 
loudly, innovation studies is pervasive in many areas in other disciplines in our School: 
media and new technologies, gender and ICTs, technology and body, innovation policy in the 
UK government’s agendas, institutional innovation, innovation and urban regeneration, 
cultural innovation are only few of many examples we can give. Recently, innovation-related 
issues have been quite explicitly experienced in the British Sociological Association’s (BSA) 
Conference organised at UEL. The main theme of the event was ‘Social Connections: 
Identities, Technologies, Relationships’. These examples might show us that having a 
multidisciplinary framework in one’s approach to social sciences could be advantageous in 
terms of the flexibility of crossing boundaries and learning from other academic disciplines.    
On the other hand, since Innovation Studies is a growing area in Turkey, I find it very difficult 
to explain people what and why I am doing in my PhD. Besides, Cigdem’s well advised 
statements about doing a PhD and how it is perceived in Turkey are valid for me, too.  
 
Ulrike’s claim about our contribution to the British academic system through our 
backgrounds set in different contexts, in (embedded) research cultures and experiences 
sounds agreeable. However, to what extent the British academe is “nourished” or 
transformed due to those contributions, and in what ways it might respond to the input it 
gathers from all over the world through the social, cultural and academic capital could be 
questioned. The know-how of an optimum doctoral study and a learning process within the 
British academic system will be transferred to other systems in other countries when we have 
the chance to pass our knowledge to others who may not have the same opportunity to 
experience education in a British university. Still, we may have a concern here: In modern 
universities like UEL, where I suppose the “research culture” is a significant arena for the 
institutionalisation process, the standardisation of the PhD as an outcome (with reference to 
Ulrike) can be hooked up to that process itself. That is to say, in principle, the system 
expects us, as PhD students, to contribute and develop that research culture while we may 
expect the system to behave in a standard way for everyone and create a suitable 
environment motivating us to contribute to the system. With reference to the innovation 
                                         
3 ESST- European Inter-university Association on Society, Science and Technology. http://www.esst.uio.no/  [last 
accessed on 2 July 2007] 
system jargon, I would agree that our School at UEL is at a stage of “learning by doing”, by 
interacting and by forgetting, and is still in the process of institutionalising (in a formal way). 
 
My other concern is my assumption about the dominance of the Anglo-Saxon research 
experience in the developing world’s research discourse. It is obvious that the packaged 
knowledge in the form of education, training and consultancy is one of the key successes of 
British universities contributing to the so-called knowledge economy. As customers and 
trainees of this packaged knowledge system, I wonder if we all have become similar 
products who will carry the flag around; or perhaps the system itself has taught us to 
analyse it critically; and that’s the catching point of the British academic environment which 
numerous developing countries may lack in. In that sense, I celebrate Patricia’s attempt to 
challenge the Western approach in understanding African women, which aims to include 
male power in transforming females’ lives for the better. I guess my attitude toward 
informing policy by attracting attention to explicitly unspoken major issues in the Turkish 
political realm have a similar course of action. Conclusively, it would be difficult to deny the 
fact that the experience of learning how to do research in Britain and particularly at UEL, has 
improved my critical understanding of my own context as an “outsider” both at UEL and in 
Turkey.   
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Appendix I 
List of pre-2005 entrants to the School, and their research topics  
Abdul Rahim N A study of newspapers' roles in intergroup conflict resolution 
in Malaysia 
Ahmed A Aliens and Locals: Maids in Contemporary Egypt 
Allen S 
Women's peace campaigning before Greenham: Politics & 
Culture 1950-70 
Anan G J Managing change in the church: an investigation into the 
reorganisation of the Church of England 
Armstrong J Contemporary independent feminist web media:  A dialogical 
analysis 
Bramall R Cultural amnesia' and 'amnesic' narrative:  examining 
accounts of memory loss in contemporary culture, 1981-2001 
Chowdhury S Government - NGO Collaboration : an Effective Strategy for 
Poverty Focussed Development in Bangladesh 
Crome Y I Child abuse: what impacts on the health visitor's ability to 
work in a primary preventive way 
Cross K Training the eye of the photographer 
Edwardes M 
The genesis of grammar: a study of the sources of structure 
in language. 
Elfer P 5000 hours.  Organising for intimacy in the care of babies and 
children under three attending full-time nursery. 
Esin C Construction of sexuality in the narratives of well-educated 
young women in Turkey 
Faingulernt A The 'Journey Film' genre in European Cinema - a Modern 
Odyssey 
Garofalo G Political Economy of Prostitution in Europe 
Goodman K F To understand the policy process in child welfare and 
protection, and whether it confirms the process envisaged by 
policymakers or reveals a different process and if so,the 
implications for future policy processes 
Gracia-Luque R Access, gender and empowerment in multimedia education 
Gunkel H The cultural politics of female same-sex intimacy in post-
apartheid South Africa 
Harvey C Towards a cartography of the video game 
Hawkes C Predictive factors of sexually abusive behaviour in children 
Henderson V An evaluation of the importance of interprofessional 
collaboration in the implementation of Section 4 of the 1983 
Mental Health Act within London hospitals 
Ikoniadou E Digital architecture : an acoustic space of movement and 
effect 
Johansen M The dust of the departed and the fame of the struggling 
"hero":  the life and cultural location of Charles Goss (1864-
1946) 
Jones H A study of intensive outpatient psychotherapy with sexually 
abused children 
Kasapi E Humorous advertising and audience cultural differences: A 
cross-cultural comparison study of British and Greek 
humerous television advertisements 
Kurt A The Turkish ICT Sector and the European Information Society: 
Innovation for Integration? 
Litho P Information and communication technologies and the 
empowerment of rural women in Uganda 
Manion  H K Voices of the unheard: perceptions on the success of holistic 
interventions with commercially sexually exploited girls in 
three countries 
Mouriki E Women's rituals among the Hadzabe hunter-gathers of 
Tanzania 
Moustaki-Smilansky E "Inner Residence Projected" a psychodynamic approach to 
studying shared inner-outer spaces 
Nassari J Narratives of exile and identity: experiences of Turkish & 
Greek Cypriot refugees in Cyprus & London 
Nigianni C Rethinking 'queer': A film-philosophy project 
Orrelle, E The Evolution of Social Complexity in the Southern Levant 
5500-3000BC 
Pardo M Family policies and gender equality in England and Germany ; 
the fathers' perspective 
Pitcher B The limits of British multiculturalism and the terms of 
legitimate cultural citizenship 
Pitcher D Meet the Family: Understanding adopted children and their 
grandparents 
Pizzey S J T The work of "guardians ad litem" in care proceedings 
Portonova S Autopo(i)eitcs – audiovisual stratifications and the active 
space of video 
Robinson M M R Possible links between experience in the first year of life and 
subsequent emotional and cognitive development 
Sales S Open adoption:  controversy, conflict & contradiction 
Shibli A Different Roles and conditions of Coverage for Western and 
Arab Media during the "War on Terror” 
Somun L Feminisms within a post-socialist Muslim context: the case of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Taylor H The view from here:  Cypriot refugees and the meaning of 
home in the metropolitan context of London 
Thomas D Who do you think you are?  Identity, Identification and 
Narcissistic Phantasy in the Psychic Structures of the Central 
Characters in the Prose Fiction of Kazuo Ishiguro 
Told M A gender perspective on transnationalism of the Sri lankan 
diaspora communities in Germany - influence on the ethnic-
nationalist conflict and peace-building in Sri Lanka 
Trafford J Virtual Agency of Nano-Bodies: Molecular Ethics, Affective 
Individuations, and Living Dust 
Vieten U Situating Cosmopolitanisms: A feminist discou the Other in 
contemporary discourses on cosmopolitanism in Britain and 
Germany 
Williams A Priests in the making or priests already?  Life stories of 
candidates for ordination in the Church of England 
Yeh D Performances of identity as forms of resistance in the cultural 
practices of Chinese artists in Britain from the 1930s to the 
present 
 
Appendix II 
The Conflict of the Faculties 
Derek Robbins 
 
Kant’s The Conflict of the Faculties was published in 1798.  It was divided into three parts, 
dealing with the conflict between the ‘lower’ or philosophical faculty and the three ‘higher’ 
faculties of theology, law, and medicine.  These three parts had been written separately in 
response to different situations but Kant decided to bring them together into one text.  This 
was one of the last books Kant published.  He was 74 years old and died six years later.  As 
you know from the synopsis of this presentation, I want to bring Kant’s text into relation 
with the thought of Bourdieu and some of his French contemporaries, before raising some 
questions about ‘situating cultural research’ in universities in England in the present. 
 
Before looking at Kant’s text, I want to make some introductory comments about the context 
of Kant’s production – firstly in relation to the political situation in Prussia in the 18th 
century; secondly in relation to the traditional structure of the curriculum before Kant; and, 
thirdly, in relation to the formulation of Kant’s thought in his three Critiques of the 1780s. 
 
First of all, the politics:  It was only during Kant’s lifetime that the balance of power shifted 
significantly away from the Holy Roman Empire towards the State of Prussia. In his The 
Decline of the German Mandarins.  The German Academic Community, 1890 – 1933 (Ringer, 
1969), Ringer offered a social history of the rise of a class of academic intellectuals in the 
new Prussia in the 18th Century and throughout the 19th Century.  Ringer contends that  
 
“Politically, it is the gradual transformation of an essentially feudal state into a 
heavily bureaucratic monarchy which favors the development of a strong and self-
conscious mandarin elite.”  (Ringer, 1969, 7) 
 
In order to counteract the power of the nobility, the reforming monarch sponsors the 
education of bourgeois state officials.  Although he retains the loyalty of these educated 
officials  by paying their salaries as civil servants, they begin to aspire to significance which 
is more than that of a class of state functionaries.  As Ringer puts it: 
 
“They demand to be recognized as a sort of spiritual nobility, to be raised above the 
class of their origins by their learning.  They think of themselves as broadly cultured 
men, and their ideal of personal cultivation affects their whole conception of 
learning.”  (Ringer, 1969, 9). 
   
According to Ringer, this elevation of the function of bourgeois academics took two forms.  
There was a legalistic orientation which attempted to prescribe constitutional arrangements 
which would safeguard the new relations between the monarchy and the people, but there 
was also a more ‘cultural’ orientation which wanted to argue that, in the absence of any 
remaining belief in the divine right of kings, the rational, administrative framework of the 
state lacked any sense of vital purpose.  The state should not operate as an administrative 
machine but should sponsor a cultural or spiritual vision.  Taking these two orientations 
together, the incipient mandarin elite were seeking to ensure that higher education would 
supply both the state functionaries and the state cultural visionaries.  During Kant’s last 
years, the work of some of his younger contemporaries exemplified these trends, on the one 
hand, for instance, Fichte’s The Science of Rights of 1796, and, on the other, Schelling’s 
System of transcendental Idealism of 1800. I shall come back to the implications of the work 
of these two ‘post-Kantians’ later but, for the moment, I am only concerned to point out that, 
formally, the bourgeois academics of the 1790s wanted to insist upon a regulated state and 
also the protection of intellectual freedom which would secure an affective raison d’être for 
that state.  As Ringer puts it again, it clearly followed from the aspirations of the new class 
of intellectuals that 
 
“… government must give material aid to the elite and that it must do so without 
demanding an immediate practical return.  The whole argument may actually be 
considered an extension of the notion that learning means spiritual ‘cultivation’”.  
(Ringer, 1969, 11).  
 
Ringer was attempting to trace the origins of the German crisis of 1933 in the development 
of liberal idealism in German thought during the 19th century, but I want to return now 
specifically to my second background point – to discuss the situation in which Kant found 
himself in the second half of the 18th century, and, in particular, to Kant’s position in relation 
to the university curriculum of his time. 
 
The classification of university knowledge was already fixed in the medieval period by the 
13th century, under the dominant influence of Bologna, Paris and Oxford, well before any 
universities had been founded in what is now Germany.  There was a distinction in the  
structure of learning between those disciplines – the ‘liberal arts’ - which were regarded as 
‘propaedeutic’ or preparatory, and the three properly superior disciplines – primarily ‘sacred 
knowledge’, that is to say biblical exegesis and Theology; Law; and Medicine.  
Conventionally, the preparatory ‘liberal arts’ were divided into the ‘trivium’ which were the 
arts of words and signs (grammar, rhetoric, and dialectics) and the ‘quadrivium’ which were 
the arts of things and numbers (arithmetic, music, astronomy, and geometry).  It is 
important to remember that in none of these cases were the studies in any sense empirical 
or, in our terms, ‘scientific’.  The assumptions were all scholastic.  The emphasis of 
instruction in the superior disciplines was on the exegesis of consecrated texts, whether in 
theology, law or medicine, whilst instruction in the liberal arts was based on classical texts 
such as, for geometry, the axioms of Euclid.  In places, particularly in Paris in the 13th 
century, the faculty of arts became transformed into a faculty of philosophy, but this only 
meant that the study of Aristotle’s Physics, Metaphysics and Ethics supplanted the study of 
his Organon, or treatises of Logic and the transformation did not alter the subordination of 
these studies to the three superior disciplines. 
 
About a dozen universities were established in Germany between 1378 and 1500, all the 
creation either of princes of small states or of the ecclesiastical authorities of the Holy 
Roman Empire.    The University of Königsberg, where Kant taught, was founded in 1544 in 
Prussia but this was before Prussia became absorbed into Brandenburg-Prussia at the end of 
the 17th Century.  Königsberg was a Baltic port which had been a significant member of the 
Hanseatic League.  It was fiercely bourgeois and independent and only succumbed to the 
authority of Brandenburg after it was invaded by the ‘Great Elector’ in 1674.  At this time, it 
was much larger than Berlin.  The ethos of the university was correspondingly independent.  
The newly established Prussian state had established two powerful new universities which 
were directly under its control – the University of Halle, founded in 1693, and the University 
of Göttingen, founded in 1733.  Halle trained the civil servants and bureaucrats of the 
Prussian state whilst Göttingen introduced curriculum reforms, teaching new subjects such 
as dance, design and modern languages as well as modern disciplines such as history, 
geography and physics, attracting the nobility from all over Germany to its courses.  By 
contrast, therefore, Kant began to teach at a university which was traditionally inclined to 
resist the characteristics of Halle and Göttingen by retaining bourgeois independence from 
state control.  The other point to remember about the organisation of knowledge in the 18th 
Century was that most innovatory thinking in science and philosophy occurred in the context 
of learned societies.  The Berlin Academy of Sciences was founded in 1700 in imitation of 
the British Royal Society, founded in 1662, and the French Académie des Sciences, founded 
in 1666. 
 
My third background point relates specifically to the development of Kant’s own thinking in 
relation to the political and curricular contexts which I have outlined.  Kant matriculated at 
the University of Königsberg in 1740.  Only five years before, Frederick William 1st had issued 
a decree which insisted that all students should choose to pursue studies in one of the three 
faculties – theology, law, and medicine - with a view to becoming state functionaries as 
priests, lawyers, or doctors.  The decree had stated categorically that ‘the pretext that they 
wish to apply themselves only to philosophy or a part thereof is under no circumstances to 
be accepted; but each shall declare himself for one of the higher faculties, and make it his 
business to derive at least some profit from these.’  (Quoted in Cassirer, Kant’s Life and 
Thought, 1981, 20-1).  Kant appears to have paid no attention to this decree, dabbling in the 
instruction offered in the higher faculties whilst involving him thoroughly in the philosophy 
and humanities learning of the lower faculty.  This led to all of his early publications which 
were concerned with physics and discussion of the philosophy of physics based on his 
reading, in particular, of Descartes and Leibniz.  His first publication of 1747, for instance, 
was entitled:  Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces.  The hallmark of Kant’s 
thinking was already apparent in that first publication.  He was less concerned to evaluate 
opposing explanatory systems of the external world than to analyse the conceptual basis of 
opposing systematisations.  At one point he actually made it clear that he was not opposing 
Leibniz’s objective explanations, “not actually the facts themselves, but the modus 
cognoscendi” (the form of knowing) (Quoted in Cassirer, 1981, 27). 
 
After this first publication, Kant became a private tutor for seven or nine years.  It is known 
that he gave his first lecture at the University of Königsberg in the autumn of 1755, and it is 
clear that his appointment was to teach in the lower faculty.  In the early years he lectured 
on logic, mathematics, metaphysics, physical geography, ethics, mechanics, and theoretical 
physics.  In other words, Kant’s teaching did not impinge upon or subvert the existing 
hierarchy of the faculties.  This was changed as a result of the influence of the non-university 
institution which I have mentioned – the Berlin Academy of Sciences.  For the year 1763, it 
announced a competition for a prize, inviting the submission of essays in response to the 
question:  “Are the metaphysical sciences amenable to the same certainty as the 
mathematical?”.  Kant did not win the prize but his entry was published as The Only Possible 
Basis of Proof for a Demonstration of God’s Existence.  You can see, therefore, that Kant was 
philosophizing not so as to offer the traditional preparatory training of the lower faculty for 
the higher faculties but, instead, so as to differentiate philosophy from Theology and to 
argue that there are limits to the exercise of reason in defending theological beliefs.  He was 
not questioning the validity of biblical exegesis and Christian understanding based on 
revelation, but he was determined to challenge the way in which reason was deployed to 
defend religious belief in the kind of rational theology that was dominant at the time.  This 
was the beginning of the project which led to the famous publications which, together, are 
known as Kant’s critical philosophy.  The first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason was 
published in 1781.  The Critique of Practical Reason, published in 1788, began life as part of 
the work of revision of the first Critique, the second edition of which was published in 1787.  
The Critique of the Power of Judgment was published in 1790.  I don’t want to get bogged 
down in the complexity of Kant’s thought, but I do need to make a few simple points.  The 
essence of Kant’s philosophy can be said to be that he achieved a reconciliation between the 
tradition of British empiricism and ‘continental’ rationalism, insisting that experience is 
necessary for the acquisition of knowledge but that, equally, knowledge is not exclusively 
derived from experience.  This was the overriding form of his thinking – the desire to insist 
on the a priori determination of experience – but the three Critiques elaborated this form in 
three different spheres.  
 
Crudely interpreted, Kant argued that there are a priori principles which govern our 
understanding of nature and, equally, a priori principles governing our inclinations to act in 
certain ways and not others, as well as a priori principles governing those things which give 
us pleasure or displeasure.  In these three areas, therefore, which came to become 
institutionalised as the philosophical sub-areas of metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics, we 
can establish a priori the boundaries of what we can know, do or feel rather than deduce 
these things from empirical observation of beliefs, morals or tastes.  The paradox of this 
endeavour, or, if you prefer, the fallacy, was to attempt to define rationally the 
characteristics of a priori reason.  The history of philosophy since Kant – in so-called post-
Kantianism, neo-Kantianism or even in Hegelian idealism - has been the history of attempts 
to sustain the status of the Kantian a priori in governing experience whilst, in a kind of 
obverse paradox, trying to derive its characteristics empirically, either by a form of 
subjectivism or by either psychological, historical or dialectical analyses. 
 
There are some grounds for supposing that Kant was himself moving away from an 
emphasis of a prioristic pure reason in relation to speculative metaphysics towards an 
emphasis of the free exercise of judgment in science as well as in ethics and aesthetics, even 
though the judgment still was thought to operate in accordance with a priori rules.  Kant 
published his Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view in 1798.  At first sight, this 
might seem to suggest from the title that Kant was proposing to analyse man pragmatically 
on the basis of what man culturally has made of man rather than scientifically on the basis of 
man’s biological characteristics, and there is, I think, this tendency in late Kant, but it is 
doubtful, nevertheless, whether he relinquished his insistence on human a priori rationality.  
I hope I have said enough now to situate Kant’s The Conflict of the Faculties, also published 
in 1798. 
 
Kant had dedicated many of his earlier works to Frederick II – Frederick the Great.  In What is 
Enlightenment, published in 1784, Kant had discussed Frederick’s motto which was:  “Argue 
as much as you will, about what you will, but obey”.  Frederick the Great, in other words, 
licensed freedom of speech and thought as long as it remained within the bounds of 
obedience to the state.  Kant had followed Frederick’s prescription and had developed his 
own modus operandi.   
Although Lutheranism was the Prussian state religion, Kant had avoided censorship under 
Frederick the Great by making a distinction between the personal and official exercise of 
reason.  However, Frederick the Great died in 1788.  He was succeeded by his nephew, 
Frederick William II who was religiously orthodox and mystically inclined and, in the same 
year, a new Minister of Justice was appointed, replacing the person to whom Kant had 
dedicated the Critique of Pure Reason.  A new Censorship Edict was enacted and enforced by 
a Censorship Commission.  It seems as if the editions of the three Critiques of the late 
1780s escaped censure.  However, Kant wrote Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason in 
1793.  It was in four parts.  The censor of philosophy judged that the first part fell under his 
jurisdiction and approved it for publication, but he considered that the second part fell 
under the jurisdiction of the censor for biblical theology who refused to approve it.  The full 
text was approved by the philosophy faculty of the University of Jena, but its publication 
aroused hostility towards Kant and, in 1795, the Censorship Commission issued an order to 
the senate of the University of Königsberg, forbidding any professor to lecture on Kant’s 
philosophy of religion.  This is the context in which, before 1794, Kant wrote The Conflict of 
the Philosophical Faculty with the Theology Faculty and the political situation explains why 
he thought it important subsequently to join this article with comparable pieces on the 
conflicts with the faculties of Law and Medicine. We have to remember, of course, that this 
was all happening in the decade immediately after the French Revolution of 1789 and at a 
time in which, in the UK, William Pitt suspended the Habeas Corpus Act as a result of his fear 
of pro-revolutionary activists. This morning, I want simply to look at aspects of the text of 
this essay as it was published in 1798 as the first part of The Conflict of the Faculties. 
 
In the Preface to The Conflict of the Faculties, Kant reproduced for the first time the letter he 
had received from the Censorship Commission on the publication of Religion within the 
Limits of Mere Reason.  It accused Kant of acting irresponsibly against his duty ‘as a teacher 
of youth’ and it required him to give an account of himself.  Kant also reproduced his reply.  
He invented a distinction between his role ‘as a teacher of youth’ and his role as a ‘teacher 
of the people’.  In relation to the former, he insisted that he had never mixed philosophical 
instruction with any evaluation of Christianity.  He had never been guilty of any 
transgression of disciplines and had, therefore, never denied the legitimacy of what was 
taught within the confines of theology.  As Kant put it: 
 
“ … since I have always censured and warned against the mistake of straying beyond 
the limits of the science at hand or mixing one science with another, this is the last 
fault I could be reproached with.”  (Kant, 1992, 13) 
 
However, Kant made a different kind of argument in relation to his role as a ‘teacher of the 
people’ – in his writings rather than in his academic teaching.  Whilst teachers of youth are 
obliged to transmit dogmatically the autonomous dispositions of their disciplines, whether 
in philosophy or theology, nevertheless it is the function of the university to encourage 
debate between faculties so that modified dogma can then be transmitted.    As he put this 
in the last paragraph of his Introduction to The Conflict of the Faculties: 
 
“It is absolutely essential that the learned community of the university also contain a 
faculty that is independent of the government’s command with regard to its 
teachings;  one that, having no commands to give, is free to evaluate everything, and 
concerns itself with the interests of the sciences, that is, with truth:  one in which 
reason is authorized to speak out publicly.  For without a faculty of this kind, the 
truth would not come to light (and this would be to the government’s own 
detriment); …” (Kant, 1992, 27, 29) 
 
 
I don’t have time this morning to go into detail about Kant’s full discussion of the 
relationship between philosophy and theology, law and medicine in The Conflict of the 
Faculties.  I would recommend that you read it – particularly the first part – On the Relation 
of the Faculties – of The Philosophy Faculty versus the Theology Faculty. It is time, instead,  
for me to take stock of my general argument.  I have tried to show that Kant taught within a 
system in which a new nation state saw the primary purpose of the university as being to 
deliver trained and obedient state functionaries.  He taught in the lower faculty which, since 
medieval origins, was thought to be subservient to the dominant faculties and where 
instruction was thought only to be preparatory to the dogmatic instruction which took place 
in these higher faculties.  Within the lower faculty, Kant developed a philosophy of 
knowledge which emphasized the a priori structural determinants of all forms of knowledge.  
In other words, he developed a position which was not just one amongst other possible 
philosophical positions but one which argued that the essential raison d’être of philosophy 
was to explore the limits of all forms of knowledge and their claims to truth.  The 
importance of The Conflict of the Faculties was that, in it, Kant sought to institutionalise the 
a priorism of his critical philosophy.  The philosophy faculty was to embody proactive 
consideration of the grounds of knowledge of everything communicated in the university 
and, as such, was to challenge the authoritarianism of the prescribed curriculum sponsored 
by the state. 
 
You might be forgiven for thinking that my account so far has been tacitly or tendentiously 
leading towards the recommendation of a return to Kant.  I shall certainly argue that the 
situation in which we are all researching and teaching is suffering from central state 
intrusion in a way which is analogous with the enlightened despotism of Frederick the Great 
but, somewhat sadly, there is no possibility of a simple reversion to the Kantian strategy of 
critical subversion.  I want now to examine briefly some of the complications inherent in the 
Kantian legacy so as then to generate some discussion about our current dilemma.  The 
complications mainly arise from the distorting effects of Napoleon’s domestic and imperial 
policies.   Within France, there were no universities in the 19th century until 1896.  The 22 
universities which had previously existed before 1789 were abolished by the Revolution.  
Instead, Napoleon instituted specialised écoles to offer professional and technical training 
and the old universities were fragmented into independent faculties.  Professors and 
teaching staff were state appointments and servants of the state.  This only began to change 
after the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 by which time the positivism of Comte was 
intellectually dominant.  In the Third Republic, from 1871, an attempt was made to borrow 
from the ideology of the German universities to establish institutions of higher education 
which would inculcate positivist values and methods in the service of a socially inclusive 
republic.  Durkheim’s establishment of social science went alongside a commitment to a 
conception of the social function of the university in securing social solidarity or cohesion.  
Napoleon’s military aggression had an unintended opposite effect on the development of 
German universities.  In the settlement of the Treaty of Tilsit of 1807, Prussia lost the 
territory which contained the University of Halle.  Plans were immediately made to establish 
a new university in Berlin and there was sophisticated debate about what should be the 
nature and function of the new institution.  Those most involved in the debate were a 
younger generation of post-Kantian philosophers, notably Schelling, Fichte, Schleiermacher, 
von Humboldt and Hegel.  These transformed the Kantian notion of a critical faculty within 
the university.  The post-Kantians undermined Kant’s commitment to rationality and 
emphasized, instead, the primacy of identity, either of the self or of the state, discovered 
through historical and cultural research.  Their influence contributed to the consolidation of 
an ideology of a liberal university which, as a total institution, performed the critical function 
for society which Kant had only envisaged for philosophy within the institution.  It was this 
ethos which dominated throughout the 19th Century in Prussia and generated German 
historical and cultural scholarship. At the end of the 19th Century, it generated the 
alternative, hermeneutic, philosophy of social science which we associate with Dilthey, 
Simmel and Weber. 
 
These alternative ideologies of universities are described in section 9 of Lyotard’s The 
Postmodern Condition.  He distinguished between what we might call the French and German 
ideologies.  The French ideology, he claims, was state-controlled because it sought to bring 
into being a participative society, whereas the German ideology sought to develop 
individuals independently of, even against, state regulation.  Two aspects of Lyotard’s 
description of the French ideology resonate with our situation in the UK currently.  Lyotard 
writes that, according to the French ideology, 
 
“All peoples have a right to science. …  the right to science must be reconquered.  It 
is understandable that this narrative would be directed more toward a politics of 
primary education, rather than of universities and high schools.”  (Lyotard, 1984, 31) 
 
Lyotard goes on to show that the apparent state-centredness of Napoleon’s reforms was not 
incompatible with the legacy of French Revolutionary thought: 
 
“ … even if imperial politics designated the institutions of higher education as a 
breeding ground for the officers of the State and secondarily, for the managers of 
civil society, it did so because the nation as a whole was supposed to win its freedom 
through the spread of new domains of knowledge to the population, a process to be 
effected through agencies and professions within which those cadres would fulfill 
their functions.  … The State resorts to the narrative of freedom every time it 
assumes direct control over the training of the ‘people’, under the name of the 
‘nation’, in order to point them down the path of progress.”  (Lyotard, 1984, 31-2) 
 
By contrast with the French ideology, Lyotard cites Schleiermacher to show that the essence 
of the German ideology was to think that 
 
“The great function to be fulfilled by the universities is to ‘lay open the whole body of 
learning and expound both the principles and the foundations of all knowledge’  
(Lyotard, 1984, 33). 
 
Lyotard indicates how readily a post-Kantian critical philosophy became conceptually and 
institutionally allied with Hegelian idealism.  Lyotard writes: 
 
“Philosophy must restore unity to learning, which has been scattered into separate 
sciences in laboratories and in pre-university education;  it can only achieve this in a 
language game that links the sciences together as moments in the becoming of 
spirit, in other words, which links them in a rational narration, or rather meta-
narration.  Hegel’s Encyclopedia (1817-27) attempts to realize this project of 
totalization, which was already present  in Fichte and Schelling in the form of the idea 
of the system.”  (Lyotard, 1984, 33-4)  
 
As I’m sure most of you know, the point of Lyotard’s representation of these two opposing 
ideologies – which he calls ‘narratives of legitimation’ - is to argue that, as meta-narratives, 
both are untenable.  Irrespective of the ebbing and flowing of fashion in modernist or 
postmodernist thinking, I think Lyotard’s The postmodern condition is a great book which 
still deserves very close attention.  Rather than engage fully with his solution to the problem 
he identifies, however, I want to use his diagnosis of the problem a little more before 
focusing on the solution, as advanced by Bourdieu, which I would prefer to recommend. 
 
I want to take four points from Lyotard.  The first is simply to note that Lyotard was trained 
as a philosopher who, as early as 1954, had written a short introduction to Phenomenology,  
and that he acknowledges in his Introduction to The Postmodern Condition, which was 
written as a report on knowledge to the Council of Universities of the Quebec government, 
that “It remains to be said that the author of the report is a philosopher, not an expert.” 
(Lyotard, 1984, xxv).  The second point to take is that announced by Lyotard in the first 
sentence of the book:   
 
“Our working hypothesis is that the status of knowledge is altered as societies enter 
what is known as the postindustrial age and cultures enter what is known as the 
postmodern age.” (Lyotard, 1984, 3) 
 
The manifestation of this hypothetical perception is thought to be the influence of 
computerization on knowledge.  Learning is in the process of becoming, as he puts it, 
‘translated into quantitites of information’ (Lyotard, 1984, 4).  This commodification of 
knowledge means that: 
 
“The old principle that the acquisition of knowledge is indissociable from the training 
(Bildung) of minds, or even of individuals, is becoming obsolete and will become ever 
more so.”  (Lyotard, 1984, 4) 
 
In other words, the cornerstone of the German ideology has collapsed and with it the whole 
structure of the liberal ideology of universities.  
 
The third point I want to take from Lyotard is that he deduced that the commodification of 
learning would have another important consequence: 
 
“For the mercantilization of knowledge is bound to affect the privilege that nation-
states have enjoyed, and still enjoy, with respect to the production and distribution 
of learning.  The notion that learning falls within the purview of the State, as the 
brain or mind of society, will become more and more outdated ….”  (Lyotard, 1984, 
5) 
 
In other words, the cornerstone of the French ideology has also collapsed and with it the 
whole notion of state-regulated higher education. 
 
My final point from Lyotard is to quote his description of the situation which necessarily 
arises from the collapse of these traditional forms of knowledge legitimation.  For Lyotard, 
the problem lies not in the kinds of legitimation adopted but in the notion of legitimation 
itself.  Although Lyotard does not make any reference to the conflict of the faculties, the 
consequence of Lyotard’s diagnosis must be that no conflict is possible because we no 
longer have any conception of arbitration or discrimination or inter-faculty knowledge 
judgement.  In what could be a description of our current situation, Lyotard writes: 
 
“The classical dividing lines between the various fields of science are thus called into 
question – disciplines disappear, overlappings occur at the borders between sciences, 
and from these new territories are born.  The speculative hierarchy of learning gives 
way to an immanent and, as it were, ‘flat’ network of areas of inquiry, the respective 
frontiers of which are in constant flux.  The old ‘faculties’ splinter into institutes and 
foundations of all kinds, and the universities lose their function of speculative 
legitimation.  Stripped of the responsibility for research (which was stifled by the 
speculative narrative), they limit themselves to the transmission of what is judged to 
be established knowledge, and through didactics they guarantee the replication of 
teachers rather than the production of researchers.”  (Lyotard, 1984, 39) 
 
Before you get too depressed by this account which, for me, was extraordinarily prescient, I 
want to move to my preferred solution whilst also taking a glancing swipe at some other 
inadequate solutions. 
 
Lyotard derived much of his knowledge of the development of the German ideology from a 
text, which he cites in footnote 108 of The Postmodern condition.  This was a collection of 
translations of German idealist articles on the university which was published in 1979 – the 
same year as La condition postmoderne – as Philosophies de l’université.  L’idéalisme 
allemand et la question de l’université.  The collection was edited by philosophers associated 
with the Collège de Philosophie which was a development largely sponsored by Derrida 
which was committed to retaining the centrality of philosophical training in French 
education.  One of the editors, incidentally, was Luc Ferry who subsequently became Minister 
of Education in the Raffarin government not too long ago.  Most of the selected articles 
which had first been written at the beginning of the 19th Century in connection with the 
founding of the University of Berlin in 1810 were translations into French of a similar 
collection which had been published in Germany in 1956 as Die Idee der deutschen 
Universität.  My point is that in both countries, reference back was made to the German 
liberal idealist ideology of the university to seek to establish a philosophical basis for 
proposing university reform, in the case of Germany at the point of reconstruction after the 
Second World War, and, in the case of France, in the period after the May events of 1968.  I 
haven’t got time to look in detail at Habermas’s response but only to give a brief sketch.  In 
the 1950s, he did his doctoral research on Schelling – one of the post-Kantian idealist 
philosophers.  His inaugural lecture as Professor of Social Philosophy at Frankfurt, given in 
1965, began with a critique of Schelling (published as the appendix to Knowledge and 
Human Interests, 1971) but it is clear from a lecture which he gave just two years later 
(published as “The University in a Democracy – Democratization of the University” as chapter 
1 of Toward a Rational Society, 1971) that he regarded it as being the social function of the 
university to counteract the tendency of new institutions of higher learning to become 
exclusively technological or commercial and primarily agents of economic regeneration.  In 
other work of the same period, Habermas explored philosophically the relations between the 
positivist and hermeneutic traditions in the social sciences (in On the Logic of the Social 
Sciences, first published in 1970) and, historically, The Structural Transformation of the 
Public Sphere, first published in 1962, but at no time did he relinquish the discourse of 
philosophy or the social space within which that discourse might be offered.  Similarly, 
Foucault’s critique of Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic point of view, which Foucault 
presented as his second doctoral thesis in 1961 alongside his translation of Kant’s text, 
published in 1964, was a philosophical critique in which he concluded by recommending the 
superior relevance of Nietzschean philosophy.  Habermas’s critique of Foucault, published in 
1985 in his The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity is a critique which actually sustains the 
legitimacy of the autonomous discourse within which they both confronted each other. 
 
By contrast, Bourdieu argued that the philosophical perspective was a part of the problem.  
Philosophical discussion about universities tacitly sustained the liberal notion of the 
centrality of philosophy to the function of universities.  In a famous passage, Bourdieu 
attacked the way in which many of his contemporaries were generating new pseudo-sciences 
to disguise the way in which they were actually operating still philosophically rather than 
scientifically.  He called this the “’-ology effect’” and singled out for criticism the use of 
‘archaeology, grammatology and semiology’, clearly therefore condemning Foucault, 
Derrida, and Barthes, and he commented retrospectively: 
 
“I think that just at that time what was necessary was to question the status of 
philosopher and all its prestige so as to carry out a true conversion into science”  
(Bourdieu, 1990, 6) 
 
As early as 1967, Bourdieu and Passeron produced an article entitled “Sociology and 
Philosophy in France since 1945:  Death and Resurrection of a Philosophy without Subject” in 
which they argued that the dominant Lévi-Straussian structuralist social anthropology of the 
time was the culmination of a movement which had wrongly reinserted humanistic values 
into the practice of positivist social science.  For Bourdieu, the human dimension of science 
has to be accommodated by understanding the social conditions of its generic construction 
rather than by attempting to modify the defining characteristics of its operation.  In 1975, 
Bourdieu wrote the article on which his book entitled The Political Ontology of Martin 
Heidegger was based.  Here again, Bourdieu argued that the fallacy of Heidegger’s thinking 
was that it presented itself as ‘pure’ philosophy whilst in fact it incorporated elements of 
contemporary fascist thinking.  The way to counteract Heidegger’s philosophy was to expose 
the extent to which it was an impure product of the social conditions in which it was 
generated.  Bourdieu’s Pascalian Meditations of the early 1990s was his most developed 
critique of institutionalised philosophy. 
 
In effect, Bourdieu proposed that sociological analysis should fulfill the function originally 
proposed for philosophy by Kant.  It is significant that Bourdieu consistently opposed 
philosophical idealism whilst, throughout his work, there were echoes of both Leibniz and 
Kant.  In a paper of 1989, published in English in 1992 as “Thinking about Limits”, it is clear 
that Bourdieu thought that sociology could be used to oppose state intellectual intervention 
in the same way as Kant had proposed for philosophy – by defining the boundaries of 
legitimate concern of competing disciplines - as opposed to the way envisaged by the post-
Kantian tradition which was to encourage imperialist philosophy rather than philosophy as a 
device for intellectual arbitration.  This was the framework of Bourdieu’s programme of 
research from the early 1960s onwards.  The Inheritors of 1964 was based on an analysis of 
the social conditions causing students in French universities to choose between the study of 
Sociology and Philosophy.  It was, therefore, a sociological analysis of the conflict between 
the two faculties, as perceived by the students.  Reproduction in Education, Society and 
Culture of 1970 attempted to provide a conceptual framework for systematically analysing 
the conditions of production in universities of different curriculum content.  It offered a 
framework for understanding sociologically the conflict between faculties at the level of 
transmission rather than at the level of student reception.   
 
However, Bourdieu was not engaged in a process which would simply elevate sociology as a 
meta-analytical discourse in place of philosophy.  At first, in 1968, he edited, with others, 
The Craft of Sociology, in which he argued that sociological research also necessitated a 
sociological reflexion on the social grounds of its own existence.  This has often been 
interpreted as just a recommendation for securing the scientificity of social science as an 
autonomous discourse, but, at the same time, Bourdieu began to deploy sociological 
analysis to clarify the boundaries between disciplines in French universities.  He carried out a 
sociological analysis of the production of knowledge in Parisian universities on the eve of the 
May events of 1968.  During the 1970s he refined his conceptual framework.  We all inherit 
social and intellectual dispositions, which he called our habitus.  These subjective 
dispositions are articulated as we position our lives and our thinking in relation to objective 
social and intellectual structures which have been constructed historically.  Our own 
position-taking constantly modifies the objective structures with which we inter-act 
reciprocally.  He argued, for instance, that in 1962, socially privileged students could afford 
to take the risk of studying the new subject of sociology whereas socially underprivileged 
students sought to buy into the security of the established discipline of philosophy.  
However, importantly, the consequence of these actions was that the status of these 
disciplines themselves would change so that gradually the study of sociology would become 
as secure as the study of philosophy.  The structure of disciplines, therefore, is not absolute 
but constantly contingent, dependent amongst other things on the attitudes of those 
studying them.  Bourdieu first articulated this most clearly in Distinction, published in 1979 
with the sub-title which has a deliberate relation to the work of Kant:  ‘a social critique of 
judgment’.  This was a work, published in the same year as Lyotard’s La condition 
postmoderne, in which Bourdieu acknowledged that our tastes – of wine, beer, golf, rugby, 
soccer, etc. – are not autonomous tastes with intrinsic absolute values, but, instead, 
acquisitions which function for us in our social position-taking.  Like Lyotard, in other words, 
Bourdieu recognized that tastes and, equally, knowledge, have lost their ‘Bildung’ capacity, 
their capacity to influence or modify personal character.  They have become commodities 
which have value in exchange and which we deploy for our social advantage.  The important 
thing is to understand the competitive process of position-taking – the drive towards 
‘distinction’ – rather than to try to formulate value judgments about tastes which are only 
pawns in the social game. Bourdieu confronted Kant head-on in a ‘postscript’ entitled:  
“Towards a ‘vulgar’ critique of ‘pure’ critiques”.  As we have seen, Kant was disposed to 
believe in an a priori faculty of judgment.  Tacitly following the analyses of Kant made by 
Lucien Goldmann, Bourdieu argued that Kant’s a priori was the product of his bourgeois 
class position. The origins of Kant’s willingness to identify universal criteria of beauty and to 
despise the cultural tastes of the vulgar had to be understood sociologically.  In the same 
postscript, Bourdieu attacked Derrida’s philosophical critique of Kant.  Bourdieu’s position 
was not anti-Kantian so much as a sociological extension of Kantianism which would enable 
the social judgment of ‘low’ cultural activities to be taken as seriously as the judgment of 
canonical ‘high’ culture. 
 
It was a short move for Bourdieu from Distinction to consideration of the kinds of issues 
raised by Lyotard in La condition postmoderne.  In writing Homo Academicus in 1984, 
Bourdieu’s analysis was resolutely sociological.  He revisited the sociology of knowledge 
analysis of Parisian universities which he had undertaken in 1968 and interpreted his 
findings in the light of the kind of reciprocal relationship between structure and agency 
which he had worked out in relation to taste in Distinction.  In trying to demonstrate 
sociologically the way in which the conflicts between faculties correspond with the relative 
‘cultural capital’ which these faculties possess in relation to intrinsic intellectual status or 
extrinsic social, economic, or political power, Bourdieu was also deeply conscious that his 
analysis had to be reflexive.  If he was to avoid the charge of elevating sociological analysis 
to the level of detached philosophical scrutiny after the manner of Kant and to avoid the 
charge that he was simply replacing bourgeois philosophy with bourgeois sociology, 
Bourdieu knew that he had to acknowledge that his own analytical perspective was situated 
within the game that he was analysing. 
 
I don’t have time to assess in detail Bourdieu’s Homo Academicus.  Again, I simply urge you 
to read this text and, particularly, to read the preface which he wrote for the English 
translation when it was published in 1988.  I can only extract a few comments in order to 
lead into my own concluding recommendations in this paper.  Bourdieu’s first chapter 
discusses the methodological difficulties encountered in seeking to be reflexive about the 
situation in which we are engaged in research.  He writes first of all: 
 
“There is no object that does not imply a viewpoint, even if it is an object produced 
with the intention of abolishing one’s viewpoint (that is, one’s bias), the intention of 
overcoming the partial perspective that is associated with holding a position within 
the space being studied.”  (Bourdieu, 1988, 6) 
 
Not only do we need to reflect on our own viewpoint irrespective of the object of our 
research enquiry, we also, according to Bourdieu, derive benefits from subjecting to scrutiny 
the system of classification of our research within the university environment.  Bourdieu 
continued: 
 
“… we can only avoid claiming that the truth of the university field is one or other of 
the more or less rationalized representations which are engendered in the struggle 
for classification, and especially the semi-scholarly representations which scholarly 
circles give of themselves, if we include in our study the process of classification 
effected by the researcher, and the relationship between that and the classificatory 
attributions indulged in by the agents (and by the researcher himself, once he is not 
directly involved in research).”  (Bourdieu, 1988, 11-12) 
 
One of the constant emphases of Bourdieu’s position was that we should take care not to 
allow the existing structure of knowledge organisation within the university to define the 
parameters of research which is about a wider social reality of which the university itself is 
only a part.  Given that universities hold a defined position and status within society at any 
time, Bourdieu is saying, in other words, that all researchers need to analyse sociologically 
those particular conditions so as to ensure that their research is not simply self-fulfillingly 
reaffirming the perspective of the institution within which it is undertaken.  It was the 
second chapter of Homo Academicus which was entitled “The Conflict of the Faculties” and 
which was headed by a quotation from Kant’s text.  Here Bourdieu outlined in great 
empirical detail the consequences of his attempt to sociologise Kant’s inclination to 
conceptually define the limits of the knowledges offered within universities, particularly 
those which communicated knowledge in accordance with the dictates of state authority.  
Rather than pursue this further, however, I want instead to point out the next stage of the 
logic of Bourdieu’s position.  He carried out research on the relative status of all the 84 
grandes écoles in France, analysing the relationships between the social origins of students, 
admission policies, curriculum content, and assessment procedures.  This work was 
published in 1989 as La noblesse d’état, and published in English in 1996 as The State 
Nobility.  Whereas Homo Academicus encouraged the reflexive analysis of the conflict 
between faculties within one institution, La noblesse d’état extended this to encourage the 
analysis of the differentiations between institutions and the consequent gradations of access 
to political power and economic opportunity. 
 
I want to conclude by extracting some points from my discussion in relation to the situation 
currently in the UK and by suggesting some orientations which you should try to keep in 
mind during this conference when considering ‘Contexts, Fields, Positions:  Situating 
Cultural Research’.  This conference offers a great opportunity for a kind of collective 
reflexivity.  It brings together research students from a range of universities – mainly UK, but 
not exclusively – who are undertaking research within the framework of a range of 
disciplines, perhaps Cultural Studies, Anthropology, Sociology in particular.  Without wanting 
to become too polemical, I am suggesting that UK higher education is currently in a state of 
ideological confusion.  Until the late 1960s, the situation was still quite clear.  The dominant 
ideology of British universities was what, following Lyotard, I have been characterising as the 
German ideology.  The expansion proposed by the Robbins Report of 1963 which led to the 
establishment of the new universities of the late 1960s was an expansion which only 
cautiously extended the proportion of the population which might be offered the social 
advantages to be derived from a liberal university education.  The establishment of the 
polytechnics at the end of the 1960s did not at first alter that ideological domination 
because the ‘binary’ division was thought to legitimate a co-existence between the German 
and French ideologies, whereby the universities fulfilled liberal functions and the 
polytechnics fulfilled vocational functions.  From the outset, most of the polytechnics 
refused to accept that role differentiation and, after the abolition of the binary division in the 
early 1990s, the so-called market of universities euphemised a clash of ideologies where the 
older universities have continued to be associated with the cultivation of superior minds and 
preparation for superior careers whilst the new universities struggle to avoid relegation to 
teaching institutions even though the supposed differentiations of quality of provision are 
normally spurious.  Building on Mrs. Thatcher’s attempt to make all universities economically 
productive and accountable, the post-1997 Labour governments have attempted, as Lyotard 
could have predicted, to introduce increasing state-controlled regulation whilst retaining the 
language of choice but, in doing so, have failed to take any steps to challenge the perceived  
hierarchy of universities between which choice is supposedly exercised.  Again, as Lyotard 
could have predicted, the strategy of regulation was at first preoccupied with primary and 
secondary education but, as you will all know, it is beginning now to encroach on real 
freedom of choice in research by tightly regulating research training and, incipiently, 
determining which universities should be authorised to support research students.  As 
Lyotard could further have predicted, this state regulation is introduced in the interest of 
increasing the economic competitiveness of the UK whilst simultaneously encouraging a 
selected minority of universities to become multinational corporations trading commodified 
knowledge internationally.  The collapse of the state legitimation narrative co-exists with the 
increased exercise of state control over knowledge production. 
 
The solution to this predicament which I prefer is derived from Bourdieu.  I contend that all 
the forces are currently conspiring to encourage you all, as research students, to close your 
eyes to the ways in which your research activities are conceptually or institutionally framed.  
If the Arts and Humanities Research Council funds research scholarships within the 
framework of a map of learning which is still dominated by the conventional demarcations of 
the humanities of liberal institutions, most students in most UK universities are structurally 
excluded from the competition and are deprived of the power to modify that structure of 
knowledge as a result of their research.  In a situation of relative impotence, most students 
are forced to opt to operate within the knowledge demarcation legitimated by their 
institution and hope that the guarantee offered by their institution’s status will secure 
general recognition.  I am suggesting that there is a danger that this will tend to acquiesce 
in perpetuating a hierarchy of research practices which, in turn, will tend to acquiesce in a 
dysfunctional alienation of academic research from the real social and cultural problems of 
the country or the world.  I would, therefore, like to encourage you to be reflexive on three 
levels, the personal, the disciplinary, and the institutional.  First of all, ask yourselves what it 
was in the reciprocity between your inherited dispositions and your encounter with social 
structures which led you to articulate the particular problem which you are now researching.  
Secondly, what are the social historical conditions of existence of the intellectual field within 
which you have chosen to situate your enquiry.  How are your research problems 
conditioned by the discourse within which they are conceptualised?  Is it possible to carry 
out the ‘same’ research in the field of sociology, psychology, anthropology, or Cultural 
Studies, for instance?  Thirdly, the social historical conditions of existence of disciplines 
relate closely to the social historical conditions of existence of institutions.  As we have 
seen, the ideologies of French and German universities are historically different and, as I 
have suggested, the ideologies of British institutions are now very confused.  Ask yourselves 
how far the study of the ‘same’ cultural phenomenon is the ‘same’ when it is undertaken at 
the university of Durham or Middlesex or Strasbourg, or Leipzig, or Ibadan or Princeton, for 
instance. 
 
I have only one last point.  As Bourdieu insisted, I have to acknowledge that my perspective 
on your situation is a product of my own situation as it has developed in the course of my 
career, first of all as a research student at Cambridge and then, since 1969, as a lecturer at 
this institution.  I have to register this reflexively and so do you.  The book which is due out 
shortly to which Ben has referred, entitled On Bourdieu, Education and Society (Robbins, 
2006), attempts to provide the information which will enable you to analyse sociologically 
the relevance both of Bourdieu’s thinking and of my interpretation of his thinking.  I hope 
you will look at this book when it comes out.  After that, it is up to you to reflect on your 
own situations and to manipulate the conflict of the faculties to your own ends so as to 
participate proactively in an equitable society. 
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